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 1 
Introduction:  
 
The Subjunctive Aesthetic 
 
The success,  
Although particular, shall give a scantling 
Of good or bad unto the general— 
And in such indices, although small pricks 
To their subsequent volumes, there is seen 
The baby figure of the giant mass 
Of things to come at large. 
Troilus and Cressida 1.3.334-40 
 
The words above express a beginning that is not a beginning. They predict the arrival of a 
larger object. A baby figure of a giant mass. An index and its subsequent volumes. The general 
from the particular. According to Nestor in Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida, these are the 
images that define what “shall” give a scantling of the “good or bad” to the Greek and Trojan 
armies’ martial designs. Nestor is discussing a potential meeting of Hector and Achilles, a battle 
that should serve as an example for each group’s larger designs. He construes this meeting as a 
kind of planning. It is literary, made of indexes and volumes, as well as military advice, made up 
of practical considerations in a particular moment of the Trojan War. His prediction is also a 
“baby figure,” a small image that leads to a “giant mass of things to come.” This development is 
strange. A large “mass” is not an adult. Nestor’s words transform the initial figure of a potential 
person and unfix it, subsuming the baby figure by the ranging mass that follows. In this mass, the 
deliberations on what is to come implicates an overlap of options—a “good or bad”—in the 
process of working toward the future. The multiple opposed outcomes of the potential meeting 
and the war itself are suspended, possible, and of thrilling importance, defined somehow by their 
lack of clarity. This haziness of the uncertain “or” in “good or bad” connects, in this moment, to 
the “figure,” or the visual summary of these possibilities. In short, Nestor is grappling with the 
mechanics of plotting a future in visual terms, confronting the process of finding a practical route 
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to achieve what are, at least initially, unreal ends. In his miniature plot for the future, he sees an 
experience that mixes the imaginary and the real. From Nestor’s words, I find an appropriate 
“scantling index” for introducing this dissertation. As Troilus and Cressida looks backward at 
the mythic Trojan War from Shakespeare’s moment and finds people considering options, I look 
backward to planning in the early modern period. In early modern England, planning connects to 
a range of narrative and imagistic forms of potential. My plan for the dissertation defines success 
not in the achieving of a single goal, but in outlining the suspension and preservation of a range 
of possible outcomes, in finding a way to maintain both the “good or bad” that Nestor engages. 
The connection of the baby figure and great mass of Shakespeare’s lines demonstrates a 
particular example of a narrative-image multiplicity that I call the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
This dissertation studies the way early modern English writers and illustrators plot 
provisional outcomes across texts and images. In particular, I analyze visual sources and the 
relationship among early modern architecture, probability, and narrative. My work is, above all, 
an exploration of plans. Investigating examples drawn from both the literary and non-literary, I 
outline a constellation of image, narrative, and potential that I call the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
This phrase, which I comment on more extensively below, draws on the key grammatical 
inflection that defines the provisional nature of the Aesthetic in language, and that the “shall” of 
Nestor’s quote above hints at—the particles may, should, would, could, and might.1 “Shall,” in 
                                                 
1 The Subjunctive is a matter of debate and confusion in English linguistics and has been since 
early modern grammarians discussed it (see footnote 16 below). For the increasing obsolescence 
of the form in English, as well as the controversy over defining the form, see Kovacs, Eva. “On 
the Development of the Subjunctive from Early Modern English to Present-Day English.” Eger 
Journal of English Studies. IX (2009).  
“Shall” and “should,” in particular often blend into each other, with some definitions pushing an 
indicative reading and some suggesting the subjunctive for either word. In my reading, “shall 
give,” in Nestor’s quote is conditional and subjunctive, as he is discussing what would happen 
“if” Achilles were to battle Hector. This aligns with the OED’s I.6 definition. “Shall” is 
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the quote above is provisional; it follows Nestor’s earlier words about what would happen “if” 
Achilles were to fight Hector. Yet it also has forward movement and speaks to a possible future. 
It is a conditional statement charged with potential activity. In the course of my dissertation, I 
demonstrate that this provisional language connects to visual images, or the “figure” in Nestor’s 
quote. Though I also reference various figures in several other images and discourses, this 
dissertation mainly draws on architectural pieces. Architecture, as will become clear, inhabits the 
space of the Subjunctive Aesthetic not only because it is itself an image and narrative but also 
because architecture attempts to bring about a specific end in calculating and working through 
probabilities through that visual narrative.2 Nonetheless, this book would not be necessary if the 
connection between architecture and conditional narratives was not also obscure, as hinted by 
Nestor’s confusing connection of the “baby figure” to “the giant mass of things to come.” This 
ambiguity, I claim, is not a distraction, but an essential aspect of narrative meaning making in the 
early modern period. Ultimately, this dissertation analyzes architecture in order to define how a 
ranging umbra of narrative-images can illuminate early modern representations of a provisional 
multiplicity in other narratives. 
 
A Narrative Form of Probability 
Overall, I construe this dissertation as a work of narrative analysis. Yet it also challenges 
definitions of narrative as sequential events in time. The first difficulty is that the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic has a strange relationship to time, seemingly moving toward the future while also 
emphasizing the anachronism of forward projection. Subjunctive image-narratives take place in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
commonly subjunctive only as the past tense of “should,” but the “good or bad,” makes this shall 
something more than an indicative statement of what will happen. 
2 For a helpful summary of architecture in England see Summerson, John.  Architecture in 
Britain 1530-1830.  (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993). 
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particular moment of time, transitioning from earlier medieval representations of building 
planning and later forms of design, while also self-consciously peering backward and forward in 
time. Early modern architecture is one of the earliest fields that first use the term Renaissance, 
looking back at Roman ruins and incorporating medieval building techniques while also prizing 
innovation and novelty. Because of this strange tension, it is easy to locate modern tendencies in 
provisional narratives like architecture, a tendency my dissertation resists. In our contemporary 
moment, plans are more fixed than they are in the early modern period, coloring assumptions of 
what planning means in the past. For example, Nestor’s phrase “the great mass of things to 
come.” appears to predict a more modern version of the saying—“the shape of things to come.”3 
For many dictionary editors, the phrases would probably be similar enough to cite Shakespeare 
as the earliest etymology of the later phrase. But trying to understand how Nestor’s words about 
“the great mass,” are tied to “the shape,” produces several difficult representational questions 
that challenge this etymology and make it a productive site of analysis. Is there a difference 
between the modern phrase and Shakespeare’s “giant mass?” If so, what is the difference 
between the shape of things to come and “the giant mass”? Are both masses and shapes 
somehow a guiding representational technique to describe the future? Does Shakespeare’s 
“mass” also have a shape? Is the “mass of things to come” material or is it imaginary? Do things 
to come only belong to the future, or do other categories of time—say the past—also have a 
mass?  
To begin addressing these questions about the temporality of provisional representations, 
I begin by contending that the Subjunctive Aesthetic relates to a category of perception now 
called probability, which attempts to specify degrees of potential. Most analyses attribute the 
                                                 
3 Usually attributed to H.G. Wells. 
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birth of modern probability to Pascal and Fermat in the late 17th century. The two 
mathematicians and philosophers certainly introduce statistical calculation to explorations of the 
likely and unlikely, but I believe that the shift to this statistical form has a pre-history that 
connects to architecture and narratives that incorporate the subjunctive mood.4 Though I say 
more about the term probability below and in several of my chapters, I bring it up now to 
emphasize that my dissertation historicizes the early modern engagement with probability as a 
category perception by exploring images and narratives. An assumption in this analysis is that 
perceptions can change over time and thus a definition of probability in any moment necessarily 
requires a contrast.5 In early modern texts and images, I argue probability is a non-paradoxical 
multiplicity within a text or image that does not privilege defined trajectories. This definition is 
related to but distinct from statistical measurements of the likelihood of an event. In the early 
modern texts I analyze, probability can describe coexisting or even potentially conflicting events, 
spaces, and narratives contained in a representational field. Using probability as a guiding term, I 
argue that the Subjunctive Aesthetic makes images into narratives, and defines narrative by a 
visual range. 
Using probability as I do in this work to describe the narrative-image perception of 
potential may be slightly anachronistic, but this anachronism is also in the spirit of the 
Subjunctive Aesthetic. I place the Aesthetic in the early modern, but I must necessarily look 
askance at other moments in potential time periods. Plans, as Nestor’s words suggest, often look 
forward, and their anachronism is a primary narrative aspect of the Subjunctive Aesthetic.6 
Defining planning in this way is not unique to the early modern period. In my moment, for 
                                                 
4 As with any origin story, there are older versions of statistical calculation. 
5 Chapter one also deals with the ways representations of time and space change over time. 
6 For a survey of the future in early modern Europe see Brady, Andrea and Butterworth, Emily.  
The Uses of the Future in the Early Modern. (New York: Routledge, 2010).  
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example, I see the effects of the calculations of the past. The government that makes my laws, 
the streets where I walk—all designed at some point in the past with a future time in mind. My 
embodied experience of these edifices and institutions might not always register their designed 
aspect, their relation to probability, or their anachronism, but occasionally the plan of something 
becomes vital and immanent. These modern moments when I become aware of probability and 
the past looking forward are often similar to early modern encounters with the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic. But the early modern places a special emphasis on the destabilizing suspension 
involved in such representations.  
Architectural plans formed the starting point for my analysis, and remain the clearest 
example of the Aesthetic. Most of the works I explore draw out or focus on moments of 
planning. To explain why and how plans represent multiple possibilities through space/time and 
to understand why plans are a privileged site of analysis, it is helpful to survey the broad features 
of a plan. Although some of what I claim may appear obvious, the total effect illustrates why 
plans are helpful for literary critique. To begin, plans are both practical and fantastic. Their goals 
can be mundane or otherworldly, but they utilize the same outlining of specific steps for 
completion. Plans use abstraction, usually some type of proportion, shape, or mental comparison, 
in order to manipulate physical objects and/or people. Plans utilize both imagination and 
material, and they also blend the two categories. Although some readers might assume an reality 
predicted by plans, I do not believe that a plan’s wall is a real stone, or potential stone, or if such 
distinctions are the important ones in the piece. As a second important point, plans typically, 
though not always, look from a present moment toward a future, with the aim of controlling or 
bringing about a desired end. In order to bring about these desired ends, plans have several 
stylistic features. They self-consciously announce intention. This intention should not be 
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confused with the often-taboo idea of authorial intention. Early modern English architectural 
plans from the Elizabethan and Jacobean eras in particular often do not have a defined author. 
Some even clearly have several authors. But even when plans have a name attached, the 
intention defined by the plan is not the same as the masterful control of the author. In their own 
moment, plans announce their intention in order to bring about that intention. They have no 
guarantees of success, no complete text for verification. As such plans exist on a strange scale of 
tautology and contingency.  Plans imbricate their intention with the failure to bring about the 
desired end, as well as multiple other iterations of foreseen and unforeseen possibilities. This 
openness is partly what makes plans so powerful, and explains their appeal in the Tudor and 
Jacobean regimes. Plans are rarely useless, even when widely off the perception of what is 
ostensibly real. Finally, plans, in both narrative and image, are a unique genre of their own. As 
an indicator of the Subjunctive Aesthetic’s versatile form, the imagery and style of plans remain 
consistent whether uttered in a practical setting or fantasy text. Designing a building project in 
The Faerie Queene uses an identical style as designing a building in Queen Elizabeth’s England.  
To capture what planning means for this dissertation’s image-narratives and the 
predominance of probability, of that which does not strictly happen, my dissertation’s title looks 
ahead to my final chapter, in Macbeth’s monologue about the titular character’s own plots. As 
Macbeth inches toward a successful and ghastly scheme he says, “Nothing is but what is not.” 
His words relate to his immediate emotional state, but they also appear to capture the pathos of 
the modern predicament of being trapped by someone else’s plans. This notion, however, takes 
Macbeth’s words out of their context. Looking backward to Macbeth as his past projects forward 
reveals many potential timelines in the Subjunctive Aesthetic, many ways things could have 
been. I pull Macbeth’s words from the play and shake loose their monologue, but I do so to 
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emphasize that his pain is just one possible emotional encounter with probability. Macbeth may 
be horrified by his designs, but he is not afraid of being trapped in the way contemporary plans 
seem to restrict options. Although the Subjunctive Aesthetic can seem overwhelming and 
restrictive, it can also generate wonder, doubt, or joy. In this multiplicitous Aesthetic, I attempt 
to recover and uncover a sense of planning as building, as constructing, as imaginative and 
material labor; a means of acknowledging and working through a range of outcomes without 
privileging achievement. The title of my dissertation, “Nothing is but what is not” is suggestive, 
not a summary. Instead of existence and non-existence, I see a range of probable images and 
narratives that define not only literary fantasies, but also practical reality. 
 
The Critical Impact of the Subjunctive Aesthetic 
Part of the reason I focus on planning as a form of narrative is because the image and 
writing of architectural design defines ongoing academic modes of analysis in the humanities. 
Despite repeated challenges to settled categories, for literary critics, philosophers, and others, 
architecture is often a transparent means of representation, a fixed system that specific 
interpretations defy or work against. Architecture is a tool for building. Upon scrutiny, however, 
architecture is a specific development that is not just a fixed system in some versions of Marxist 
analyses or in certain accounts of Foucauldian epistemologies. Architecture is a style of image 
and narrative of its own that changes based on its context. This ambiguity is exacerbated by the 
fact that architecture incorporates likelihood, as a probabilistic form of intention built into the 
plan. And probability, as I argue, has a different meaning in different times. Supporting this 
notion, a recent work by Rudiger Campe develops the history of probability in a different 
cultural context at a slightly later time period. Beginning with Pascal he illustrates the 
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development of modern definitions of probability. 7  My work is another step in a potentially 
wide network of comparisons regarding probability. Like other projects that historicize 
perception and seek out other ways of knowing, an obvious payoff of these analyses for early 
modern studies is an enrichment and new vigor for the understanding of the complexities of 
seemingly well-worn texts like Paradise Lost, Novum Organum, and Shakespeare’s plays.  
Historicizing probability also has an ethical dimension, in that my analysis reframes the 
anonymous and/or oft-ignored authors, painters, and architects of the many plans I explore. With 
the Subjunctive Aesthetic in mind, these understudied writers and draughters become primary 
actors for an entire movement. As a practical art, building plans are often associated with a lower 
class of person than critics can usually access through early modern writings. But architecture is 
a discourse also employed some of the most influential people in early modern England. 
Planning connects the unwritten and the written, giving a limited measure of contact to those 
without cultural capital or even literacy. Finally, the historical analyses of perceptual categories 
force us to think critically about what we deem our own perceptions. Too often critics fail to 
acknowledge how our own definitions of the likely and the unlikely predict how we approach 
and proceed through a text. The Subjunctive Aesthetic gathers a whole field where the issue 
cannot be ignored. Plans show how any teleology must account for probability, likelihood, and 
unforeseen contingency. This is partially an ethical insight, but more importantly it is useful 
across historical eras and even other disciplines. 
The most important critical discussion this dissertation addresses is the one that grapples 
with what counts as narrative. Texts and images of the Aesthetic work with the specific demands 
of their time in order to define what is probable and what is improbable. In doing so, the images 
                                                 
7 Campe, Rudiger. The Game of Probability. Trans. Wiggins, Elwood. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2012). 
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and narratives almost always look to or incorporate other eras, especially the future. The 
Subjunctive Aesthetic’s methodological mix of specific timeliness and anachronism defines the 
pieces I explore. The Aesthetic’s intrinsic anachronism is important for queer readings. Drawing 
on earlier analysis that developed the history and prehistory of gender in the Western world, 
many recent critics have attempted to understand non-normative forms of sexuality and desire. 
These explorations are not always strictly related to the expression of gender, and some of the 
work that attempts to queer the straightforward and linear progression of narrative. Critics like 
Carla Freccero and Jonathan Gil Harris have noted the way that narrative and temporal 
categories have the potential to queer normative understandings of texts.8 Harris in particular 
settles on categories of time as palimpsests. This means that a single text can encode the past, the 
future, and the present in different modes of relation. Analyzing time in these efforts is 
important, but it is not enough. A historical analysis of probability is key to this project. Modern 
norms are based on modern statistical notions of probability. In contrast to normative 
understandings, any temporal category can have multiple probable outcomes when dealing with 
the Subjunctive Aesthetic. But probability is not all the Aesthetic offers for queering 
interpretation. For a plan, desire is directly represented by the self-conscious intention announced 
by the text. This desire is not strictly erotic, but it can be, as in the ubiquitous bed-plot of early 
modern England, where the planned sexual conquest becomes confused. The way desire is 
represented in plans is not authoritative in the way other texts are. In the early modern period, 
even relatively simple designs acknowledge the potential failure of gender systems or desire. 
                                                 
8 Freccero, Carla.  Queer / Early / Modern.  (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2006). Harris, 
Jonathan Gil.  Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare.  (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009). For a comprehensive recent survey of “unhistoricism” in queer 
studies see Traub, Valerie. “The New Unhistoricism in Queer Studies.” PMLA. Vol. 128, No. 1. 
(January 2013), 21-39. 
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Many Italian architects design rooms with the hope that women will stay there, for instance. But 
the rooms, as the gender roles, could be laid out in many other ways. Plans do not just 
manipulate material; they navigate the potentials of embodiment and subjectivity through image-
narratives. 
To conclude the overview of the critical impact, I think it is helpful to describe the 
development of my analysis and touch on what seem to be obvious connections to Foucault’s 
ideas. Before arriving at my conclusions, I initially focused my research on the architecture of 
early modern cities and the way early modern literature described space, continually comparing 
the way that space inflects my contemporary moment and the burgeoning urban space the past. 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish and De Certeau’s The Practice of Everyday Life initially 
guided much of my analysis.9 These are works of visually and historically inflected cultural 
analysis that works through agency. The final argument in my dissertation still incorporates the 
accounts of both of these thinkers while attempting to push their research into new areas of 
narrative analysis. This is not an entirely novel development, as narrative is clearly important for 
both. Their oeuvres are too complex to be reduced to a handful of positions. In particular, 
Foucault’s heterotopia that I reference in chapter three points to a different notion of multiple 
possibilities in spatial diagrams. What both thinkers provide is the important background of 
subjectivity. The development of the Subjunctive Aesthetic is the rise of a new kind of agent, as 
my chapters two, three and five demonstrate. In plans, the representation of ideas comes to have 
a decision-making capability beyond authorship that spawns new genealogies and histories of 
person-hood. Foucault singles out Bentham as a figure of this coming agency, but the Panopticon 
                                                 
9 Foucault, Michel.  Discipline and Punish.  (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). De Certeau, 
Michel.  The Practice of Everyday Life.  Trans. Steven Randall.  (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2002). 
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most closely aligns with this new type of human actor. Like the Panopticon, early modern plans 
can become beings of their own, able to act in ways that often turn on their creators. Building on 
Foucault, the final chapter demonstrates that these plans are tragic and hubristic, working against 
the designs of their creators at the moment of inception even as they define certain subjectivities.  
De Certeau is important for this dissertation because he illuminates what Foucault does 
not emphasize—that other possibilities remain in designs, even if implementation fixes the 
networks of power. Indeed, as the queering aspects of the Subjunctive Aesthetic suggest, the 
process of this growing power of fixing probability with norms is uneven and uncertain. There 
are multiple moments in the social development of architecture as the prevailing metaphor for 
western social control might have been otherwise. De Certeau exposes a deconstruction of 
Foucault’s system of knowledge, suggesting tactics as a popular and guerilla response to the 
gridiron imposed by institutions. De Certeau points to the multiple possibilities included in any 
design, but his dichotomy still seems reductive. What he and Foucault both fail to account for, 
even in their navigation of norms, are the multiple categories collapsed in institutional definitions 
and even in tactical responses to definitions. There is more than strategy and tactics. De Certeau 
often approaches this notion in The Practice of Everyday Life, but he does not explicitly address 
the notion of multiple overlapping variables. He does not deal with probability. 
Foucault and De Certeau did not emphasize probability, I realized, because they focus 
often on reified diagrams and modern notions of space. Foucault’s plans points and lines that 
crystallize the vast veins of power. De Certeau’s tactical responses pervert or convert these nodes 
of power to individual or communal ends, but create a dyad of strategy and tactical response—a 
small plan to fight the big one. As I continued my analysis with de Certeau in mind, time and 
narrative stepped forward to my analytic foreground and space began to recede. I rediscovered 
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reification; I observed that narrative movement through time often becomes represented through 
space.10 As I considered reification, I realized that the way an architectural plot in the early 
modern period encodes space is not the same was the way my 21st century timesheets do, or the 
same way Marx’s architectonics do. As the references to other intersections of time and space 
make clear, modern thinkers rely on a long history of planning that relies on a clarity or fixity. 
Plans are either reliable or they are not. But I slowly realized that a persistent indistinctness of 
time and space defines the architectural and narrative plans I inspected. After wrestling with the 
haziness implied or specified by plans, I realized that planning’s umbra of doubt can be 
attributed to simultaneous multiplicity or a comingling in space. In addition to Foucault’s 
arresting power and De Certeau’s tactical responses to these apparatuses, plans contain a range 
of narratives called up by their utterance or depiction. These probabilities mingle and endure 
even when one option seems to be the only likely outcome. When a historical or institutional 
teleology brings about a plan, a plan’s engagement of possibility persists. This can make plans 
both uncomfortable and valuable points of analysis. Plans meet at time and space, but move in 
the category of probability.  
 
Situating the Subjunctive Aesthetic While Finding a Broader Method 
My readings, as my references to later thinkers like de Certeau suggest, can provide a 
method of reading various texts in various times. But this method is comprehensible only if I 
locate the Subjunctive Aesthetic in its own early modern moment in England. This placement is 
                                                 
10 In Kapital Marx outlines the alienating de-materializations of labor with reification and sees it 
as arresting. But for a process that ties this to time while captures the materiality and theory of 
the process see Lukacs, Georg. History and Class Consciousness. Trans. Livingstone, Rodney. 
(Pontypool: The Merlin Press, 1967), I.1. Lukacs seems to be the exception of Marxist 
systematic analysis, which does not often admit many probable outcomes. 
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most quickly illustrated by comparing and contrasting early modern plans to other eras. The 
clean lines of an overhead groundplot are not unique to the early modern period—modern 
blueprints are a common image today. There are a handful of examples from earlier plans, such 
as castle-building, cathedral construction, and monastery-making. But in the earliest surviving 
medieval plot of a monastery, the Plan of St. Gall, the clean shapes of walls in blanks space are 
not tools for the construction of buildings. Instead, the plan is “a generic solution for the ideal 
monastery” that “does not actually fit the terrain” where St. Gall is located.11 This is not to say 
that medieval England had no surveyors or defined plans. Several scholars have outlined the 
surveying techniques employed in medieval plans.12 But as the ideal plot of St. Gall and the lack 
of many surviving medieval plans illustrates, medieval constructions were usually on-the-ground 
considerations that produced few narratives or images and worked within extant settlements or 
plots of land. In the rarity of medieval town surveys, images are even scarcer. In William Fitz 
Stephen’s 12th century survey of London, for example, he has no drawings and only 
descriptions.13 But even when images do appear, they are not usually like St. Gall’s ideal lines on 
a blank page; the buildings of medieval plans are descriptive facades of buildings. In contrast, 
early modern plans often utilize vanishing point perspective in cross-sections of buildings.14 By 
                                                 
11Frischer, Bernard and Patrick Geary. “The Plan of St. Gall.” Carolingian Culture at Reichenau 
& St. Gall | Karolingischen Kultur in Reichenau und St. Gallen. (Accessed May 27, 2012). 
http://www.stgallplan.org/en/index_plan.html.  
12 For a case study see in Stratford see Slater, T. R. “Ideal and Reality in English Episcopal 
Medieval Town Planning.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. New Series, 
Vol. 12, No. 2 (1987), 191-203. For an early overview of Medieval surveying techniques see 
Price, Derek. “Medieval Land Surveying and Topographical Maps.”  The Geographical Journal. 
Vol. 121, No. 1, (March 1955). 1-7. 
13 Fitz Stephen, William. Norman London. (New York: Italica Press, 2008). 
14 Palladio, Andrea.  The Four Books on Architecture.  Trans. Robert Tarvnor and Schofield, 
Richard.  (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). 
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this I mean that they often incorporate images that look like paintings of buildings in addition to 
abstract shapes. 
Thus, many of the techniques and contexts of architectural plans pre-date the early 
modern period. However, I locate the Subjunctive Aesthetic in the early modern period for two 
key reasons. The early modern era is an English age of vision—in two senses. The first sense 
refers to visual culture and the widespread use of images in dispersed contexts. From the Tudor 
period into the Jacobean reign, images attain an ascendency in English culture that has wide 
repercussions. As several scholars have argued, early modern England is a time and place of 
intense and problematic scopophilia. The workshops of Renaissance painters, the Blazon of 
poetry, anatomical images, mapping, property enclosure, stage effects, the depictions of overseas 
voyages, public buildings, and, I suggest, architectural pieces, demand to be seen and complicate 
the process of creating images in England.15 In comparison to the medieval use of images, the 
diffusion and complexity is remarkable. The icons in chapels and the stained glass windows of 
cathedrals would have been an important part of daily life and objects of veneration for medieval 
people, and crosses provided a ubiquitous shape for cathedrals. But for technological and cultural 
reasons, these images remain in the margins of culture. This is literal—pictures of Cathedrals and 
paintings are sketched marginalia in medieval texts, illustrating the text described, as with the 
plan of St. Gall. The most widespread and well-known image narratives of the period are likely 
                                                 
15There is copious work on the meaning of visual culture in the early modern period. For pieces 
that influence this dissertation, and early example is Freedman, Barbara. Staging the Gaze 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), which connects visual culture to gender-based criticism. 
For a more argument challenging the normative and factual power of visual culture see, Stuart, 
Clark. Vanities of the Eye (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). Iconoclasm is one of the 
key battles between Protestants and Catholics both inside the English church and on the 
continent. For a recent work exploring the relationship of this iconoclasm to the literature see 
O’Connell, Michael. The Idolotrous Eye: Iconoclasm and Theater in Early Modern England 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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in tapestries that adorned a handful of palaces and castles. But these images tend to be of singular 
moments, or move in a linear series, like the famous Bayeux tapestry. Their status as practical 
tools with complex points of view is not as robust as the early modern period and these medieval 
pieces do not quite have the appearance in the daily lives of large numbers of people that early 
modern visual and textual culture does. Sight comes to define English early modern culture in 
marked ways. From the battles over icons in the English church to the reliability of astronomical 
objects for navigational purposes, early modern England demands visual representations while 
simultaneously producing wide-ranging reactions to visual productions. As a succinct illustration 
of the early modern connection of visual-culture to literature and architecture, the early modern 
period is also the first time that professional building designers appear in England, the most 
famous being Inigo Jones in the early 17th century. Jones designs the elaborate masque theaters 
used for Ben Jonson’s scripts in King James’ court. Jones’ plans for Jonson’s stage are an acute 
example where plans are influenced by literature and in turn influence literature. But this is only 
part of a very broad movement in provisional narrative channels. Theaters appear often in 
architectural images and treatises, but more often the narrative form they employ appears in 
plays, poems, and prose. 
 For the second meaning of vision that relates to the first but that looks ahead to a 
different age of probability and image-narrative, early modern England is a milieu of grand and 
forward thinking designs. Bacon’s scheme of science is one I discuss at length in chapter three, 
but other famous examples include the plantations in Ireland, the overseas colonial dreams of 
Hakluyt, Gilbert, Raleigh, John Smith, etc., joint stock companies, and the church organizational 
plans of Independent Protestants and, later, of Presbyterians. These visions are almost always 
failures even long after they fail to produce results. In retrospect, and according to later eras, 
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these plans and visions have an impact on later more successful endeavors. But the first 
plantations and joint stock companies, in Ireland as in America, are almost all abandoned quickly 
or toil in obscure failure for many decades. Protestant visions of the church pressure Elizabeth 
and the Stuarts, seemingly to erupt later in the Civil War and the execution of Charles, this 
historical process is like Nestor’s strange baby figure of a larger mass of things to come. In 
Europe, speculation and long-term plans fail as well, as with the bankruptcy of all the early 
major publishing houses, but in early modern England the projects come quickly, think far 
ahead, receive major institutional support, and in retrospect seem to initiate titanic projects. 
Though I do not discuss the economic or colonial projects at great length in this dissertation, I do 
address Bacon’s “great instauration” of Science that initiates few, if any, actual Baconian 
projects. The attribution of scientific method to Bacon, I argue in my third chapter, is a non-
teleological process that critics and historians nonetheless derive from the early modern period. 
Bacon’s actual plan, as I show, is never achieved in practice because the form it takes is the 
eternal deferral of a self-consciously provisional plan. In this provisionality, historians from the 
18th century onward will insert a great scientific mass of the Royal Society in the gaps in the 
Novum Organum. But Bacon’s famous science, like colonial designs in North America, are best 
viewed as what they are—large, flawed, complicated plans. Bacon is one example, but the 
English early modern period is an era littered with great designs that fail in their stated goals, 
leaving traces that become the great mass of a project that they initially were not. These schemes 
have practical effects, but they are also visions. For this reason, to understand the period’s 
culture and texts it is essential to investigate the plans of early modern England, not just in their 
practical effects, but also in the narrative appeal that leads to their retooling and revision into a 
history of nationalism, colonialism, and science. 
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To continue this contrast on the other side of the early modern period, in the 
contemporary moment plans fix things. Examples of the trend are ubiquitous. The law requires 
insurance plans for car owners, and economic speculation is so routine it is often no longer quite 
speculative. Military tactics of the past appear in classrooms and ongoing campaigns are live on 
the news. Blueprints appear on billboards, in libraries, at shopping malls. This is de Certeau’s 
familiar realm of modernity and the practice of everyday life. In contrast to early modern plans, 
however, modern blueprints and plans have the institutional sanction of specialization and the 
certainty that comes with that social power. This is Foucault’s notion of modernity. Although the 
architect and the expert may be aware of the many potential situations her design may encounter, 
modern interpretive frameworks treat plans as operative fictions meant to be re-categorized upon 
completion or abandonment. Once attempted, the plan is either an item of fact or a dream that 
never came to fruition. This push to treat plans as either fact or fiction can be seen in the mortal 
and legal consequences for the architects and designers of failed projects, like bridges and 
buildings. In many cases, the real-world outcomes of their designs treat the outcome as 
inevitable. If a bridge fails, it’s because the architect failed. But in spite of this trend toward 
modern fixity, plans can still have a playful quality even today, often appearing in works of 
fiction to undo certainty, blending the barriers between fact and fiction.  
My method can emphasize the moments of probability in fixed locales. In the recent 
science-fiction film Inception, for example, nearly a full act of the film is taken up by planning 
an elaborate con job involving invading someone else’s dream. The film is a caper-movie, and 
the confidence job is familiar and common genre that leverages the excitement of planning and 
the slips between design and execution. Often film critics presume a simultaneous con on the 
audience, as theatergoers buy into the fiction on screen. This interpretation captures some of the 
 19 
potential excitement of the form, but it ignores the specific probabilistic quality of planning. In 
the case of Inception in particular, the fictionality or factuality of the plan isn’t important, since 
everything takes place in dreams where those categories mesh. The only thing that matters for a 
plan in this environment is whether or not the design is probable within a given context. In 
Inception, audiences can recognize the planning process because nothing seems to happen in 
terms of the film’s narrative, but the various predictions and calculations prepare viewers for the 
climax. During the sequence of planning, individuals make drawings, an architect designs an 
environment, and possible outcomes are sifted through. Nothing strictly happens, and yet 
audiences become aware of many potential things happening and react emotionally. In Inception 
I see something like King Lear’s first scene that I lay out in my final chapter, as Lear’s famous 
map attempts to grapple with political and personal possibility. 
Beyond examples in entertainment and day-to-day life, plans form a ubiquitous metaphor 
and unassuming foundation for big ideas in the contemporary moment, especially in the 
institutional oppression of unprivileged subjects. As such, it is vitally important to actually 
analyze their representation. The plots of a plan, whether textual or spatial, seem to fix outcomes. 
In the triangular design of the Middle Passage, in Bentham’s Panopticon, in the medical 
definition of male and female, in the conspiracy of a secret cabal, or in capitalist ideology 
thinkers often see rigid tracks for the future that we have to deal with as if they are simply real. 
These institutional plans blend ideology, conspiracy, and oppression to the point where it 
becomes difficult to be critical from within the operations of the plan. To understand the design 
of these large-scale projects means to imbricate interpretation in one outcome of these plans, to 
go along with their direction, to assume their teleology is, for lack of a better word, real. As a 
counter to this trend, De Certeau suggests that in specific enough cases we can find ways to work 
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around, under, or through the grids of this planned reality that no one ever designed. But De 
Certeau did not look closely at the early modern foundations of institutional strategies. Plans, 
especially the ones that remain in place for long periods of time, contain numerous gaps and 
lacuna for contingency. Designs, after all, would be unnecessary if success was assured. This 
does not mean that plans are a meaningless morass wherein we can move in any direction, but it 
does mean that some of the more open aspects of planning may be a more essential feature than 
hitherto realized. The perceived antagonism between an abstract design and a body, a group of 
people, or a landmass makes the Subjunctive Aesthetic necessary. Even in our most fantastic 
plans, transcendental abstraction is impossible. A design is always grounded to matter in some 
way. Inversely and in tension with this notion, early modern plans treat matter as contingent. 
Unlike other narrative and imagistic contexts, it is easier to emphasize the mixture of thought and 
matter in the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
Furthermore, although the stakes are high, the unique properties of the Aesthetic never 
dismiss the more literary aspects of image and narrative. Early modern plans, I note, are with us 
even today, though we are only faintly and strangely aware of the great mass that results from 
these baby figures. Although aesthetic experiences generally make moral, cultural, racial, gender, 
and class judgments, in the Subjunctive Aesthetic these assumptions become clearly defined and 
also malleable. An example: Palladio, one of the most famous of early modern Italian architects, 
crafts designs he argues for clear hierarchies of class and gender, with women and servants on 
the lower floors. But at the same time the necessity of representing and specifying this design 
means he grapples with other potential iterations for material and ideological organizations. 
Readers do not have to look deeply to realize this fact, but if one does read deeply into designs, 
one can see much more give and possibility than critics usually allow. The rigid barriers of class 
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and gender are in Palladio’s plan for the palazzo. But so are other potential organizations. 
Although they seem hidden, they are constitutive of the design, represented in what seems to be a 
blank space or an unwritten possibility. 
 
Terminology 
My terminology, and even the title of the Subjunctive Aesthetic, requires further 
commentary. Thus far and throughout the dissertation, I employ both period terms and 
anachronistic terms. Plan, for example, is not widely used in early modern English. Instead, the 
words plant, plot, groundplot, and groundplan are more consistent. But the word plan and plot 
are similar enough and the concept meaningful enough that the more familiar term is general 
more clear for most readers. In text, when non-image plans appear, early modern writers tend to 
title their narratives as devices, designs, inventions, ways, plots, or means, but there is cross-
pollination of all the terms. In grammar books of the day, the subjunctive mood is defined as the 
grammatical clause that relies on another verb for intelligibility, often with little commentary or 
extensive discussion.16 Originally imported to English based on Latin grammars, the Latin relies 
on the jussive, optative, and potential moods. I use the term subjunctive because it captures or 
overlaps with all of these uses, but also suggests that English has its own developed non-
indicative modes of speech. In English, the particles like might, would, could, should, and shall 
all overlap with the optative and the potential. The optative is about defining all the available 
options, and the potential subjunctive registers the many potential outcomes. The jussive, 
                                                 
16 The most influential is Lily’s Latin grammar. Lily, William. Brevissima institutio seu ratio 
grammatices cognoscendae, ad omnium puerorum utilitatem praescripta, quam solam regia 
maiestas in omnibus scholis docendam praecipit. (Londini: R. Wolfe, 1553). For a later 
grammar, focusing on English see Busby, Richard. A Short Institution of Grammar. (Cambridge: 
Printed by Roger Daniel, 1647). 
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meanwhile, most closely aligns with planning by giving the subjunctive a material force that 
pushes toward an object. All three Latin categories, however, suggest the power of the Aesthetic 
in early modern English. The term Subjunctive registers potentials and wondering, while also 
including a sense of moving in a specific direction, gathering possibilities and pushing forward 
rather than pausing to wonder. In connecting the category of probability to the subjunctive, I am 
not breaking new ground, as Transversal Theorists such as Bryan Reynolds have noted how 
subjunctive space allows for counter-hegemonic possibilities to register alongside hegemonic 
texts. I am, however, developing the notion of linguistic embedding of this suspension of cause-
and-effect relationships. I assert that language often preserves a range of probable outcomes, 
sometimes even contradictory ones, when the subjunctive is uttered or written. This is not to say 
that the Subjunctive is natural or fundamental, but it does mean that I do not find my intervention 
in early modern texts completely anachronistic. On their own terms they contribute to a 
suspension of probability. 
Finally, the Aesthetic part of my phrase requires a bit of unpacking. The term is loaded 
and can often seem to carry more baggage than is worthwhile. But confronting these difficulties 
and demonstrating a method of reading in spite of the problems is a part of the appeal of the 
term. I first became attached to the word aesthetic in describing my project because it captured 
the movement between text and image that defines the form. In an image of an architectural plan, 
the textual narrative either accompanies or is implied and contained by the plan. In the early 
modern verbal descriptions of plans, the imagery of space and range often appears. Because the 
movement I describe imbricates two distinct forms of artistic media, I chose the term that can 
encompass both. As an upside, the word also captures the sense that the aesthetic can appear in 
literary and non-literary texts, in paintings, in plays, etc. A second recommendation for the word 
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aesthetic comes from Kant, who uses the words in relation to the perception by the senses. Part 
of what I am arguing is for a unique mode of representing the perception of probability, making 
the term apropos for a perceptual category.  
The final reason for using the word is also the reason why the word is contentious. I am 
addressing the elite and calcified meaning of Aesthetic, by suggesting a connection of a more 
menial activity with several standards of English literature. The high Victorian Aesthetic 
movement, usually reduced to the phrase “art for art’s sake,” looked back to the Renaissance 
order to define its ideals of beauty. Walter Pater’s The Renaissance, in particular, attempts to 
define a cultural milieu and ideology through the artistic continuities between various kinds of 
art and literature. This definition of Aesthetic persists, rankling many critics who view the term 
as restricting beauty to certain elite categories and channels of expression. I may find plans 
beautiful, but I know I am looking at a form of art that hearkens back to the etymology of art as a 
handcraft. Plans form a key component of my analysis, and many of the plans I view are 
clustered around centers of capital and power. But plans themselves are often the products of a 
nameless and lower-class group bent on practical ends. The Subjunctive Aesthetic, in spite of its 
Latinate terms, is describing practical building projects. Carpenters, as Henry Turner argues in 
The English Renaissance Stage, utilize groundplots more often than any other group. Plans can, 
of course, be made with varying degrees of labor and cost, but a wide array of people produces 
them. Furthermore, although I have outlined the essential features of the Aesthetic, I do not 
rigidly divide the Aesthetic from other forms of image and narrative. Doing so would run counter 
to the narratives produced within early modern plans, as they often attempt to negotiate between 
opposed categories, such as material and imaginary. Nonetheless, my use of the term Aesthetic 
does not completely dismiss critics like Pater and the other Aesthetes. Despite planning’s often 
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practical outcomes, there is a sense of the closed-loop in their practice of planning. Plans work to 
bring about the artistry that they depict, and in a way, do produce art for art’s sake.  
 
Chapter Outlines 
I attempt to ground each chapter’s textual engagement with probability in a specific place 
and time. But because texts of the Aesthetic often look to a different time in order to bring out 
about a defined goal, I do not proceed in a linear fashion. Instead, I move forward and backward 
in time in order to suggest potential developments in representations of probability. In this my 
analysis reflects the narratives and images I investigate. My first chapter resembles a plan for the 
piece as a whole, laying out all the component parts that each image-narrative of the Aesthetic 
can work with or against. Many of the texts I explore are canonical pieces of literature. But many 
are not. My choice of pieces is partly motivated by personal preference and partly by ease of 
recognition for an audience who may not be extremely familiar with early modern texts. But in 
general I choose unique expressions of probability that have the potential to challenge 
preconceived notions of control and representation. An important aspect of my reading method is 
ability to appear whenever possibilities are calculated or represented. This includes anonymous 
architectural images produced on the cheap, and it also includes moments in some of the most 
famous names in English. By working with both, I attempt to privilege neither and demonstrate 
the widespread applicability of my observations. 
My first chapter is in some ways a reversal of Nestor’s particular to general development. 
I begin with a general survey of images and texts that work with probability in order to define the 
Subjunctive Aesthetic, and then I work down to an extremely specific expression of these 
Aesthetic in the Alma’s house section in Book 2 of The Faerie Queene. The general overview 
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will include architectural images and texts, but will also survey different visual and textual 
examples of the Aesthetic in various formats. Included in this survey are images of state plans 
from the Tudor and Jacobean eras, especially the diverse iterations of Henry VIII’s orders of 
succession and the varied visual engagements with his designs. I also include Machiavelli’s 
political philosophy, which exposes the distinctly early modern way that the Subjunctive 
reconciles different building plots and state inventions. Another important piece for later 
chapters is the contrast I make between Providence, especially Calvin’s notion of it, with 
probability.  
In many ways, Alma’s house distills the essential features of the Aesthetic by offering the 
most explicit connection of statecraft and architecture. The visual format of architecture and 
probability in Alma’s house helps unpack the broader means of representing probability in the 
probabilistic images surveyed at the outset. In addition, Alma’s house, Machiavelli, and the 
orders of succession in particular offer a means of queering the representations of desire that 
occur in the Subjunctive Aesthetic by highlighting the anachronistic nature of the narrative-
images they depict. The final part of the chapter begins developing the generic implications of 
the aesthetic for allegory and history. In many ways this chapter defines the multiplicity of the 
Aesthetic as well as the diverse loci where for its expression. In genre, medium, and context, the 
Subjunctive Aesthetic defines multiple probabilities. The ensuing chapters build, cut across, or 
work against several of the arguments defined in this chapter, resembling the coexisting 
potentials contained in the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
 The second chapter captures the expansiveness and oftentimes forward-looking nature of 
the Subjunctive Aesthetic by jumping to the end of the early modern period and Milton’s 
Paradise Lost. I argue that the epic poem complicates the narrative distinctions found in The 
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Faerie Queene that place the Subjunctive Aesthetic between history and fantasy. Instead, 
Milton’s poem addresses a similar but distinct issue in the registers of pre-history and history, 
relating the spatial anachronism of probability that I develop in the first chapter while analyzing 
probable-thinking writ large in an epic and religious context. Centered on the ever-receding 
representation of Original Sin being predicted as Satan first plans his rebellion, the chapter works 
through the implication of placing Satan’s plot in the juncture between Christian pre-history and 
providential history. Furthermore, this chapter develops the queering that happens in the 
Subjunctive Aesthetic. Sin’s appearance from Satan’s skull as an agent in the angelic world 
initially offers an asexual version of reproduction that quickly becomes incestuous as Satan falls 
in love with her and she gives birth to Death. Yet Sin and Death’s experiences also suggest that 
their representation in the universe contains the potential to disrupt patriarchal control via 
teleological or providential forms of history.  Comparing Satan’s plan to God’s surveying of time 
and space reveals the increasing complication made possible in the Subjunctive Aesthetic over 
the early modern period. But the sequence also introduces planning as a new kind of agent that 
has the potential to work with and against the designs of its creator. 
 The third chapter turns away from the dichotomy of practical and literary, as suggested 
by the reconciliation of architecture and state papers in chapter one, and turns to the elaborate 
systems and experiments of John Dee and Francis Bacon. Collecting their respective 
epistemological projects reveals a dichotomy in the way probability is represented. The analysis 
of Bacon’s scientia centers on his Novum Organum, which attempts to harness the random 
chance of experiments, attempting to negate intention and focus on material, spiritual, and 
emotional effects. John Dee’s view for the future of knowledge is distilled in his “Preface” to 
Euclid’s Geometry. But I also reference other works by each thinker, including Dee’s 
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astronomical predications and Bacon’s Essays. Dee’s universe is strictly defined by Providence, 
much like Calvin’s version from my first chapter, rendering the future pre-fabricated but also 
rendering each prediction of the future connected to its potential failure. The defined structure 
predicts the fact-fiction divide of modernity’s numerical based epistemology. Bacon, in 
opposition to this, makes predictions but he leaves space for the unknowable and the unknown 
within his episteme. Bacon is explicit about the multiplicity of probability and attempts to work 
its multivalent potentials into his system, often through an overlap with architectural style. In 
addition to exploring the connections of two figures who are often unconnected, this chapter 
critiques the history and pre-history of science, by suggesting that much of the debates over 
probability post-quantum theory have roots that reach back to Bacon and Dee’s disagreements 
over the nature of the knowledge and the future. The chapter finally suggests that experiments 
and hypothesis might be best understood as occupying a space between fact and fiction, best 
understood not as pure creators of fact or magical attempts at power, but rather as instances of 
probability in the vein of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
 The fourth chapter analyzes the genre that most clearly expresses the queer potential, the 
agency, restrictions, imagery, and narrative mediation of the Subjunctive Aesthetic—utopia. 
Gathering More’s Utopia, Bacon’s The New Atlantis, Donne’s dystopian Ignatius, His Conclave, 
and Margaret Cavendish’s The Blazing World, with references to Plato’s Republic, I argue that 
the genre is description, critique, and potential for other iterations. Although understood by some 
critics as fictive world building, the texts actually mediate between an ostensible reality and the 
other potential iterations of reality. In the juncture between the likely and the unlikely, these 
utopian texts imagine probability in terms of first-hand experience and hearsay. Their prose often 
utilizes first-person point of view through another character’s perspective in order to suggest the 
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multiple ways of interpreting established institutions, such as More and Donne’s religious 
houses, Bacon’s experimental orders, and Cavendish’s animal-man scientists. Each piece 
critiques earlier visions of utopia that seek a regular order for the cosmos by suggesting that 
multiplicity is the defining feature of any design. In particular, Margaret Cavendish’s The 
Blazing World gives the early modern summa of the form. She outlines the ways that patriarchy 
has defined the channels of desire, even in utopia, even as they suggest that these expressions 
could always be otherwise. Cavendish surveys the existing utopias and takes their critiques a step 
beyond by queering their desires for a homogenous or multiplicitous design as still too restrictive 
and heteronormative. Ultimately, Cavendish reveals that a utopia unique for each individual, 
while also demonstrating that each perfect design is implied or contained by the others. All these 
texts, but Cavendish in particular, also stand between pre-modernity and early modernity, 
looking ahead and looking behind. In many ways their suggestions seem to define the future, 
most especially Bacon’s New Atlantis. But as they look forward, they also look to their own 
moment and to other potential moments that never existed. They grapple with probability by 
allowing an author to become an early modern architect of material, people, and ideas. But 
instead of offering a single view of the future, utopias touch potential and suggest the activity of 
readership in the Subjunctive Aesthetic.  
 The final chapter culminates the suggestions of agency from the second chapter and 
Providence in the third chapter by analyzing the plans that appear in Shakespeare’s historical 
tragedies, King Lear, Macbeth, and King John. These plays, perhaps more than any others in the 
Shakespearean corpus, put plotting as the central element of both dialogue and monologue. They 
also show the restrictive and terrifying potential of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. In each play’s 
action, competing plots are not just expressed as mental processes through soliloquy, but appear 
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in visual, spoken, and written formats. Macbeth contrasts planning with providence from its first 
scene, along the same lines as Paradise Lost does. But Macbeth is driven mad by his awareness 
of these possibilities, paradoxically creating a proxy agent via his designs that ends up 
controlling him. King Lear opens with a planned division of the kingdom that is immediately 
discarded in favor of the king’s whims. Nonetheless, the divided design constructs a conflict that 
undoes its builder. King John, in contrast to the other two plays, leaves its plans carefully defined 
but also dangerously unspoken. Intentions are transmitted, but not with specifics. In the process 
that murder’s King John’s heir, the play depicts the potential to work against the King’s plot, 
only to confirm it as the design becomes an actor of its own, persuading the heir to destroy 
himself. Each of these plays envision plans as a new kind of agent or human prosthetic that 
maximizes the power of rulership, but each also turns these designs on their maker. In Macbeth 
and King John’s encounters with the narratives of history, I also see the critique of teleology that 
I began in chapters one and two. In these three plays, the Subjunctive Aesthetic is exploited for 
terror at the possibility of time moving forward in terrifying uncertainty. Even a certain future 
becomes hazy and undefined when planning is introduced to each decision. 
 Unlike Nestor’s speech, which ends in action, my own giant mass of things to come 
concludes with another design, a post-script that suggests where the Subjunctive Aesthetic can 
go next. But first, let us see how architecture helps The Faerie Queene build a house. 
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Chapter 1 
 The Aesthetic in Alma’s House: Narrative-Images of Probability 
 
Edmund Spenser christens the villainous sorcerer of The Fairie Queene with an 
especially evocative title: Archimago. The name underscores the character’s “archi-magic” while 
at the same time linking the sorcerer to the word “architect.” Making the connection explicit, the 
poem uses “architect” to describe the sorcerer in the second book of Spenser’s epic questing 
Romance (2.1.1).17 Using “architect” to connect magic to the initiator and oft-times controller of 
The Faerie Queene’s plot is fitting according to a standard contemporary metaphor. Modern 
readers are familiar with beings like God, Marx, or the Narrator taking on the profession of 
architect and imposing a structure of ideas on society, narrative, or reality.18 In seemingly 
familiar terms, then, the first stanza of Spenser’s second book equates architecture with 
Archimago’s manipulation of others by calling him “a conning architect of cancred guile” 
(2.1.1). But in 1590, Spenser’s comparison marks one of the earliest figurative uses of the word 
architect, and an early appearance in the English language in general.19 In Spenser’s day, Italian 
draughtsmen and translators had only recently claimed to rediscover architecture as an 
intellectual discipline or profession in its own right. Similarly, the rest of book 2 suggests that the 
                                                 
17 “That conning Architect of cancred guyle.” 2.1.1. Unless otherwise noted, all citations from 
The Faerie Queene are given parenthetically by book, canto, and stanza. from A.C. Hamilton 
ed., The Faerie Queene, 1st ed. (London: Longman, 2001). 
18 One of the earliest examples of this trend comes from almost half a century after Spenser’s 
death. See William Austin, Haec Homo wherein the Excellency of the Creation of woman is 
described by way of an Essaie (London: Printed by Richard Olton for Ralph Mabb, and are to be 
sold by Charles Greene, 1637). 
19 Oxford English Dictionary, “architect” 3.a.  The OED lists Shakespeare as the first recorded 
metaphorical application in 1594, which follows Spenser by four years. Twenty years earlier 
than Spenser, however, the benefits of architecture appear in John Dee, “Preface” to The 
Elements of Geometrie of the Most Ancient Philosopher Euclid of Margera (London: Imprinted 
by John Daye, 1570). 
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archmage-architect comparison marks Archimago as an actual planner of buildings to an extent 
we might initially miss.20 In this chapter, I take Spenser’s handling of architecture seriously as I 
analyze the Alma’s house section of Book 2. By analyzing the overlap of early modern 
architecture, government planning, and narrative, the stanzas focusing on Alma’s house reveal 
the narrative and imagistic multiplicity of the Subjunctive Aesthetic in early modern England. 
The section also outlines the discourses touched by the Aesthetic. Gathering various forms of 
planning, deliberation, and contingency in Alma’s house, I initiate the analysis of a multivalent 
concept linking early modern architecture, government plans, images of likelihood, and narrative 
structures and images. Alma’s house is a case study and a lens for organizing discourses. 
Demonstrating a narrative range rather than a single narrative plot in Alma’s house, I connect the 
genres of history, planning, and allegory through an account of probability. Spenser’s sequence 
captures a distinctly early modern perspective on architecture, and the focus on probability in 
Alma’s house points to the widespread engagement of the Subjunctive Aesthetic 
Modern statisticians and dictionary editors define probability as the measure of the 
likelihood of an event.21 Through an investigation of Spenser’s text and early modern discourses 
of design, especially in the intersections of architecture and government, I argue probability is a 
non-paradoxical multiplicity within a text or image that does not privilege defined trajectories. 
Probability can describe coexisting or even potentially conflicting events, spaces, and narratives 
                                                 
20 On architecture’s promise for interpreting Book 2 see Carroll Camden, “The Architecture of 
Spenser’s House of Alma.” Modern Language Notes. 58:4 (Baltimore, 1943). Recent analysis 
tends to accept Alistair Fowler’s sarcastic dismissal this “discovered” meaning as well-explored 
ground in Appendix I of Spenser and the Numbers of Time (London: Routledge, 1964). 
21 For a historicization of the creation of modern statistical probability in a slightly later context 
that connect the movement to the growth of capitalism, science, and other disciplines, but never 
mentions architecture see Rudiger Campe, The Game of Probability (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2012). 
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contained in a representational field.22  This version of probability can be inflected by and 
represented through perceptual categories such as space and time. Indeed, the mingling of 
architecture and narrative in Alma’s house helps to foreground probability. As discourses of 
space and time overlap in the section, multiple dimensions become perceptible within what 
initially stand as defined boundaries.23 The contingencies encoded into Spencer’s poem resonate 
with the contingency of architectural images from the period. Using the continuities between 
Spenser’s plans, architectural planning, and government orders, I argue that a discourse 
involving time, space, or narrative genre can be circumscribed while maintaining an active 
multiplicity within that circumscription. In Alma’s house, the constant engagement with multiple 
probable outcomes is important because it gives critics a means to explore genre without the 
expected restrictions of generic boundaries. In short, planning in Alma’s house forces readers to 
reckon with doubt without dismissing it.  
This chapter’s analysis of suspended doubt across architecture, government discourses, 
and literature sets up the subsequent chapters, but also holds broader importance for literary 
criticism in other periods. The Subjunctive Aesthetic, I argue, can queer narrative and imagistic 
representations, revealing the way that architecture’s potential haunts the rigidity of modern 
theories that incorporate architecture. The architect is one of Foucault’s modern bogeymen, 
organizing and identifying subjects with material and ideological institutions of power, and in 
Discipline and Punish he associates this figure with modernity whenever institutional control 
may appear.  In contrast, Michel De Certeau argues that architectural mastery is exposed and 
                                                 
22 The OED has overlapping definitions that define the “probable” as something that can be 
proven, something that is likely to happen, something that commends itself to the mind, etc. The 
mixture of truth claims and non-truth claims defines the narrative form of plans. 
23 My argument owes a major debt to Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. 
Steven Randall. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). For a specific example, see his 
contrast of tactics and strategy in street grids versus the paths of individual persons. 
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sometimes overcome by counter-insurgency in our daily lives.  According to him, we can 
overcome the mastery of planning with our on the ground experience.  And yet, this too relies on 
the provisions of a plan. In his words, we can overcome the structures of power through a 
“tactical response” to a “strategy”—guerilla plans to fight the big plans. The difference between 
the two is not in manner but in scale. These theorists helpfully point out that planning is an 
almost mundane part of our experience, whether we believe it categorically arrests individuals or 
provides counter-intelligence against the forces controlling our lives.24 I hope to build on these 
observations by exploring what they assume as a given.  
Theorists who use architecture and architectonics often transition seamlessly to state-
discourse from architecture, as if both are the same and both are totalizing. In Foucault’s famous 
example:  Bentham designs the Panopticon to keep each of its inhabitant prisoners under watch, 
directly connecting architecture to the operations of the state. Yet this plan is never carried out in 
Bentham’s life. Although revealing of punitive, ideological, and institutional processes, the 
Panopticon is a plan and a failed one at that. Early modern architecture, I argue, haunts modern 
notions of represented control, and Bentham’s biography highlights that. The polymath’s greatest 
phobia was of the impossible figure of a ghost observing him, not because the ghost was real, but 
because it might not be.25 The mythic narrative of the ghost that crosses the border between 
                                                 
24 When Bourdieu draws on base, structures, and super-structures of Marxism, he is discussing 
the way ideology fixes subjects. Marxist analysis is often restrictive, but Jameson contrasts the 
“play” of utopias with the “superstructure” and “infrastructure” of later times. He explicitly calls 
More’s Utopia a genre of “multiplicity of consequences.” Archaeologies of the Future (New 
York: Verso, 2007), 41. 
25 “Bentham was, therefore, forced to confront the distinction between the real and the imaginary 
from his early childhood, and it is possible that, as C. K. Ogden has intimated, it was upon the 
‘grim foundation’ of ghosts and spectres that he constructed one of his most important insights, 
namely his theory of real and fictitious entities.” Schofield, Philip. “Real and Fictitious Entities.” 
Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 2. 
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impossible and possible haunts Bentham because even in if its reality is verifiable, its form is 
immaterial. This materially immaterial status defines the Subjunctive Aesthetic, and is especially 
visible in the connection of early modern architectural plans to statecraft. By this I mean to say 
that the pre-history of architecture, where the meeting of potential and failure is more tangible 
and/or conscious, can also suggest that modern plans are not as rigid as we might imagine. De 
Certeau finds tactical on-the-ground responses to theory as a means to escape their stricture. I see 
something similar. I see in the Subjunctive Aesthetic a means to recover a hazy, ghostly 
theorization within plans themselves that also works against rigid social controls. 
The chapter also draws on and contributes to more specific critical projects. My reading 
of the archive of planning continues recent readings that combine the best aspects of both theory 
and historicism, such as the work of Jonathan Gil Harris, among others.26 Critics like Harris seek 
meaningful multiplicity within texts, often by focusing on moments where early modern sources 
rely on abstract categories such as time. The Subjunctive Aesthetic, as will become clear, 
touches on many forms of representing probability. But the open connection of Alma’s house 
with architectural planning forms an exemplary point to elaborate on a reading that is both 
grounded in a time and yet looks to another time. A building plan self-consciously connects a 
present moment and an imagined future, moving between these categories. Similarly, a plan also 
combines practice and theory, describing a specific deployment of theoretical imagination and 
                                                 
26 Gil Harris gives a method in Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). He uses material and visual culture to rethink the 
boundaries of material, space, and time. He briefly mentions probability too, but does not 
develop the idea. In another vein, Henry Turner, The English Renaissance Stage (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) explores carpentry and geometry’s influence on stagecraft in an 
exhaustive study of practical handbooks. He ties these practical considerations directly to a type 
of literary imagination. Turner’s connection of literature to the plot depends on Lorna Hutson’s 
earlier observations in The Usurer’s Daughter (New York: Routledge, 1994), 105. Also see her, 
“Fortunate Travelers.” Representations. 41. Winter (1993), 86-7.  
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embodied materials. In a complex maneuver, a plan navigates temporal categories while also 
pivoting between practice and theory. In the stanzas of Alma’s house as well as the schematic 
representations of architecture, the “either/or” of theory and history breaks down into a 
meaningful “both/and.” A second critical project that situates my work is the attempt to give 
cultural context to perceptual categories. Recent readings have fastened on space and time as 
fundamental categories demanding historicization and analysis.27 Probability enriches analyses 
of space and time in early modern England with multiplicity, offering a perceptual category not 
usually included in these conversations. Finally, and as my queer grappling with Foucault and De 
Certeau suggests, this chapter’s analysis of planning defines an anachronistic narrative within the 
early modern period. In these more specific temporalities, Alma’s house convenes with attempts 
to queer straightforward readings of early modern texts and images. Time progresses in the 
probable narratives I investigate, but not in a direct teleology or linear chronology.28 A plan’s 
representation of desire is a wide-ranging engagement with multiple outcomes, never assured of 
a straight line. 
The chapter calls on the primary artifact of architecture—the plot (or ground plot, plant, 
or plan) of a building.29 It will become clear that the imagery and writing of these pieces connect 
                                                 
27 John Gilles, “Space and Place in Paradise Lost,” ELH 74:1, Spring (2007), models a nuanced 
understanding of spatial categories in the later epic poem, contrasting homogenous space with 
subjective place. 
28 Carla Freccero, Queer / Early / Modern (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006) outlines 
anachronism as a site for queering temporal movement. Sergio Zatti, The Quest for Epic 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) develops an argument that Ariosto, a source for 
Spenser, and his interlaced plotlines deny forward movement. 
29 “Plot” or “groundplot” is the typical early modern name for a building plan. The two are 
usually traced to the French “plan” or “plant.” See Turner, The English Renaissance for more on 
the connection of groundplot to narrative plot, 19-39. For a similar, narrative/imagistic approach 
to Book II see John M. Steadman, “Image-Making in the Verbal and Visual Arts: A Renaissance 
Obsession.” The Huntington Library Quarterly 61.1 (1998). 53-80. 
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to plans more broadly as narratives describing what should, could, or might be done.30 Beyond 
these texts and images, early modern political images and writings, especially about dynastic 
succession or state policy, also encode the same multiplicity associated with the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic. Both architecture and statecraft are practical, but both have a self-conscious element 
of imagination that incorporates aspects of fantasy. Finally, I also explore the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic’s impact on early modern philosophy, especially the concept of Providence, through 
the figures of Machiavelli and Calvin. These divergent thinkers reveal the breadth of the growing 
awareness of probability, and the difficulties and demands of representing its multiplicity. 
Government, architecture, and even philosophy incorporates a probalistic narrative, usually one 
projecting into the future. In addition to this future-focus, the visual format of architectural plots 
informs the way early modern plans, architectural and otherwise, express probability. In these 
schematics probability is a simultaneously spatial image and narrative term. Early modern plans 
move in an umbra of multiplicity that accompanies the line of the plot that is drawn, or the 
narrative plot described by words. In a future-orientated probable narrative like a plan, the 
narrative of what will happen emerges from the field of probable outcomes, with some being 
defined more solidly and some with less distinct features. All of these potential outcomes, 
however, are maintained in the representation of the plan, even after a set goal has been 
achieved. A plan, even when successful, never stops being a plan. 
My plan for the chapter has four parts. The first section gathers the critical and 
architectural background for Alma’s house and also introduces early modern architectural works. 
In the second section I build on the part and introduce the texts and images of dynastic 
                                                 
30 This subjunctive language often accompanies early modern architectural plans, but even when 
words are not explicitly written, such language seems implied in the way plans become 
interpreted by readers/viewers. 
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succession and government policy. I connect these discourses narratives the strange time-based 
tension among the advisors inside Alma’s house. By looking closely at the way probability 
works around and through these advisors, I argue that the collapse of time and space in Alma’s 
house is partially explained by an Aesthetic defined by the multiple probable narratives encoded 
by planning. The third section contextualizes the projective narratives of architecture and 
planning alongside other types of storytelling techniques in Book 2. This portion of the chapter 
focuses on the way Book 2’s peculiar narrative incorporates and manipulates more familiar 
narrative genres such as history and allegory. History and allegory cannot be easily separated in 
The Faerie Queene, but the Subjunctive Aesthetic’s unique narrative mode allows the two genres 
to interact on a continuum of probability.31 The fourth and final section follows the religious and 
philosophical impact of the Aesthetic’s probabilistic representations by comparing the house to 
other forms of future projection in Spenser’s poem and in Spenser’s romance tradition. Alma’s 
house forms a specific nexus around which the practical and the literary move in the same 
narrative channels, enabled by planning’s mixture of spatial representation, temporal categories, 
and probability. 
 
Designing Alma’s House 
The starting point for my argument comes from a reading of Spenser’s own commentary 
on the poem. In a letter to Sir Walter Raleigh appended to the publication of The Faerie Queene, 
Spenser writes that for a narrative model, he prefers Xenophon “before Plato, for that the one, in 
                                                 
31This is contrasted the notion that history and romance align with fact and fiction, as one genre 
defines the other in Paul Riceour, Time and Narrative Vol II, Trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and 
Pallauer, David. (Chicago: University of Chigago Press, 1990). For a similar analysis focusing 
on the early modern period see Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1998). 
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the exquisite depth of his judgement, formed a commune welth such as it should be, but the other 
in the person of Cyrus and the Persians fashioned a governement, such as might best be: so much 
more profitable and gratious is doctrine by ensample, then by rule.”32 This quotation and the 
letter as a whole situate Spenser’s poem as a plot for how to organize a state and instruct 
politically engaged gentlemen.33 The letter explains this hope by placing his work on a scale of 
narrative genre, connecting “might best be” and “should be.” Both “might” and “should” evoke 
intermingling possibilities, relying on other potential means of organization for their 
comprehensibility. In this formulation, Xenophon’s Cyropedia and Plato’s Republic stand on 
opposed ends of a genre continuum. The difference between Xenophon’s more-historically 
inflected narrative and Plato’s philosophical dialogue is in the relationship of a potential range of 
narratives to limitations of likelihood.34 Two strands run through the probabilistic comparison in 
the quotation, one threading through a “commonwealth,” “should be,” and “rule,” the other 
running through “government,” “might best be,” and “example.” The “should” strand treats all 
organizations as contingent—all could potentially be otherwise. This path moves through these 
possibilities to settle on a single unified option, a “rule.” “Might best be,” in contrast, moves 
within a broad range of possibilities that “might be,” and although seemingly expansive, these 
possibilities are restricted by a hazy limit. This array of “might best be” stands in contrast to the 
impossible options of what cannot be. The ideal Spenser chooses maintains multiplicity. “Might 
                                                 
32 Hamilton ed., The Faerie Queene, 716. 
33 The 1590 version of the Letter to Raleigh claims that the letter is “expounding [Spenser’s] 
whole intention in the course of this work” making it one plan for the poem as a whole. In a 
telling anachronism, the intention actually follows instead of preceding the text of the poem in 
the first printing. Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene London: Printed for William Ponsonby, 
1590. 591. Phillip Sidney, Defense of Poesy (London: Ponsonby, 1595) gives another early 
modern text very clear about poetry’s value for the education of gentleman in service the state. 
34 For a summary of the ongoing dispute over Xenophon and Plato, see Gabriel Danzig, “Intra-
Socratic Polemics: The Symposia of Plato and Xenophon,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 
(2005), 331-357. 
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best,” acknowledges other policies as “should” does, while also connecting to a broader range of 
governments that overlap with the best option. These probable “examples” persist even when 
Xenophon, according to Spenser, settles on what might best be. With the letter’s connection of 
planning, probable narratives, philosophical heavyweights, and genre in mind, let us turn to 
Spenser’s work. 
Each book of the Faerie Queene proclaims one virtue as a theme, using an allegorical 
narrative to explore the virtue’s difficulties, practical applications, and philosophical 
implications.35 In Book 2, the theme is temperance. During the course of the book, questing 
knights eventually come to the House of Alma, a utopian palace that presumably illustrates the 
ideal version of temperance.36 Alma’s house is a strange place by any standard, but particularly 
within the stanzas of Spenser’s poem. The house seems to be a perfect Elizabethan allegory for 
the state, running in an orderly fashion at the command of a noble Lady. As is often the case in 
medieval and early modern discourse, the ideal body politic is also an allegory for the ideal body. 
Many critics have struggled to parse the relationship between the two as the many overlapping 
potential allegories for the house often become potentially confusing.37 For instance, Alma’s 
advisor associated with knowledge of the future, Phantastes, lives in a room defined by 
                                                 
35 Jeff Tolvin, “Panic’s Castle,” Representations. 120:1, Fall (2012) argues that epistemological 
forethought about how to enact these virtues drives the plot of the poem. 
36 Frederic Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future argues that utopian narratives overlap with 
planning. For another utopian intersection, also see Amy Boeskey, Founding Fictions (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1996) for a definition of utopias as moving pictures that feeds into 
my definition of the narrative-image of architecture  
37 “The primary allegorical reference developed in the subsequent description is to the human 
body with its basic parts of legs, chest, and head.” Walter Davis, “The Houses of Mortality in 
Book II of The Faerie Queene.” Spenser Studies. Vol. II. (Pittsburgh, 1981), 122-7. For Alma’s 
house as a narrative of anatomy see Jonathan Sawday, The Body Emblazoned (London: 
Routledge, 1995), 167-8.  
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disorderly imagery and yet holds a senior spot in the brain trust of Alma’s flawless regime.38 
Another point of confusion involves the seeming lack of conflicts in Alma’s house that readers 
find elsewhere in the epic.39 The name of the house’s owner, for instance, refers to the rational 
soul, which deploys reason and rules matter. Yet unlike many other sections of The Faerie 
Queene, where body and soul seem to be at odds, this section harmonizes the two and 
demonstrates the virtue of temperance without any clear conflicts. Whether political or body-
based, Neo-Platonism usually structures the ways critics have responded to Alma’s house, as 
critics read the house’s proportions in various understandings of Platonic ideals.40 At the most 
basic level, the poem offers Alma as an ideal if often unembodied and undescribed ruler, advised 
by three counselors allegorically aligned with the past, present, and future. The organization of 
her household awes the visiting Sir Guyon and King Arthur with its efficient quotidian 
operations as well as the learning of its inhabitants.  
                                                 
38 Fowler, Spenser and the Numbers of Time, 260: the Alma’s House section is a ‘tour de force 
of ambiguity.” He also associates Phantastes with horoscopes. Robert L. Reid, “Spenserian 
Psychology and the Structure of Allegory in Books 1 and 2 of ‘The Faerie Queene’” Modern 
Philology 79.4. (1982) associates Phantastes with a tripartite division of the mind. Tina 
Romanelli, “Imagination as Arbiter: Spenser’s Phantastes and the Natural World” (paper 
presented at Shakespeare and the Natural World Conference, Chapel Hill, March 29th, 2012) 
summarizes this ambiguity, claiming the character “proves both a blessing and an unresolved 
problem in his allegory of the ideal body.”  
39For a reading that fixes on Guyon in particular as “passive and puppet-like, too ludicrously 
virtuous to sustain readerly interest” see Grant Williams, “Phantastes’s Flies: The Trauma of 
Amnestic Enjoyment in Spenser’s Memory Palace.” Spenser Studies 18.1 (2004). 231-252. 
40 Neo-Platonism hides a history of architecture, as the classical architect Vitrivius provides the 
background for many medieval and early modern understandings of Plato’s philosophy. Fowler 
(Spenser and the Numbers of Time) assumes the importance of Vitrivius without comment. 
Frances Yates makes a case for the importance of architecture in Neo-Platonic philosophy in The 
Art of Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). For more conventional Neo-
Platonic readings of Alma’s House see Jon A Quintsland, Spenser’s Supreme Fiction: Platonic 
Natural Philosophy and The Faerie Queene (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). Allan 
Silverman. “Plato on ‘Phantasia’.” Classical Antiquity 10.1 (1991). 123-147. Kenelm Digby, 
Observations of the 22. Stanza in the 9
th
 Canto of the 2d. Book of Spenser’s Faerie Queene. 
(London: Daniel Frere, 1644). 
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Guyon and Arthur arrive at Alma’s house after a series of encounters with Temperance’s 
countervailing vice—Intemperance. Then, outside the Alma’s walls, they battle against illusory 
knights as a test to receive admittance to the castle. These knights are not Archimago’s illusions, 
but rather real beings who dissolve into nothingness when defeated.  Their materially immaterial 
status is the first suggestion that readers are entering a realm of coextant embodiment and 
abstraction. The guards themselves are multiplicitous.The text never specifies whether these 
knights are illusions or real. Nonetheless, they have an effect on Guyon and Arthur in the 
narrative, even if that purpose is to pause their progress for a moment. Pausing is not necessarily 
unexpected in the interlacement of wandering plots in romances like The Faerie Queene.41 This 
pause is the first of many suggestions that Alma’s house will move forward along a linear path. 
As readers move into Alma’s house, architecture defines a mixed practical and theoretical 
focus by using probability. Although “plotting” and “architecture” do not appear by name, the 
section’s style marks architectural planning as a central focus: 
First she them led vp to the Castle wall, 
  That was so high, as foe might not it clime, 
  And all so faire, and fensible withall, 
  Not built of bricke, ne yet of stone and lime, 
  But of thing like to that AEgyptian slime, 
  Whereof king Nine whilome built Babell towre; 
  But O great pitty, that no lenger time 
  So goodly workemanship should not endure: 
Soone it must turne to earth; no earthly thing is sure. 
The frame thereof seemd partly circulare, 
  And part triangulare, O worke diuine; 
  Those two the first and last proportions are, 
  The one imperfect, mortall, foeminine; 
  Th'other immortall, perfect, masculine, 
  And twixt them both a quadrate was the base, 
  Proportioned equally by seuen and nine; 
  Nine was the circle set in heauens place, 
All which compacted made a goodly Diapase. (2.9.21-2) 
                                                 
41 Sergio Zatti, The Quest for Epic. 
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The description emphasizes the walls’ planned construction using rational principles and 
proportions. The clearest architectural elements in Alma’s house come from the shapes 
“proportioned equally between seven and nine” and the mention of the triangle, circle, and 
quadrate. These numbers and shapes derive from the classical architect Vitrivius’s divine 
proportions for buildings, based on a numerological alignment with masculinity and femininity. 
Vitrivius’ De Architectura is the only extent classical source on architecture, and Spenser’s use 
of Vitruvian symbolic shapes buttresses the claim that the building is between “mortal” and 
“immortal,” between “masculine” and “foemenine”—the shapes that create this building are 
“twixt them both.” Lauren Silberman posits that the section hovers betwixt practice and theory, 
and the dichotomy set up here reflects her notion.42 In her framework, the virtue of temperance 
comes alive in Alma’s house, performing an ideal in a practical world, much like Spenser’s letter 
introducing the poem suggests. Her push to move between practice and theory resonates with 
Spenser’s use of Vitriuvian proportions and shapes, as building plans also move between 
abstraction and practicality, attempting to build through the use of ideal shapes.43   
The most fascinating part of the quote above is a combination of masculine and feminine 
within the house. Architecture mixes practice and theory and simultaneously mixes genders. The 
mediating work of architecture becomes both ideally and physically transsexual, even 
multiplicitous. Masculinity connects with perfection and immortality in contrast to femininity, 
which is connected with imperfection and mortality. The division comes together, however, with 
                                                 
42 Lauren Silberman, “The Faerie Queene, Book II and the Limitations of Temperence.” Modern 
Language Studies , 17:4, Autumn, (1987), 9-22. 
43In a similar reading that incorporates probability, the poem is “not to be imitated but to be 
marveled at” and this wonder instills “doubt.” See Genevieve Guenther,“Spenser’s Magic, or 
Instrumental Aesthetics in the 1590 Faerie Queene.” ELR 36.2 (2006), 194-226.  
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intimations that Alma’s house stands between the two gendered tracks.44 The building’s poetic 
space between genders heightens the impression that architecture allows readers to enter a new 
realm of probability, moving in the space between sexual dualism. Reflecting this use of 
architecture, a 1637 piece with the tantalizing title of Haec Homo demonstrates Spenser’s range 
of gender through architectural images. In the work, William Austin renders several familiar 
shapes: 
 
Fig 1.45 
Citing Vitrivius, Austin argues the square is one of several schematic proportions derived 
from the human body that allows for the expression of “all proportions, all buildings, and all 
structures.”46 He continues, “all of which discourse concerning the severall proportions of the 
body are elegantly and briefly contracted by the late dead Spenser.”47 Austin finds multiplicity in 
                                                 
44The genders also point to different types of columns. Vitrivius aligns Doric and Ionian columns 
with masculinity and femininity in De architectura, 4.1.8. Renaissance architects follow. See 
Andrea Palladio, The Four Books of Architecture. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). 
45 William Austin, Haec Homo, 79. 
46 Ibid. 76. 
47 Ibid. 79. 
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the masculine and feminine proportions of Alma’s house, “Which, indeed, is no other but the 
body.”48 In addition to Spenser, Austin’s images trope on Da Vinci’s earlier and more famous 
Vitruvian Man, whose title also points to the ancient architect Vitrivius. Both Da Vinci and 
Austin seek to encode multiplicity through overlapping shapes and multifaceted embodiment. Da 
Vinci has multiple possibilities mingle in the same visual field of the Vitruvian man. Austin’s 
separate series of shapes draws out the multiplicity contained within the earlier image. 
Comparing the above image of what appears to be a woman to Da Vinci’s ostensibly masculine 
drawing, Austin plays on what Spenser also emphasizes, namely that male and female are both 
contained within the diagrammatic form of the body. The title of Austin’s work, Haec Homo, 
mixes the genders of its modifier and noun, further emphasizing this overlap. Taking Austin and 
Da Vinci together, their images mix male and female and yet render them simultaneously 
probable when expressed as architecture’s schematics. Austin’s citations and images help clarify 
the gendered component to Spenser’s proportional multiplicity, as architectural shapes connect 
“betwixt,” or perhaps even among, genders.49 
As Spenser’s description of the house combines schematics and proportions of two 
genders in one framework, it also uses probable activities to define the entryway to Alma’s 
house. The phrase above it, “no earthly thing is sure,” insinuates that even this solid building is a 
temporary place, maintained and created only by human effort in imagining and preservation. 
The temporality of the inevitable destruction is obscure, described by the words “longer” and 
“soone.” Yet the use of “should not endure” introduces probability to the production of the walls. 
Re-emphasizing the principles and application of the building process, Spenser makes the walls 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 79. 
49 For a related discussion of the difficulties of sex for Neoplatonic ideology, see Katherine 
Crawford, “Marsilio Ficino, Neoplatonism, and the Problem of Sex.” Renaissance and 
Reformation. XVIII:2, (2004). 
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indistinct and yet material. They may exist, but by describing how the walls may have been 
conceived, he reveals the architectural connection between theory and practice that makes these 
walls unique. As in Spenser’s letter to Raleigh, probable language defines the introduction to 
Alma’s house. The narrator’s initial perceptual framing relies on verbs defining probability with 
“might not it clime” and “must turne.”  Some of these verbs seem to negate probable narratives, 
like “should not endure.” But the overall impression of the stanzas is an outline of the house’s 
walls as if these probable narratives define the building’s plan.  In short, the introductory outline 
of Alma’s walls plots a building with discrete shapes and proportions, emphasizes possible 
narratives of interaction with these shapes, and blurs the boundary between materiality and 
imagination. One means of evoking this mixture is by queering gender dichotomies.. 
Spenser’s architectural blending relies on two overlapping strands of early modern 
architectural imagery and discourse. The first is the schematic form commonly found in printed 
versions of works on building. The second is often found in manuscripts and has a more 
artistically inflected positioning of designs in a field of color, countryside, and action. Like 
Spenser’s introduction to Alma’s house, architectural plots and writings of both types of image 
define their work in terms of proportions. They also depict regular shapes in a visual field to 
describe a building. Both types of image also encode multiplicity. In many cases, both categories 
of image accompany or are accompanied by writing that uses probable language such as should, 
could, or might. 
The first schematic architectural pieces are comparable to modern blueprints. During the 
late 15th and early 16th centuries, images of keeps, castles, towers, villas, and fortified towns 
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became defined by their use of proportion and regular geometric shapes, as this image from 
Andrea Palladio’s Works (Fig 2):50  
 
Fig. 2 
Palladio stands among the most famous Italian Renaissance architects, and models his Four 
Books on Architecture after Vitrivius. Palladio also maintains one of the most visible and lasting 
presences on the English architectural scene.51 The above image fairly represents a whole genre 
                                                 
50 Andrea Palladio, “Villa Almerico (Villa Rotonda),” I quattro libri dell'architettura. Book 2, 
page 19, (1570). Woodcut illustration with letterpress text. (41.100.126.19) “Heilbrunn Timeline 
of Art History.” The Metropolitan Museum of Art. http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-
art/41.100.126.19#ixzz1Xm2cA8DN 
51 Serlio, Alberti, and Filarette are also widely known architects in early modern England. They 
were not published in English until Serlio’s Works. (London: Robert Peake, 1611). But John 
Dee’s preface to Euclid mentions architecture much earlier, and the Italian and Latin of these 
architects are in several early modern English library collections. 
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of architectural images, also published by the likes of Serlio and Filarette.52 In a departure from 
medieval draughts of complex buildings like cathedrals or castles, this format for architectural 
plots reached mass audiences in the Renaissance thanks to the printing press, the growth of a 
professional class of designers, and the growing interest in the Roman ruins often reconstructed 
in these texts. The rapid standardization of these images indicates a widespread aesthetic that 
even modern viewers can recognize as building designs.  
Like Spenser’s description of the walls of Alma’s house, Palladio’s drawing initially 
seems to define the contours of a building on a blank page using solid shapes. Lines and points in 
blank plane with a minimum of color or mimetic touches define the design. In addition, numbers, 
both written and dotted by the points of pillars, emphasize the building’s proportionality. These 
numbers, however, receive less attention than the shapes. The less schematic and more sketch-
like side-view on the bottom of the image breaks the building down into its geometric shapes, 
simultaneously looking at and through the building’s walls, much like Spenser’s poem does. To 
understand the image, viewers must relate these geometric shapes to a building process. As a 
plan, the image is a tool that makes construction possible. To understand how to build, viewers 
must understand that the image is a narrative. The proportional abstractions in the blank space 
are practical. Yet this practicality remains mediated through an abstract, often undrawn and 
unwritten, narrative of the building process. In order to comprehend how to use Palladio’s plan, a 
potential builder must take in the overhead view of the design as well the cross section, in 
addition to the accompanying textual narrative of how it could be built, and then do the 
understood but unrepresented mental work of connecting the two perspectives into a unitary 
building. In short, Palladio’s plot represents the outcome of a complex process implied by the 
                                                 
52 Although printed pieces had wider circulation, for manuscript examples see British Library 
MS Landsowne Charter 18, MS Augustus I.II.11, 13, 32. 
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blank space on the page. Viewers must use the two different points of view on the top and 
bottom of the page to imagine a building between and beyond them. Part of the mental work 
involved in understanding the plan is moving between categories of time. The plan connects a 
present moment to an imagined future, perhaps placing the two in the same plane. 
In addition to the image’s combination of two perspectives and the intermingling 
temporal categories of the building process, another signature feature is the homogenous and 
blank space of the page that implies the potential for other iterations of the design. These 
probable lines seem invisible. But the presence of these probable narratives is paradoxically 
illustrated in the text describing the building. Palladio and other architects emphasize an 
architectural image’s probable narrativity by writing a paragraph or two that describes 
construction or potential construction for each of these images. The stories Palladio, Serlio, and 
others tell in the brief sketches are of contingent modifications to the building site, available 
funds, and special materials. Within these narratives, just as when planning becomes the focus of 
Alma’s house in The Faerie Queene, the verbs Palladio uses to describe the building process are 
often translated into English with the subjunctive mood.53 For one palazzo he writes, “The hall 
which is above the entrance has no columns and is as high as the roof and has a walkway or 
balcony at the same level as the rooms on the third story, which would also give access to the 
windows above…the smaller hall should have a wooden ceiling at the same height as the vaults 
of the second story rooms…All the doors and windows would have corresponded to each 
other.”54 Like Spenser’s description of Alma’s walls, Palladio’s words emphasize probability in 
the construction of the palazzos and villas he discusses.  
                                                 
53 Andrea Palladio, The Four Books of Architecture, 149-57. 
54 Ibid. 150-1. The standard grammar of Italian verbs make even more distinctions of probability 
than English, with a distinct conditional as well as a subjunctive. But for an example supporting 
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 Alma’s walls also evoke a second architectural archive that renders multiplicity in a less 
schematic way. This other group of architectural images are manuscript draughts commissioned 
by the English state during the Tudor period.55 Sitting monarchs surveyed existing military and 
civil building projects and reviewed proposals for new ones. In these images one can see a 
clarification and substantiation of the probable narratives encoded in the blank space of 
Palladio’s schematic images. More than Palladio, the Tudor draughts mix mimetic reflections 
with the abstract shapes of imaginary buildings. Although many early modern architectural 
designs resemble Palladio’s, images like the one of Great Yarmouth below appear at a similar 
frequency in many archives (Fig 3)56: 
   
 
Fig. 3 
                                                                                                                                                             
my argument the phrase “would also give access to the windows above” in Italian is ”Che 
servirebbe anco alle finestre di sopra.” 363. 
55 The British Library contains an extensive collection in this style ranging over nearly 200 years.  
For other examples see, Cotton Augustus MS I.ii. 3, 11, 32, 64, 69.   
56 British Library MS Cotton Augustus, I.1.f74.  See 
http://www.bl.uk/onlinegallery/onlineex/unvbrit/g/001cotaugi00001u00074000.html for a brief 
and helpful summary of the genre and provenance of the image. 
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In particular the image depicts the collapse of multiple categories of time through the spatial 
representation of dozens of probable activities mingling in close proximity. In this way, the 
action resembles medieval narrative paintings and tapestries. The above image depicts the entire 
town of Great Yarmouth, where a town’s worth of activity is temporally and spatially 
compressed.  Ships stand ready to enter the river and dock (Fig 3a), cannons fire from a fort, 
while cattle inhabit the foreground and windmills stand ready to spin. 
 
Fig 3a 
At the river, other concerns preoccupy the town’s inhabitants as they duck someone in the river 
(Fig 3b) Perhaps an accused witch?  A cuckold?  The image does not specify, but it may in fact 
be trying to evoke the possibility of both. 
  
Fig. 3b 
These activities, and their similarities to familiar paintings or medieval narrative images, make it 
easy to miss the fact that the harbor edifices on the left of the painting are plans (Fig 3c).57 
                                                 
57 In the early modern period, plans describe completed edifices as well as potential ones. I 
believe, as the curator in the summary footnote above, that the image is a part of a royal survey 
of existing harbor works alongside a proposed project. There is, however, no way to be sure 
based on the image alone since abortive projects and existing buildings often have the same 
visual format. This similarity further suggests and interlacing of theory and practice. 
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Fig. 3c 
If viewers expect an image like Palladio’s, Great Yarmouth’s colorful flourishes and 
narratives of action could mislead. But this image is not a painting or a map. It is an architectural 
survey and part of a construction proposal commissioned by the state. At the same time, the 
image helps builders and state planners and the harbor blends into the image of the town as a 
whole. Indeed, the waterway edifices facilitate or make possible the dozens of possible narratives 
contained inside the buildings, subjects, and animals of Great Yarmouth. The plots on the left 
have almost the same amount of information as Palladio’s more obvious architectural pieces, 
though they may not give exact enumerated building instructions. In contrast to those images, an 
important formal aspect of the piece is that activity clusters in the right and center of the image, 
defined by where a planner might have seen activity in the town. Building on these clusters, the 
Great Yarmouth image also emphasizes probability in the mixture of multiple points of view in 
the image’s different angles. The mixed vantage spot in the depiction of each individual activity 
multiplies the two perspectives necessary to comprehend Palladio’s pages. By occupying 
intermingling perspectives, the image suggests that architecture self-consciously requires 
multiple equally likely viewpoints in a single overview, without privileging any vantage point as 
the only necessary one. Thus, the Yarmouth image exploits the openness to multiple perspectives 
found in architectural image-narratives.  
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Another architectural image that represents this multiplicity does so in a way that even 
more clearly illustrates the material-abstract blending of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. The image, 
describing a battle in the 17th century, has the familiar plan of a battle and a fort.58 The twist is 
that the central image of the fort can be flipped up, revealing an image beneath with the 
destroyed version of the same fort. The image and material represent the multiplicity of these 
two positions in material space. 
 In the encoding of multiplicity, images like Great Yarmouth might be compared to Gil 
Harris’ palimpsests from Untimely Matter in the Age of Shakespeare.  A palimpsest is a text that 
has been written over, but that still contains the traces of the underlying text.  According to 
Harris, these texts are polychromic because they contain multiple time periods, but they are also 
multi-temporal because they “can be made to articulate several different organizations of time.”  
The three organizations that Harris finds in early modern palimpsests are the “polychromic,” 
where different times can speak to each other, the “explosion,” where an older text unexpectedly 
gains importance in more recent writing, or the “supersession,” as a new text attempts to 
overtake the writing it covers up. In this understanding, a palimpsest’s physical arrangement—its 
matter—is “antisequential: superimposing past and present without insisting on any linear 
relation between them.” 59  The Great Yarmouth image may be a palimpsest of possibility, as it 
contains a projection of one probable future alongside actions from various other times.  Like in 
Harris, the key features are matter, only here it is the arrangement of certain projections in 
addition to bodies, and there is a self-conscious freezing of actions and activities for an even 
greater emphasis on multiple coexisting time periods. The diagram of the destroyed fort that flips 
                                                 
58 Cotton Augustus MS I.ii.79. This image is from the late Tudor period, but is consistent with 
the groundplots I am describing. 
59 Harris. Untimely Matter. 14-17. 
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up to reveal the intact one offers the material version of this palimpsest. Both are images of 
designs that engage multiplicity. 
The narrative-imagery of Great Yarmouth and the narrative-imagery of Alma’s walls 
both define material representations of buildings alongside multiple coexisting theoretical 
narratives that interact with these edifices. In the above image, the possibilities include ships 
firing or docking, farming, grinding wheat, or even corporal punishments like ducking. In 
Spenser, the walls are defined by foes that “could” climb, and foes that “might” not reach the 
height. In both poem and image, the concerns are practical, and they are also potential. The poem 
and architectural archives both rely on the imagistic and narrative components of planning—they 
share a foundation. Using this foundation, The Faerie Queene poeticizes architectural images 
and texts in order to construct Alma’s house. In the next section we will see how this basis in 
planning gives rise to the house’s multiplicity of setting and characters. 
 
The Shape (and Time) of State Planning Inside Alma’s House 
The probable image-narratives of Alma’s walls set the expectations for the rest of the 
cantos exploring Alma’s house even as the section transitions into the related process of state 
planning. As the operations of the state are laid bare, the poem simultaneously incorporates the 
architectural techniques above and intensifies an exploration of probability. The ensuing stanzas’ 
overlap of architecture and statecraft is apropos since the Tudor regime commissioned many of 
the surviving architectural images as a part of far-reaching plans for war or commerce. Spenser 
himself, as an aide to the governor of the colonial project in Ireland, would have seen the 
preparation and implementation of these plans first hand.60 But in Spenser’s day this connection 
                                                 
60 For an example of a fort in Armagh see MS British Library Cotton Augustus I. ii. 32. 
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between state and architectural plans was new and strange, and not a simple metaphor of control. 
The connection between the two, I want to suggest in this section, is only linear in retrospect. In 
the moment these plans are crafted, the connection between different sorts of plotting was 
strange and destabilizing. I’ll start first by giving an overview of counsel and its connection to 
architecture to broaden the scope of the Subjunctive Aestehtic, before turning back to Spenser’s 
advisors and seeing how they work with the anachronism, space, and probability outlined in 
these discourses. 
In early modern government discourses of counsel, the self-consciousness anachronism 
of projection often announced itself with vehement denial of provisionality that is reflected by 
current understandings of planning.  When a monarch or a lord decided on a plan of action, no 
matter how complex, it was generally described as an “Act” or an “order” as when Henry VIII 
and his Parliament declared the various “Act of Succession.”  These plans were granted the 
status of law, but they altered repeatedly as the political and personal situation of the monarch 
shifted.  No matter how speculative or contingent these plans might be, they were understood to 
be efficacious even while the creator or other agents might modify them to suit their will.  These 
devices and plots were couched in terms of “If…then” statements, or delivered as the best course 
of action in what “should,” “shall,” or “might be” done.61  In terms of language, these acts and 
                                                 
61 An example from the Third Act of Succession:  “His Majesty therefore thinketh convenient 
afore his departure beyond the seas, that it be enacted by His Highness with the assent of the 
lords spiritual and temporal and the commons in this present parliament assembled and by 
authority of the same, and therefore be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, that in case it shall 
happen the king's majesty and the said excellent prince his yet only son Prince Edward and heir 
apparent, … then the said imperial crown and all other the premises shall be to the Lady Mary, 
the king's Highness' daughter, and to the heirs of the body of the same Lady Mary.” Bailey, 
Alred. The Succession to the English Crown (London: Macmillan and Company, 1879), 130. 
Queen Elizabeth’s first speech to Parliament clarifies that she will rely on “counsel,” from 
“advisors,” much like Alma. But even this counsel is enumerated into provisional steps, “And for 
counsel and advice I shall accept you of my nobility, and such others of you the rest as in 
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orders are plans that relate directly to architectural plans, occupying a mental space 
comprehensible as both practice and theory, moving through the same perceptual mode the 
counsel of Alma’s house.  
Modern historical discourses have previously had difficulty in detecting the probabilistic 
makeup in the comprehensibility of an Act, Order, or any kind of governmental device.  If events 
proceed in a manner unforeseen or unforeseeable from the moment of utterance, historians have 
been tempted to call an Act a mere failed fantasy—or in Philip Sidney’s terms a “poetic” conceit 
that “nothing affirmeth, and therefore nothing lieth.”  In contrast, historians usually grant special 
status to a well-executed Act that passing time reveals as prescient, believing it to be historical 
description, such as Elizabeth’s provision settlement of the English National Church as neither 
staunchly Protestant nor quite Catholic. Because looking backwards allows viewing 
governmental acts as either failed or successful implementation, historians and critics have often 
associated them with various versions of linear histories—now generally summarized as 
Whiggish. Although there may be problems with Whiggish histories, I emphasize that the Acts 
of Succession or the Act of Settlement are neither operational fictions nor historical facts, but 
probable narratives that remain in that mode despite our attempts to contextualize these artifacts 
in those terms. Several historians have recently noted the difficulties in pronouncements of 
teleology, insisting for, example that the Elizabethan settlement of religion was not a settlement 
at all, but a deferral or argument powered by the monarch’s fiat.62  I want to add that the open-
ended plan format of Elizabeth’s act is not some dream of a via media English Protestantism or 
                                                                                                                                                             
consultation I shall think meet and shortly appoint.”  Elizabeth. Collected Works. Ed. Leah 
Marcus, Muller, Janel, and Rose, Mary Beth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 52. 
62 Lake, Peter. “Puritanism, (Monarchical) Republicanism, and Monarch; or John Whitgift, 
Antipuritanism, and the “Invention” of Popularity. Journal of Medieval and Early Modern 
Studies. 40:3, (Fall 2010), 463-495. 
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an historical fact described post mortum, but rather a device that attempts to navigate multiple 
outcomes at once. The choice to emphasize historical action over the Subjunctive Aesthetic leads 
us to imagine her Act as fact or counter-fact, when probability is actually the most satisfying 
means of understanding how people experienced these texts. At the same time that these texts are 
not as factual as some discourses would have them, though, I also think they illustrate the 
practical government effects of the Aesthetic. 
These government plans make things happen, and in the case of Henry VIII’s issue or the 
settlement of the church, can describe an ongoing process. But even once a person or group 
undertakes an action, its plan—no matter how well followed—never becomes as reliable as a 
description.63 Its status remains akin to a strong suggestion for one choice among a group of 
others. A plan, even when complete, remains in its own representational category that is not 
fictional, but subjunctive.  The Subjunctive Aesthetic in government discourses then, then is also 
defined by this representational movement through probability, wherein we project ourselves, 
others, and objects into an imagistic or rhetorical alternative that can approach but will not 
seamlessly reconnect to ontology or epistemology.  It can sometimes act as a bridge between a 
piece of fiction or a fact, but in early modern England it more often moves through narratives all 
its own. The transition from Elizabeth’s reign to James is defined by uncertainty, doubt, and 
plotting, and terrifies some while providing others with a moment to alter competing narratives 
for directing new policy.64 
                                                 
63 The law, construed as an operational fiction, intersects in many ways with the way I construe 
the continuum between acts and counsel. Kantorowicz, Ernst’s The King’s Two Bodies, even 
suggests the multiplicity of forward thinking laws. But the relationship between deliberation and 
law is outside the scope of this dissertation. 
64 Collinson, Patrick. “The Elizabethan Exclusion Crisis and the Elizabethan Polity.” 
Proceedings of the British Academy, 84. 51-92 
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These textual Acts and Orders have visual equivalents that demonstrate the range that we 
can also see in archtiecture.  Modern representations of Henry VIII’s Succession, for example, 
are often represented with a genealogical diagram that flattens time to represent a certain 
narrative of dynasty.   Painters in the early modern era also attempted a similar flattening of time 
for similar reasons, although their possible progressions displayed a more extensive engagement 
with multiple possibilities.  Monarch portraits, for example, suggested the rightful heir by 
placing a smaller portrait of Henry VIII within paintings of Edward, Mary, or Elizabeth—
reaching through time to emphasize a certain vector of providence.  Just as the Act of Succession 
shakes loose from fixed temporal loci in favor of multiple possibilities of ascent to the throne, 
images of the royal family also mingle multiple narratives in a single projection.  For example, 
Henry’s family portrait from the 1540s commissioned by Catherine Parr: 
 
Fig. 4.65 
The image reveals a throne room, resembling the cross-section from the various architectural 
pieces published in the era. Like Spenser’s pillars of Alma’s house, masculinity and femininity 
sit “twixt” the pillar’s surrounding Henry’s throne. But the image describes the royal family. In a 
substitution from another time, Jane Seymour, who is dead, replaces Parr (Henry’s wife at the 
                                                 
65 The Family of Henry VIII, c. 1543-1547. Unknown artist, after Holbein. 
Hampton Court Palace. Oil on Canvas. 
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time of commission), at the left hand of the King. All possible successors to the throne appear in 
the image, with Edward at the right hand, and Mary and Elizabeth flanking the throne, reflecting 
the provisions of the Third Act of Succession. Probability of inheritance becomes distance, but is 
also combined by the anachronistic calling up of the dead Seymour. The image not only 
combines intermingling probabilities in the same visual field like Great Yarmouth, but also 
directly connects the representation to an architectural cross-section. Furthermore, this famous 
fresco is altered at least once in the course of Henry’s shifting heirs, reflecting the changing of 
the various orders of succession, of the various ways the state plots the future. 
Later images move away from the explicit connection of architecture with statecraft, 
although the concerns remain similar. These images also try and diagram succession with space, 
although in different iterations.  This portrait from 1597 shows how politically multiplicitous the 
Subjunctive Aesthetic can be. 
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Fig. 5.66 
Here, as in the earlier image, full-grown monarchs mingle across time, with a succession from 
left to right that mimics the experience of reading a story. No longer does each heir’s parents 
appear—now only monarchs mingle in the visual field, possibly to emphasize the direct lines of 
the throne. If this is the case, however, Mary I’s absence from the gathering is striking even at 
the moment the portrait is crafted. Her omission can presumably be explained because that 
particular monarch no longer fits the new Protestant political dispensation for Elizabeth’s state. 
Some of the most famous images in the National Portrait Gallery in London preserve several of 
these portraits. Most suppress the possibility of a reversion to a Catholic monarch by combining 
images of Prince Edward and Elizabeth, or Elizabeth and Henry VIII. Some of Mary omit the 
young Edward. The self-conscious possibility of the regime moving in a different direction is 
palpable not just in the intermingling dynastic connections in the images, but also in the omission 
of certain importune counter-possibilities, such as Mary. These images aren’t directly tied to 
plans, but they inhabit the Subjunctive Aesthetic. They can omit politically passé subjects such 
as Mary even while calling up dead ones, such as Henry and Edward. The anachronistic 
clustering of figures in space evokes all of these probable options, forcing a viewer to make their 
own calculations. But the images are also strange. They’re not separate portraits, but single 
portraits, and the appearance of the dead in their frames calls up their ghosts. Partly, this 
haunting comes from the way the portraits make monarchs plastic, physically alterable to fit 
policy. Yet the images also make these alternate dynasties disposable or replaceable like Mary. 
They too are palimpsests of probable narratives. 
                                                 
66 Henry VIII, Elizabeth I, and Edward VI, 1597. Oil on Panel. Unknown Artist.Art Institute of 
Chicago. 
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In the above image, the three figures standing in the throne room suggest proper 
leadership of the kingdom in a defined space. The space of the throne room calls up anachronism 
to achieve a direction, to unpack a narrative through probability. Although the fact that there are 
three monarchs in the image is likely a coincidence, the ghostly mixing of dead and living 
sovereigns resonates with Alma’s three advisors. Unlike the above image, however, Alma’s 
advisors from different periods of time live in separate rooms. As in Henry VIII’s image of 
succession, architecture centers the scene when Alma’s most important advisors first appear, as 
readers arrive at central turret. In this central turret, the narrator points out the “Turrets frame” 
and the “roof arched overhead” (2.9.29). “Frame” repeats the word used in the initial description 
of Alma’s walls, and calls up once again the outline of a building plot. But expanding the 
connection to counsel, the tower can also “frame” the advisors. This central spot is where Alma 
holds court and where the overwhelmed narrator excuses his failure to represent the tower’s 
“great workemanship” (2.9.47). Despite the claim of failure, the term “workemanship” 
reappears, a word also used to describe Alma’s walls.  Continuing the language defined in the 
introduction to Alma’s walls, architecture and counsel come together.  
The people who live in the tower are the most fleshed-out characters in the sequence, 
measured by the number of lines the poem spends on them. Inside the tower’s frame, Alma’s 
three counselors advise her on how to best operate her estate. Critics following an allegorical 
reading view these advisors as the brain of Alma’s house, with each representing different parts 
of the mind. This reading is bolstered by character names like Phantastes, which corresponds to 
fantasy or imagination.67 These parallels of the parts of the mind establish a framework; the 
                                                 
67 Several critics argue the advisors are matched up with parts of the brain/mind. Forebrain, mid-
brain, and back-brain correspond to imagination, perception, and memory. These readings tend 
to elide the temporal elements of each advisor. See Robert L. Reid, “Spenserian Psychology and 
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complexity of Spenser’s description quickly muddies this division. In addition to their allegorical 
status as parts of the brain, the advisors also know the past, present, or future. The characters 
advise their ruler and have a special relationship to the spaces they inhabit. These attributes 
derive from the characters’ status as planners. Like an architectural plot, counsel self-consciously 
mediates between imagining and acting. The poem insinuates the architectural connection 
situating each counselor in a defined room. Yet despite the promise of partition offered by well-
defined rooms, blending of space and time—not separation—underlies the way the advisors 
interact. In fact, their rooms come to define the connection between space, time, and probability, 
beginning with an advisor who generally looks to the future: 
The first of them could things to come foresee: 
  The next could of things present best aduize; 
  The third things past could keepe in memoree, 
  So that no time, nor reason could arize, 
  But that the same could one of these comprize. 
  For thy the first did in the forepart sit, 
  That nought mote hinder his quicke preiudize: 
  He had a sharpe foresight, and working wit, 
That neuer idle was, ne once could rest a whit. (2.9.49) 
 
In this space, a category of time seems to occupy a single room, as indicated by the equivalence 
of the spatial “forepart” of the first counselor’s room and the potential of “foresight.”  This 
equivalence begins a correspondence for each room with past, present, and future. 
The subsequent stanzas do not maintain this clear correspondence of space and time, 
however, but keep pushing multiplicity. Setting up the growing multiplicity and hearkening back 
to Alma’s walls, the verbs that initiate the lines above like “could…foresee,” “could…advise,” 
and “could keepe,” define an imaginative space of probable actions. Similarly, in the following 
stanzas “infinite shapes of things dispersed” cover the walls of the room. Unexpectedly for the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Structure of Allegory in Books 1 and 2 of ‘The Faerie Queene’.” Modern Philology 79.4 
(1982), 359-375. 
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room’s supposedly future-orientated space, the space also contains the present and the past: 
“Some daily seene, and knowen by their names, / Such as in idle fantasies doe flit:/ Infernall 
Hags, Centaurs, feendes, Hippodames,/ Apes, Lions, Ãigles, Owles, fooles, louers, children, 
Dames” (2.9.49-50). Time collapses, and for a moment, it is difficult to escape the suggestion 
that lovers, children, and dames are imaginary constructions as “Centuars” are.  Instead of the 
fantastic suggestion of these beings, however, this room’s more ontologically trustworthy 
“fooles” and “lovers” introduce a continuum of probability. The imagery blends the possible and 
the impossible together in this space of planning, in a more pronounced version of Henry or 
Elizabeth’s portraits that call up the likely heir and the ghosts of the dead. In Spenser’s space, 
probable activities mingle alongside improbable or impossible fantasies like Centaurs. The room 
contains the projections of “idle thoughts and fantasies, Deuices, dreames, opinions vnsound, 
Shewes, visions, sooth-sayes, and prophesies; And all that fained is, as leasings, tales, and lies” 
(2.9.51). In fact, the counselor living here “mad or foolish seemed.” The room of the future 
describes a wide range of probability and combines self-conscious truth and falsehood. 
Bolstering this confusion and bringing our attention back to a representation of space, flies buzz 
in the air of Phantastes’ room, making the empty spaces of the room visually palpable but 
potentially obscuring the homogeneity of the room’s space with moving clusters and clouds.  
This is the room the reader might be tempted most strongly to associate with governance 
or planning, and the space that introduces the advisors. Phantastes at least partially knows the 
future, and yet his space is confused. The confusion embodied by the flies is partially explained 
as the uncontrollable operations of imagination, or the idle thoughts necessary to give rise to 
useful ideas. Yet beyond this explanation, the confusion of the flies, like the confusing 
combination of imagery in Phantastes’ room, isn’t really confusion at all. Here, in this space, 
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physically filled with the erratic movements of flies and the intermingling of “fantasies” 
alongside “shapes daily seen,” is where planning for the future happens. Instead of focusing only 
on the future, multiple narratives, even multiple time periods, can coexist here. Spenser initially 
claims that the advisors live in “three rooms” that are “sundry” (2.9.48). But the clean separation 
suggested by these divisions stands in tension with the confusion drawn on the walls and the air 
filled with flies. The buzzing flies give palpable contours to probability as a faint cloud of 
moving points. Like the Yarmouth image’s activity, the flies occupy the room’s potential 
iterations through an indistinct and yet visible motion. In their mapping of probability onto space 
they seem like the quantum cloud of electrons around an atom, only hundreds of years out of 
time. But the frame of the room is important. The imagery of their movement renders the room 
of planning as a hazy space filled with intermingling probable narratives. 
The other rooms continue and heighten the blended range of foresight. In contrast to 
Phantastes’ well-explored dwelling, very little of the unnamed present advisor’s room receives 
description. The lack of a name is the first indicator that this room is unique. Alma shows her 
guests the paintings on the room’s walls of “magistrates” and various other symbols of justice, 
and its “man of ripe and perfect age,/ who did them meditate all his life long, /That through 
continual practice and usage, He now was grown right wise” (2.9.54). “Now,” emphasizes the 
advisor’s connection to the present. Considering Spenser’s Letter to Raleigh appended to The 
Faerie Queene, where a mixed form of theory and practice is praiseworthy, Spenser’s 
description of the counselor as one who “meditates” and “practices” also recalls the narrative 
mediation between thought and action in planning. Further heightening the sensation of 
probability, Alma hurries Arthur and Guyon through to the final room of the past despite their 
desire to see more. The room remains an unfulfilled desire, offering a physical space that the 
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narrator never enters. In fact, he calls it “full” (2.9.54). In this fullness and unarticulated 
description, the room recalls the initial description of the house’s walls. The room is between 
past and future, but Spenser can only gesture to what this means by referencing a perverse denial 
of desire. Recent critics have noted Guyon’s homoerotic potential, and the frustrated desire and 
denied description connects to a similarly queer appeal of the also unrepresented Alma.68 Indeed, 
this ushering along marks her last appearance in the stanzas. Like her appearance, the room stays 
obscured and becomes a charged desire shared by Arthur, Guyon, and narrator. They can never 
obtain their desire, but must instead revel in the impossibility of achieving satisfaction by 
imagining what might be. Yet this is not end, but an occasion for more narratives of desire. In the 
queerly defined lacuna of this mostly unseen room, much like a blank space on an architectural 
plan, the balanced knowledge of perfect governance potentially exists. Yet this is the one 
moment in Alma’s house that readers never receive an explicit depiction or description of this 
potential. The room contains multiplicity in a way that cannot be visually mapped or recounted 
in narrative. In contrast with other descriptions where space and time mingle together to 
represent probability, undiluted probability resides inside this room. 
The obscurely glimpsed images on the room’s walls only hint at the raw potential 
contained inside the space. The depictions of magistrates and judges are totalizing, in Spenser’s 
words expressing “all artes, all science, all Philosophy” (2.9.53). Even the spatial context in the 
tower reinforces the room’s multiplicity. The room passes so quickly that it can only define its 
status based on our confusing encounter with Phantastes’ potential futures, and what readers 
eventually come to see in the room of the past. The room of the present does not instruct or 
educate by itself, but rather does so by spatially standing between confusing projections from the 
                                                 
68 Jeff Tolvin, “Panic’s Castle,” 15, hints at the homosexual undertones of Guyon’s story, as he is 
the only wandering knight with no lady. 
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future with what will presumably be a more trustworthy and stable narrative of history in the 
room of the past. The blank room offers an anachronistic pivot of possibility between the past 
and future.  
 Eumnestes, the final counselor, sits in a room “ruinous and old, And therefore removed 
far behind, Yet were the wals, that did the same uphold, / Right firm and strong, though somwhat 
they declined” (2.9.55).  The mention of the “ruinous” old room establishes a fundamental 
connection between architectural and temporal categories. Renaissance architectural prints based 
on proportions and rational principles sprang from Classical sources. The ancient Roman ruins 
found in Europe provided another type of information. Using these remains and the remaining 
narratives culled from Vitrivius, writers like Palladio reconstructed what they believed the 
buildings looked like. As they did so, they reconstructed the space of the past by extrapolating 
from existing parts of it. This reconstruction extended space backwards through time via a spatial 
calculation of probability. Playing with this architectural possibility, Spenser’s sequence gives a 
poetic equivalent of the architectural reconstructions. In the description of the last room, spatial 
orientation (“behind”) becomes linked in a causal relationship (“therefore”) to the past (“old”).  
Through a manipulation of probability, time becomes a space behind readers. 
In the three advisors’ rooms, temporal movement meet spatial representation so that 
probabilities can be put into dialogue and advise the ruler of the house, to define a general 
direction. Although each room claims to associate with one particular category among past, 
present, and future, each room also contains things that currently exist, have existed in the past, 
or might come to be. Each space contains fictional and non-fictional images existing alongside 
each other. Initially aligning with the categories of linear time, the section then blends categories 
of time together through a defined physical proximity and a mingling of multiple probable 
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narratives. Characters and readers can go between the rooms. The ability to spatially move 
between categories of time in Alma’s house reflects the Tudor orders of succession or their 
imagery in Elizabeth and Henry’s portraits. It also calls up the Great Yarmouth image, as 
different probabilities mix. Multiple categories of time exist simultaneously in the same central 
tower because the advisors must sort through myriad probabilities to define a plan. By 
spatializing time in their rooms, Spenser draws on and makes explicit the assumptions behind 
early modern architecture. Time and space no longer define narrative but instead become 
categories that the multiple probable narratives of planning can manipulate. Eumnestes’ room of 
the past, like the other advisors’ rooms, blends categories of time and finds multiplicity within 
them. But here, unlike the other two rooms, we will see the confluence of history and allegory 
with planning.  
Returning to my plan for this chapter, the initial lines have become more fixed. We now 
see how architecture allows for space and time to coalesce and even collapse into probability 
around Alma’s advisors. In arriving at this point, however, the figure projected from my initial 
plan has expanded, coming to include probable details that initially seemed obscure or 
conflicting. My argument, like Alma’s house, has paradoxically become a container and vehicle 
for a potential that moves beyond containment and linear movement. In the next section we will 
see how characters and genres from other parts of the poem inhabit the structure that the poem 
has made. 
 
Putting Up the Bookshelves: How Planning Mediates Between Allegory and History 
After Arthur and Guyon finally enter the room of the past there are more stanzas than in 
the other rooms combined. Inside, a blind old man with all the moth-eaten knowledge of the past 
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sits contemplating history. Here, the knights read a pair of books in genres that complement and 
connect with each other though the multiplicity of planning. Guyon and Arthur pick up two 
books called Antiquitie of Faerie Lond and Briton Monument from their neighboring positions on 
a shelf. Both claim to be histories, but Faerie Lond takes the magical Fae as its purview while 
Briton Monument describes more commonplace fare, such as Brutus and the various kings of 
England. Both titles have some similarities, as Faerie Lond’s title again offers a specific place as 
a marker of narrative while Briton Monument’s label re-emphasizes the connection of these texts 
to the process of building. As Arthur and Guyon read, the text jumps to a new canto, separate 
from the descriptions of Alma’s house. The new canto reinforces the notion of poetically 
entering yet another space, just as Arthur and Guyon entered each counselor’s room. This is not 
an entirely novel development, as space often defines the visual presentation of poetry—stanza is 
Italian for “room.” Spenserian Alexandrines in particular take a signature shape on the page. But 
Spenser develops this new space to tell two sequential narratives that simultaneously open up a 
range of probable narratives. The poem connects the two books of history and allegory through 
the context and mechanisms of planning. 
Reflecting the reader’s movement through the rooms of each counselor, the poetic space 
of Arthur’s book moves backward through time as the narrative of The Faerie Queen moves 
ahead. Briton Monument summarizes the pagan history of England, but stops before arriving at 
the person of its reader: 
After him Vther, which Pendragon hight, 
  Succeding There abruptly it did end, 
  Without full point, or other Cesure right, 
  As if the rest some wicked hand did rend, 
  Or th'Authour selfe could not at least attend 
  To finish it: that so untimely breach 
  The Prince him selfe halfe seemeth to offend, 
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  Yet secret pleasure did offence empeach, 
And wonder of antiquitie long stopt his speech (2.10.68) 
 
At the close of the text and the arrival at Arthur’s present moment, Briton Monument opens up 
radical conceptions of probability, where Arthur is internally divided by his pleasure with the 
“offence” and the “breach” in history’s linear sequential narrative. The pun on Arthur’s name 
with “Or th’Authour selfe could not at least attend to finish it” plays on the confusion of identity 
brought on by the moment—is Arthur an author or a character? The pun’s mixed identity for 
Arthur combines active and passive elements. Reading becomes a kingly activity of meaning 
making and yet a passive experience of interpretation. The mixture of passive and active reading 
parallels Lauren Silberman’s argument that the section mediates theory and practice. In the space 
between active and passive, the counsel of history that Arthur finds, like other forms of planning, 
calls upon intention but also opens up that intent to range around even the most established line 
of dynastic succession. 
The stanza above dramatizes this range of probable narratives, making their multiplicity a 
privileged aesthetic site of self-reflection. Arthur’s “secret pleasure” at the break in the text, by 
the lack of “Cesure right,” is opened up by defined absence, much like the blank space on an 
architectural plan, or Alma’s undefined advisor of the present. The word “Cesure” makes clear 
that the temporal/spatial divisions between the rooms of the past and present advisors are also 
poetic divisions between the past and the present of historical narrative via a metrical pause.  The 
pause encodes the pleasure of an uncertain future through poetry, and also through the masterful 
denial of expectation. But Spenser connects this poetic pleasure to the proliferation of narrative 
possibilities within a fixed linear history.  Here on the edges of history and literature, where a 
fictional character reads what early modern historians would define as historical narrative, 
Arthur takes pleasure in the “wonder of antiquitie” as he takes chivalric pleasure in the 
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wanderings of errantry. Although Arthur may experience pride at the established sequence of 
things, the break also suggests he can thrill at the probable next steps for an uncertain dynasty. 
The Monument’s caesura is ironically poignant and personal for the character reading the 
history, because as romance readers know, in this moment Arthur finds a secret joy in the lack of 
surety while he does not yet know his own future. In fact, he only recently discovered he fills the 
place occupied by the caesura as Uther’s son. For readers who know the Arthurian cycles, who 
know how Arthur eventually fills this caesura and assumes leadership over what promises to be 
the defining British dynasty, his pleasure becomes increasingly incongruous.  In many of the 
Arthurian cycles, and in the most popular version of its day—Mallory’s Le Morte D’Arthur— 
Arthur’s reign ends with a break in the line of British kings.69 Arthur may return in England’s 
hour of need, but Mallory has a foreign king succeed Arthur.  Even this potentially problematic 
succession takes place only after Arthur kills Mordred, his legitimate and yet incestuous heir, in 
the same battle where he receives his own mortal wound.  Regardless of which version of the tale 
that comes next, all versions of the Matter of Britain end with a disastrous break in the orderly 
rule of the kingdom. Thus, in one reading, Arthur takes pleasure in the unknown possibilities, not 
realizing that at its core this break in the book of history may ruin the goals of his dynastic plans.  
The suggestion that Arthur’s pleasure is “secret” provides another tantalizing reading.  
Although Arthur may believe that history ideally moves along a linear and providential dynasty, 
he also recognizes that such projections can never be reliable. God’s plan for a kingdom is 
unknowable, and human plans for the future always bring with them multiple probable narratives 
that may work against even the most reliable dynastic succession. “Long antiquitie” impresses 
him but does not silence Arthur. The multiplying of probable next steps in his reign “stopt” him, 
                                                 
69 Even Mallory’s text contains two options when it comes to the crown, however, as the Christ-
like Arthur is possibly dead but also possibly still alive in another world, waiting to return. 
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while also instilling a hidden enjoyment in these counter-possibilities. This text in the room of 
the past, where history meets counsel, is multiply occupied by mingling points of view and 
perceptions of what is probable. Spenser exploits the potentials to tie history and theory as his 
letter to Raleigh also claims. But by tying the forms together, Spenser requires his readers, 
including Arthur, to calculate their own probabilities. In one possible future, Arthur does not die 
or leave the kingdom—he makes the utopian Briton promised in one possible future. Or more 
radically, perhaps Arthur thrills at the possibility of his own death. At this moment, the border 
between theory and praxis becomes reworked through a connection of past and present, with a 
suggestion of pleasure in the multiple probable outcomes for the future, even in the violently 
self-destructive ones.  
One objection to this reading of multiplicity is that the end of Briton Monument’s 
cliffhanger cannot be defined as a breach, since it could not conceivably continue and still be 
called a history. This argument would claim that Arthur and Guyon could not read a book of 
antiquity’s wonders that also recounts the future of their kingdom in the same text in the same 
style. The next stanzas address this concern by suggesting a multiplicity from a complementary 
and yet separate genre. In the next stanza, Guyon picks up and reads a history of Faerie Land. 
This history stands adjacent to Briton Monument, on the same shelf—their covers separating 
their physical space much like the room’s of Alma’s advisors border each other— and actually 
continues into Arthur and Guyon’s future, albeit a future as askew to linear time as Briton 
Monument. Ostensibly the work tells of the genealogy of Fae Kings and Queens.  But its final 
strains tell a modified version of the Tudor succession: 
The wise Elficleos in great Maiestie, 
  Who mightily that scepter did sustayne, 
  And with rich spoiles and famous victorie, 
  Did high aduaunce the crowne of Faery: 
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  He left two sonnes, of which faire Elferon 
  The eldest brother did vntimely dy; 
  Whose emptie place the mightie Oberon… 
  He dying left the fairest Tanaquill, 
  Him to succeede therein, by his last will (2.10.75-6) 
 
In the allegorical reading of this moment, Elficleos is Henry VII with his two sons. In a literary-
praxis resonance, the eldest son, Elferson corresponds to Henry VII’s son Arthur. Much like 
King Arthur, Henry’s son dies and leaves Henry VIII to succeed, and from thence to Tanaquill 
(Queen Elizabeth, the Faerie Queene). Thus, the book predicts the future beyond Arthur while 
simultaneously telling of an alternate world of the Fae. Neither fiction nor history describes this 
use of allegory, nor does prophecy or prediction accurately describe the tale told here since the 
book is still a history. In its alternate account of Elizabeth’s genealogy, the book self-consciously 
skips over or purposefully omits several reigns, most notably Mary’s and Edward’s. The book 
treats time as malleable and contingent. 
Placing this historical allegory in the land of the Fae beside the book of a more 
established and reliable Briton Monument repeats the suggestion that probability alters a linear 
progression of time. In Eumnestes’ books, history and allegory connect, blend, and begin to 
define each other. The moment almost predicts Paul Riceour’s claims that the trustworthiness of 
history is vouched for by literature’s fictionality, as history defines fiction in return. Yet as Mary 
Poovey argues in A History of the Modern Fact, early modern fiction and fact have not split from 
each other. Instead of an anachronistic reading, in the history of the Fae, readers have a narrative 
form that triangulates the dichotomy of history and allegory. The context and content of Guyon’s 
book suspend the two categories by combining them, opening up a space for the conditional 
removal or replacement of events or reigns but without abandoning the framework completely. 
Bolstering the suggestion of a range of probabilities within history, the books are also meant to 
 72 
help guide Alma’s government in the future. In doing so, the book of the Fae predicts a future 
beyond the narrative of the Faerie Queene.  As Arthur’s experience shows, these futures are not 
linear. As they move in a range, they offer the potential for excitement, but they also suggest 
contingency as an important element of historical texts even in the context of instruction and 
counsel, much as Spenser describes in his letter to Raleigh.   
 The two books in the room of the past, and in particular the hybrid history-allegory book 
of the Fae, are the generic crystallization of architectural narratives. The books reiterate the 
architecture of the advisors’ rooms. Each of Alma’s sages uses the categories of past, present, 
and future to define his use to Alma’s state, but each operates in an area where these temporal 
categories no longer go in one direction. In going backward through the temporal categories of 
the rooms, readers arrive in a book that moves forward through an allegorical history. But the 
shift can easily be reversed if we face a different direction and read Briton Monument. Spenser 
places the history of the Fae alongside the book of history because in Alma’s realm 
architecturally inflected projection becomes the primary perceptual filter for the characters. All 
periods of time are literally on the shelf and available to read as readers contemplate 
intermingling probabilities. When we think of architecture as we compare Briton Monument to 
the Book of the Fae, what “should be” and what “might best be” seem to make sense as distinct 
modes of thought. The allegorical text of the Fae treats all events as contingent, even in the past, 
and offers Tanaquil as the reign that should be. Arthur’s linear history that seems to progress in a 
straight line nonetheless offers a range of options for what might best be. In this way, Arthur 
seems to be struggling with and against providence, and an entire field of law and religion called 
up by the Divine Right theory of kingship. In the next section, I will draw out what the 
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Subjunctive Aesthetic’s resistance to clear teleology means for early modern religious and 
political thinkers who would try and work through probability. 
 
Planning, Philosophy, Providence: Potential Inhabitants of the Subjunctive Aesthetic 
In the second section of this chapter, I associated images of probable and improbable 
dynasty with the Subjunctive Aesthetic. In particular, I fastened on the group of images that omit 
Mary because she no longer fits a particular goal—the Protestant narrative arc of dynasty. Yet 
the dissonance and gaps between various visions of the future contained in versions of the image 
does not deny the conception of a progressive and linear timeline, but rather interacts with it. 
Calling Elizabeth’s haunted genealogy a plan would be reductive. The images also rely on the 
conception of Providence. Providence underlies the way the royal transfer of authority works in 
the period. Arthur and Guyon’s twin history books also suggest that the concept of providence 
requires some unpacking. Biblical Providence is traditionally mysterious, often inscrutable. I 
think, however, that the Subjunctive Aesthetic reveals another means of approaching 
providence—by contrasting it with planning. In this section I view moments where the 
conception is troubled not by failed interpretation, but by the doubt of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
By doing so I do two things. I argue that the Subjunctive Aesthetic is capable of haunting 
providence, of suggesting an alternate form that denies linearity and certainty. I also outline the 
widespread importance of the Aesthetic for defining early modern conceptions of practicality in 
both religious and political philosophies. 
Providence has widespread importance in Europe, but divine Providence is arguably 
more important for the English monarchs as the heads of a new church church. Early modern 
thinkers including Machiavelli, Queen Elizabeth, King James, and John Calvin do not just use 
 74 
the term Providence, they attempt to define its operations and adjust their own actions to their 
perceptions of how it unfolds.  Providence also figures prominently in other parts of the Faerie 
Queene, especially at moments such as Book I when the holy hermit helps to foil Archimagos’ 
plots against the Redcrosse Knight. However, Providence is even more important in Spenser’s 
poetic predecessor, Ariosto, who peppers his version of the romance, Orlando Furioso, with 
eventually confirmed reveals of long-term dynasties and narrative arcs. In a more explicitly 
religious register, Calvin and Calvinism in particular have become stereotypically associated 
with an obsessive focus on Providence.  In the Institutes of the Christian Religion Calvin devotes 
an entire chapter on discussing Providence, which seems to state in no uncertain terms that, “all 
things are ordained by the purpose and certain disposition of God” and denies the existence of 
chance, fortune, and contingency.70 Calvin rails against the widespread acceptance of chance, 
directly calling the response to associate contingency with events with the carnal—“reason of the 
flesh.”71   
 I do not have the space to delve deeply into his writings, nor do I think it is necessary to 
do so. But it is important to keep Calvin’s discussion of fortune in mind when thinking about 
how the Subjunctive Aesthetic and Divine Providence because he illustrates the way probability 
haunts the religiously mandated progression of history. His description of Providence is not 
isolated. It has a widespread effect on English understandings of Providence and projection in 
the Tudor and Stuart eras.72 Although Calvin repeats that God’s ways are inscrutable to the 
intellect of man, and that the future is known, established, and governed by God, he still tries to 
                                                 
70 Calvin, John. The Institution of the Christian Religion. (Imprinted at London : By Thomas 
Vautrollier for William Norton, 1578), 79. There are earlier translations into English, but most 
are abridged. 
71 Ibid. 69. 
72 Elizabeth translated Ch. 1 of the Institutes and James was very familiar with Scottish 
Presbyterianism’s obsession with Calvin. 
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comprehend the directions of creation and apply them in his own devices. Thinking his way into 
an understanding of God requires human conceptions. The way he puts God’s operations into 
language, in the quote above and elsewhere, is by comparing “purpose” and “certain 
disposition.” There is a similarity between the two terms, but it is not a comfortable one. 
Purpose, as with Alma’s advisors, architecture, and the various state orders of the period, is more 
closely related to the Subjunctive Aesethetic than a certain disposition.  
We can see this difference in the Latin as well. The word translated as “counsel” is 
“consilium,” a word meaning thought or consideration—a word often translated as “plot” or 
“device” when Vitrivius and other architects come into English.73  Yet despite the division of 
certainty and counsel, Calvin’s description and his practice suggests how uncomfortably close 
they are. Like the way Vitrivius draws on divine shapes for his buildings, Calvin draws out his 
Institutes from rational Providence and applies them to life in Geneva and the organization of the 
church.  He imagines that the “arrangement” of creation is in some way detectable, and can be 
mimicked by institutional orders of government, that they can be counseled into the proper form. 
Yet his suggestion that fortune remains a persistent threat of the sinful, embodied reason, also 
suggests that eroticized bodies have a relationship to the purpose and counsel of consilium that 
queers a straightforward movement of Providence, even as they remain inextricably connected. 
Much of Divine Right theory propounded in the early 17th Century England, as James I does in 
Basilikon Duron for example, suggests a similar tension between Providence and planning. Early 
modern critics of Divine Right theory, many we might call Puritans, demanded a more 
                                                 
73Calvin, John. Institutio Christianae Religionis. Vol. I (London: Black, Young, and Young, 
1834), 141 “Dei consilio” is the phrase used.  
The word is used for plan in Vitrivius: ”Cum ergo haec ita fuerìnt primo constituta, et  natura 
non solum sensihus omavisset gentes, quem  admodum reliqua animalia, sed etiam 
cogitatìonibus  et consiliis aìrmavisset mentes” De Architectura Book II, Chapter 1, 37. 
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egalitarian control of the church rely on “ways,” “means,” “schemes,” and “device” they claimed 
to derive from Providence. In Calvin as in Basilkon Duron, however, Providence is certain, 
linear, and traceable. It is perfect. But the plots to achieve providence occupy a range of 
probabilistic narratives. 
Arthur’s reading experience as he encounters planning in Alma’s house gives a similar 
suggestion that the subjunctive Aesthetic haunts visions of Providence. But this can also be 
gleaned from wider comparisons. In Book II of the Faerie Queene the operations of a rationally 
comprehensible god work through the knights, the hermit, and according to the narrator, in the 
design of the central tower of Alma’s Hall where her three advisors reside. But the movements of 
divinity in Alma’s House are not as transparent or important here as they are elsewhere, or at 
other similar moments in other Romance epics.  In Orlando Furioso, for example, Ariosto 
describes the providential future of the Catholic Church with an extensive prophecy from the 
wizard Merlin that describes who will maintain the true church and how they will go about doing 
achieving the ends of Providence.74 Here, however, Merlin’s prophecy is in the stone of 
sculpture, seeming to solidify the future with material. Spenser’s Merlin also makes a prophecy 
of Elizabeth’s reign in Book III of the Faerie Queene that praises a wise God who constructs the 
glorious Tudor dynasty.In addition to Christian visions of the future, these prophecies hearken 
back to the Greek and Roman epics, especially Sybil’s prophecy to Aeneas in the Aeneid. These 
prophecies, in contrast with Arthur’s caesura, are not openly marked by probability. But they 
throw the way that the future works in Alma’s House into sharp relief. 
                                                 
74 Ariosto, Ludovico. Orlando Furioso, XXVI.35. This sculpture of prophecy is also haunted by 
contingency. It depicts four monarchs battling the heresy of Protestantism, one of whom is Henry 
VIII, prior to his own break with the See of Rome. This plan within a prophecy thus hints at the 
range of options encoded in the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
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Alma and her counselors have a bit more control over policy than a direct relationship to 
Providence because they engage a certain type of projection. This does not mean, however, that 
in early modern England there is a burgeoning separation between human will and divine 
foreknowledge, as the historian Reinhart Kosselleck claims. He argues that Western European 
thought moves from a space where God disposes and man proposes in the Medieval period, to 
one where human will dictates how the world will operate. Although in Alma’s house divine 
providence may not hold the central importance it does in other moments where prophecy 
occurs, Providence still holds some sway over the ideology of the knights on quest and the 
ordering of this perfect realm. Although mediated through practice and Vitruvian neo Platonism, 
there is some sense of a fixed divinity that underwrites the multiplicitous efforts of planning. 
This divinity is not Calvin’s, but it does bring Providence and planning uncomfortably close. 
Machiavelli’s political writings fill in the embattled relationship between Providence and 
architecture, giving the mirror image of Calvin’s assumptions but also more concretely 
demonstrating probability’s destabilizing effects on Providence. In his famous discussion of 
Fortuna and her vicissitudes, Machiavelli extends an ambivalent control over the path of history 
using a metaphor of a dyke.  According to him, although a river may crash over the bounds, 
constructing a dyke can often lead to the mitigation of effects that seem to be outside human 
control.  “I compare fortune to one of those violent rivers…Yet although such is their nature, it 
does not follow that when they are flowing quietly one cannot take precautions, constructing 
dykes and embankments so that when the river is in flood they would keep to one channel or 
their impetus be less wild and dangerous” (79). The design of earthworks can challenge, even if 
it does not overcome, this linear and one-directional force of time, a metaphor tied explicitly to 
recent political decisions; “If Italy had been adequately reinforced, like Germany, Spain, and 
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France, either this flood would not have caused the great changes it has, or it would not have 
swept in at all.”  The quotation connects the certainty of proceeding events in an agonistic 
relationship to architectural construction and subjunctive political discourse. 
 Although it initially seems like a straightforward comparison, the imbrications of control 
and non-control bolsters design as a means to queer the temporality of Providence. He construes 
the mental projection involved as masculine and Fortuna as feminine. If, as I argue, Fortuna is a 
secular equivalent to the direct and linear path of Providence, then this makes the stereotypically 
masculine dispensation of God into a feminine force of uncontrolled flooding that moves outside 
bounds. Yet policy can occasionally predict and mitigate the chaos of Fortuna’s femininity with 
boldness, calling up a discourse of masculine artifice controlling and exploiting a feminine 
nature. Then comes another turn, as Machiavelli claims that ultimately this feminine figure can 
overwhelm even the most thoughtful mental edifices. Even without the bounds of dykes, Fortuna 
has a direction. Except the background of overwhelming possibility involved in planning 
eschews stereotypical gender norms. Providential fortuna seems to offer one direction, yet it also 
seems open to modification by human effort. The earthworks in Machiavelli’s metaphor would 
outline a river, but also suggest that the river could go elsewhere, that it could buck the gendered 
terms of the metaphor. Certainty eludes. But the lack of a certain epistemology does not arrest 
political thought, but instead spurs it to be simultaneously active and passive in multiple ongoing 
Subjunctive explorations. 
 Victoria Kahn has traced an entire discourse based on Machiavellian Rhetoric that 
heightens the lines that run between Providence, Machiavelli, Calvin, and Divine Right theory. 
Although Kahn is more interested in other aspects of the discourse, an implicit and key point of 
Machiavelli’s rhetoric involves expressing doubt and fear in the subjunctive mood while 
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considering projected narratives.  King James mentions reading Machiavelli closely in Basilikon 
Duron, but Queen Elizabeth’s utilizes Machiavellian metaphors of statecraft much earlier in both 
public and personal writing.  In her poem “The Doubt of Future Foes” Elizabeth engages doubt 
in the language of the Subjunctive.  “Falsehood now doth flow / And subjects’ faith doth ebb, / 
Which should not be if reason ruled / Or wisdom weaved the web.”75 The poem, like 
Machiavelli’s handbook of prudence, associates reason with what should be done. Also as in 
Machiavelli, fortune becomes water, threatening to wash away the principality and overcoming 
“wisdom.”   
By the end of the poem, as Machiavelli does repeatedly in The Prince, decisive warlike 
action associated with historical precedent (“My rusty sword through rest / Shall first his edge 
employ”), will prevent the success of  “Future Foes.”76 Yet despite the force and materiality of 
the design she describes, Elizabeth defines “hope supposed” as “the root of rue,” and associates 
“doubt” with her “Foes” and their projections, ultimately promising “To pull their tops who seek 
such change / Or gape for future joy.”  Defining her foe’s “future joy” as the problem, the 
narrator’s final reliance on the “rusty sword” over the earlier “reason” is a strangely conservative 
promise to remain outside the pathways of planning, and thus remain free from guile. This is at 
odds with the planning that happens throughout the poem, but also forms a winking piece of 
propaganda since Elizabeth’s spy network was exceedingly effective. In short, the poem is an 
attempt to rhetorically undermine other projections by insisting on the pragmatic nature of the 
narrators’ own program—a Machiavellian rhetorical flanking maneuver, in Victoria Kahn’s 
                                                 
75 I am quoting from modernized spellings of the Folger Library manuscript in Elizabeth I: 
Collected Works,133-4. 
76 A note in the Collected Works dates the poem to 1571 and associates it with the arrival of the 
fugitive Mary Queen of Scots in England. 
 80 
terms (Machiavellian Rhetoric, 102).77  In my terms, Elizabeth is attempting to decry opposing 
engagements with the Subjunctive Aesthetic as fictitious, much like Henry VIII’s earlier acts and 
orders of succession. In doing so, her designs become Providence, omitting the undesirable 
designs. In this, it resembles her portraits that reject Mary’s claims to the throne. The poem, 
however, makes clear that statecraft is capable of relying on the rhetoric of the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic in order to justify itself. Doubt allows for a certain form of inspirational political 
narrative. Providence is conceptually related and destabilized by the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
In this sense, the subjunctive aesthetic is the queer haunting of Providence’s temporality.  
In Carla Freccero’s terms, queer forms eschew separation between time periods or engage in 
forms of narrative that do not necessarily move in one consistent direction.  There are multiple 
narratives in one text and neither future nor past are clearly demarcated. For these philosophers, 
rulers, and theologians, the future defined by providence becomes dangerously multiplicitous, as 
it does for Arthur as he reads Briton Monument, but nonetheless is required to access Providence 
in a specific way. More modern historians and critics have referred to the increasing absence of 
direct supernatural intervention in Western European affair secularization, with all the goods and 
ills that the concept brings to modernity. But the process of transferring providence from God to 
history might also be a reaction to the multiplicity implied by the Subjunctive Aesthetic, of a 
push to make the blurry triptych of history, plan, fantasy, fit a reductive dichotomy of fact or 
fiction. Alma’s house is a moment of design, and in contrast with moments of prophecy in 
Spenser’s poem or the Romantic tradition, occupies the hazy narrative-image range of the 
Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
                                                 
77 I believe a similar calculated appearance is visible in her famous Speech at Tilbury as well.  
The Collected Works, 325. 
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Spenser’s sequence dwells in architecture and counsel before arriving at Arthur and 
Guyon’s present historical moment, and in doing so renders the paths of history, allegory, and 
Providence compelling and muddled. Here, in Alma’s house, where time becomes space 
inhabited by multiple probabilities, the structures of history and fiction are both in play but are 
not the only available narratives. The focus remains on the pleasures and pains of Guyon, Arthur, 
Alma’s advisors, or readers, as each imagines how the patterns of history and allegory might be 
applied to policy.  Audiences can secretly delight in this radical and dangerous possibility, as 
Arthur does, or recoil at the violent implications of the potential break occasioned by gaps in 
projective thinking, among many other options.  As with Palladio’s plot or the Great Yarmouth 
image, each reaction relies on having multiple probabilities in a single glance. Archimago, the 
architectural figure at the fore of this chapter, is not a figure of control. He is a narrator and 
draughtsman who gives readers a range of probabilities to engage and feel. His magic as a 
builder is the magic of multiplicity. 
This chapter’s criticism dwells inside the narratives of planning, inside this genre 
between history and allegory, inside architecture’s simultaneously imagined and real spaces. 
Plans are a distinct form of narrative that treat probability as a factor in the interaction of time 
and space, a category of experience that people can calculate, represent, utilize, or find 
exhilarating. As the title of Briton Monument suggests, in certain contexts, such as in the hands 
of counselor or ruler, a book of history can also build an edifice, albeit of a different sort than a 
builder’s plot. In addition, the book of the Fae demonstrates that sometimes a world populated by 
faeries imparts a calculated multiplicity as efficacious as a historical text. Probability allows 
readings such as Arthur and Guyon’s, forcing an active navigation of what even careful critics 
might otherwise gloss as a self-evident text, a plotline, or a dead image. Alma’s house tarries 
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with planning’s range of possibilities and challenges critics to define our understanding of the 
likely and unlikely in both literary and historical narratives by maintaining doubtful images and 
narratives. Probability is difficult to trace, even in a plan wherein contingency announces itself as 
constitutive. Nonetheless, Alma’s house reveals that the effort to read probability is worthwhile. 
As the narrative embraces a range of outcomes, defined narrative genres vibrate with potential to 
generate an aesthetic experience where once there only seemed to be confusion and ambiguity. 
Having defined the Subjunctive Aesthetic in Alma’s out-of-the-way sequence, the next chapter 
treats the Aesthetic as an integral component of narrative in Paradise Lost.  
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Chapter 2  
 
Expecting Sin: Narrative Times and Agency 
 
 
Paradise Lost is an epic about building and unbuilding, creating and destroying. In Book 
VI and VII, for example, Milton takes a few lines of Genesis and expands them into hundreds of 
lines of poetry, writing two entire books between the creation of the earth and the heavens. God’s 
creation, however, is not simply a mater of intoning Fiat Lux—“Let there be light”—and light 
appearing. Even for a being of omnipotent power, the work God undertakes requires meaningful 
effort, not just in execution, but also in design. God not only announces the divergent intention 
and outcome for our world to his angels before he carries out his creation, he even uses “the 
golden compasses…to circumscribe this universe, and all created things” (VII.225-7).78 God is a 
planner.  
In a potentially baffling development though, God’s planned creation isn’t the first time 
design and its products appear in Paradise Lost. Recall that Satan and his crew of fallen angels 
build in a City in Hell based on the remembrance and imitation of the spires of heaven. 
Immediately after building the city of Pandemonium, Satan calls a counsel in order to concoct a 
new plan for how to deal with the fallen angels’ newly demonic state. I could spend an entire 
chapter analyzing the construction of Pandemonium, repeating the analytic techniques I used in 
chapter one. But the Aesthetic is about more than just building plans. It is also about narrative 
and historicity. It can alter the interpretation of an entire work. Many of the tensest and most 
emotionally resonant passages in Paradise Lost deal with plans. Occasionally a reader familiar 
with the Biblical story might know what will happen after these moments of planning, as when 
                                                 
78 Unless otherwise noted all Paradise Lost quotes from Milton, John. Paradise Lost. (Harlow, 
UK: Pearson Longman, 2007). 
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Satan concocts his design for seducing Eve. But often readers are not privy to the specifics of 
Milton’s expansion on the Biblical story. His audience may know the outcome of a design, but 
not how the poem’s narrative will approach this endpoint. Even having seen the Biblical account 
of the world’s history alongside Adam/in Eve’s dream in Books XI and XII, for example, readers 
still watch Adam and Eve with poignant uncertainty as they choose their specific path out of 
Eden: “The world was all before them, where to choose / Their place of rest, and providence 
their guide: They hand in hand with wandering steps and slow, / Through Eden took their 
solitary way” (XII.646-9). The quote is strange, as the two humans are solitary, hand in hand, 
and wandering as they try and deliberately choose their path. Multiple options are reconciled in 
this moment because planning’s overlapping probabilities form an integral narrative component 
of Paradise Lost, doing so even at moments where outcomes seem clear. 
This chapter takes the planning’s temporal-spatial representation of probability to unpack 
the narrative forms engaged by and incorporated in Paradise Lost as a whole.79 I argue that the 
Subjunctive Aesthetic mediates between historical and pre-historical narrative forms in Paradise 
Lost, centered on Sin’s strange birth. In turn, I read back from the narrative structure of Paradise 
Lost to interrogate broader theories of history and prehistory using probability. Chapter 1 also 
made forays in this direction, but the Alma’s house section was not integral to the narrative of 
The Faerie Queene. In contrast, planning is vital to Paradise Lost’s narrative, particularly at 
Sin’s first appearance. Though my first chapter defined the mixture of image and narrative that 
defines the Subjunctive Aesthetic, the sources tended toward the spatial. This chapter more 
                                                 
79 Probability is important in Paradise Lost, as critics usually note. “The human moral universe 
in Paradise Lost becomes solidly grounded in the contingent and hence the probable.” Pallister, 
William. Between Worlds: The Rhetorical Universe of Paradise Lost (Buffalo: University of 
Toronto Press, 2008), 31.  Pallister, is representative of criticism, in the sense that probability 
relates to philosophical concept of free will (via Rhetoric, for Pallister), not the narrative form of 
the poem. 
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closely approaches representations of time and narrative. This makes sense because a wide 
temporal scope becomes the field for planning in Paradise Lost, in a way that transcends the 
tight connection of time and space in the advisors’ rooms in Alma’s House. There are many 
temporal scopes in the epic and I argue that the appearance of plans, projections, and the 
language and imagery of planning at moments of tension between competing temporal 
frameworks within Milton’s poem is not a coincidence. Planning, as we saw in the last chapter, 
offers a spatial-narrative form that can mediate categories of storytelling. In Paradise Lost, 
probability bridges prehistory with a recorded Christian history. Providence, or God’s knowledge 
of the future, provides another means of connecting history and prehistory, as he views the 
narrative from outside time. But Milton represents Providence through a contrast and comparison 
with the non-divine plans of characters like Satan, Eve, the angels, and Adam. In summary, I 
argue that the Subjunctive Aesthetic overlays history and prehistory with a range of potential 
narratives that move in both forms of temporality.80 
Pre-history and history and the contrast between the two will become apparent in my 
reading of Paradise Lost. But some grounding will help to speed along my analysis. Primarily, 
history connects to textually codified Biblical canon, while pre-history connects to oral tradition 
and apocrypha. In the poem this division is reflected, connecting history to the human experience 
of time and pre-history to the angelic experience of time. Only after the creation of Adam does 
the poem and Satan’s journey begin. Everything that happens prior to the creation of humans is 
recounted in flashbacks and speeches. In terms of theoretical models and narrative definitions of 
pre-history and history, I am drawing on several sources. One is Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis. In it, 
Auerbach contrasts the Hebrew Bible’s episodes’ “vertical connection, which holds them all 
                                                 
80 For a similar reading of Milton’s poem as plural in voice see Belsey, Catherine. John Milton: 
Language, Gender, Power (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1998). 
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together,” with Homeric characters and stories who “appear to be of an age fixed from the very 
first.”81 To put his terms into metaphors of shape, the narrative shape of Biblical canon is linear 
while Homer’s epics are imagistic and flat, like the narrative sequence on a Grecian urn. 
Although he is not explicit, there is also a sense in Aurerbach that Homer’s fixed aged narratives 
align with pre-historic and oral traditions, while the Bible’s written text is historic. In addition to 
Auerbach’s narrative distinctions, I also draw on Paul Riceour’s related notion that historical 
time is “configurational,” that is, linear and imagistic. He contrasts this linear form with the 
episodic, “and then,” type of narrative that can happen outside of these historical strictures, that 
he aligns with fiction.82 Although he does not deal explicitly with pre-history, Riceour’s contrast 
of history and narrative is more helpful than Auerbach’s divisions between history and pre-
history because Riceour imbricates the two categories of narrative. Fiction vouches for history’s 
linearity and vice versa. Building on these two figures are the queer critiques of narrative forms 
and history, mounted by critics like Carla Freccero. Freccero demonstrates that history is always 
haunted by non-linearity, by anachronism. Similarly, I will argue that the way the history and 
pre-history connect is through probabilistic image-narratives of the Subjunctive Aesthetic, 
opening up a queer space for non-teleological readings. 
Thus, this chapter includes a critique of a clear distinction between history and pre-
history. This account aids in the larger critical project of contextualizing categorical divisions 
between historical and a-historical theories of subjectivity that I initiated in my last chapter. By 
contextualizing theory around the birth of Sin, this chapter use theory in a way that can 
redistribute agency among categories of people and things that do not currently have a status as 
                                                 
81 Auerbach, Erich. Mimesis, Trans. Williard R. Trask. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003), 17. 
82 Riceour, Paul. “Narrative Time.” Critical Inquiry , Vol. 7, No. 1, On Narrative (Autumn, 
1980). 178-9. 
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agents.83 Probablistic movement between history and pre-history creates agents who would 
otherwise not appear in historical chronologies. I focus on Paradise Lost for this reading because 
the poem also stands on the edge of history and pre-history, not only in its content but also in its 
style. In some ways the piece has elements of more modern texts such as psychological 
interiority, and in others casts backward to a longer epic poem tradition. The text straddles the 
border between generic epochs. Paradise Lost’s mixes religious and secular history with pre-
historical genealogy, constantly mediating the future, present, and past though subjunctive 
imagining. On these grounds I make my argument that past alternatives can potentially disrupt 
current theories of power structures by rethinking representations of probability.84  This reading 
in some ways construes Milton’s text as partially or potentially heterodox, building on recent 
notions of a heretical Milton.85 
I begin by outlining a working definition of history and prehistory as defined in Milton’s 
milieu and poem, drawing especially on Augustine and Aristotle’s notions of temporality. Then, 
I connect these temporal scopes with the background of providence. In the second section, I 
analyze how the Subjunctive Aesthetic disturbs Providence’s reconciliation of history and pre-
history while providing the narrative hinge between the two. To do so, I delve into the moment 
                                                 
83  For the implications of narrative on the understanding of subjects, also see Harris, Jonathan 
Gil. Matter in the Time of Shakespeare. 3-4. Freccero’s Queer / Early / Modern and Bryan 
Reynolds Transversal Theory make similar arguments. 
84 I believe that a similar argument could be made about certain classical epics, especially the 
Aeneid, but my emphasis on secular and Christian sources will help focus this chapter.  Early 
modern Romance novels may also come under this purview, and may be grounds for future 
research.   
85 For a recent piece on De Doctrina Christiana illustrates the debate and the ambiguity of 
Milton’s religious positions see Donato, Christopher John. “Against the Law: Milton’s 
(Anti?)nomianism in De Doctrina Christiana.” Harvard Theological Review. 104.1 (2011), 69-
92. The criticism of Milton as heretic is an extremely old one, but has recently come to the fore 
again as critics like Feisal Mohamed. Milton and the Post-Secular Present: Ethics, Politics, and 
Terrorism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) connect Milton to ongoing conflicts of 
religion and orthodoxy. 
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of planning that defines the central conflict of the narrative, as Sin appears from the head of 
Satan. The sequence, I argue, creates a multiplicitous narrative that moves in both history and 
pre-history without negating the distinction of those categories. In the third section, I turn the 
generic implications of history and pre-history on modern theories of subjectivity, especially 
Freud. Freud’s theories incorporate pre-history and history to construct subjectivity, but they also 
require probability in reconstructing these era. In the final section, I compare Sin to Eve’s fall 
with in mind in order to uncover a new agency in the poem’s world in terms of the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic, bridging the narratives of history and prehistory. 
 
Epic, Myth, and History 
“The poet and the historian differ not by writing in verse or in prose.  The work of Herodotus 
might be put into verse and it would still be a species of history, with meter no less than without 
it.  The true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other what may happen.” 86 
 
I begin the second chapter where chapter one ended—in a potentially confusing blend of 
narrative forms. Here, I hope to situate narrative categories that are broader than genre in the 
terms of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. Before I can explain how the Aesthetic moves between pre-
history and history within the epic background of Milton’s poem, I must first outline pre-history 
and history in Paradise Lost. Aristotle’s Poetics provides a relatively succinct departure point 
given Milton’s Classicist bent. In the above sentences from Poetics, Aristotle settles the 
difference between epic poetry and history by dividing the subjunctive (“may happen”) from the 
indicative (“has happened”) with a gesture toward Herodotus. The comparison recalls Spenser’s 
“Letter to Raleigh.” As with Spenser’s letter, contextualization and close reading proves the idea 
                                                 
86 Aristotle. Poetics, Part XI. 
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confounding. The ostensibly vast difference between “may” and “has” is problematic; Herodotus 
reports beliefs and fictions about the cultures he discusses that drive or diffuse more 
ontologically trustworthy historical action.87 But more importantly, Aristotle’s use of the 
potential subjunctive in describing the production of a poem and the past perfect indicative for a 
history seems paradoxical. His comparison implies one of two things: 1) Either his syllogism is 
faulty because he is considering one completed work and one imaginary narrative. Or: 2) he uses 
a divergent verb tense in discussing poems and histories. To put it another way, since in other 
moments, the Poetics describes the epic cycles to have happened in the mythological past or to 
have already been written, the more appropriate designation for poetry in this sentence might be 
“what may have happened.” Aristotle, however, collapses subjunctive with the future and 
indicative with the past.   
Aristotle’s sense of narrative over-determines the indicative past/present/future troika at 
the expense of the subjunctive, collapsing what “may happen” into the three categories of time; a 
choice I believe proves resilient and ubiquitous. Although it may not initially appear so, 
Aristotle’s denial nevertheless reveals probability as constitutive in defining history and fiction. 
According to him, poetry is still poetry even if it were to be written in verse because it concocts a 
narrative from what might happen. Analyzing the relative definitions of history and fiction is a 
constant point of contention in literary criticism. From Aristotle to Riceour the two categories are 
persistently intertwined. More recently, Freccero’s ghosts, Gil Harris’s palimpsests, and 
Goldberg’s historicity of future projection, have mounted a sustained critique of history and pre-
historical myth on the grounds of teleology. My first chapter has already built on these critical 
works that struggle to make sense of narrative without instinctively divide the genres of history 
                                                 
87 The most famous from Herodotus’ Histories might be Xerxes’ mysterious and symbolic dream 
before he invades Europe. 
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and poetics. But I want to continue pushing the history in particular. The poetics Aristotle 
compares with history is a specific kind of poetry. The epic poems Aristotle refers to describe a 
mythological pre-history of Greece. They recount ancestral origins in a time before linear 
history. In the pre-historical and mythic Golden Age, narrative is sequential, but not necessarily 
linear. The actions undertaken by Hesiod’s Zeus, for example, are not tied to the narratives of 
Homer’s Zeus. Even these ostensibly canonical pre-historic events do not happen in step-by-step 
unfolding, but rather all at once in a mythological prehistory. In Milton’s poem the two 
categories of time are connected. We see the age before and after of history, however one 
chooses to define the difference between pre-historical narrative and historical time.88  
The moments of history in Paradise Lost become perceptible in moments where the 
Biblical canon is recounted. When Adam falls, for example, even a non-Christian reader would 
likely recognize the event as historical, perhaps even as the first recorded historical event. The 
meaning may alter by sect and historical context, but the originality and reliability of the fall 
would not be questioned. At the other end of history, the Archangel Michael recounts the 
genealogy of Adam and Eve’s offspring as Paradise Lost comes to a close. In Michael’s vision, 
readers can find Genesis, Exodus, et. al, culminate in the birth of Jesus Christ. These events and 
texts are a part of the established discourses of history and referenced by historians and religious 
scholars alike.89 Other narrative strands of the epic poem seem to happen in an Aristotelian pre-
history that predates linear temporality. Satan’s fall comes from non-Biblical traditions and 
                                                 
88 The most on-point comparison for this chapter is Riceour’s mutual definition of history and 
fiction in Time and Narrative Volume 2. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 9. See 
my analysis of Macbeth for a related treatment of linear and non-linear narratives. Again, see 
Auerbach’s comparison of different epics in Mimesis. 
89Braunmuller, A.R.. “King John and Historiography.” ELH. Vol. 55, No. 2., Summer (1988). 
contains a comprehensive critique of historical teleology using early modern historiography. 
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sources, relying on a time before human reckoning of time.90 Raphael, in Books V and VI, as he 
tells the story of the war in heaven, specifies what time means for the epic. Adam asks for the 
relation of “what hath passed in heaven” (V.545). Before recounting the story, Raphael wonders 
aloud how “shall I relate To human sense the invisible exploits of warring spirits,” and decides, 
“I shall delineate so by likening spiritual to corporal forms” (V.565-73). Yet he begins “on a day 
(For time, though in eternity, applied to motion, measures all things durable by present, past, and 
future) on such day as heaven’s great year brings forth” (V.580-2). 
 From Raphael’s last line, one might assume that even before the creation of the Sun and 
the invention of days, angels still perceive time in the same way that humans do. But the fact that 
the aside happens in an explanatory parenthetical between a doubling, “on a day…on such a 
day,” defies an equivalence of the two time periods. In addition, Raphael’s earlier remarks that 
he will tell the story with an eye toward human perceptions suggests that the tale of the war in 
heaven uses some sort of metaphorical version of human time, just as he likens spiritual bodies 
to physical ones. Later remarks on days and nights of heaven in Book VI, and the speed with 
which motion and events can happen on those days suggests that time is in some way different 
for angels. Yet Raphael consistently emphasizes that this time is still sequential narrative, 
defined by the “motion” of “things durable” Both human time and angelic time thus take place in 
a sequential progression of time. All of these narratives of the war in heaven, however, take 
place “in eternity.” The mention of eternity, in conjunction with Raphael’s Classical war-focused 
tale and its supernatural forms of warfare, suggest that the war in heaven takes place in a 
mythical pre history. Like Aristotle’s version of poetry, metaphor is key for Raphael to explain 
what the war is to Adam. He defines the war’s temporality as sequential, but not like human 
                                                 
90 For a gendered reading of competing textual canon and oral Gnostic traditions in Milton, see 
Miller, Shannon. Engendering the Fall (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
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time. This similarity allows Raphael to tell his story in a way that makes sense to human 
perceptions, and yet actually takes place in a different kind of temporality. 
The historical and pre-historical frames of time crop up consistently in the poem, often in 
tension, particularly when the narrative of Paradise Lost repeatedly attempts to imagine a 
perceptual state outside time in order to represent time. In a vivid example from Book III, God 
looks down on the fugitive Satan from a disorienting time/place, “beholding from his prospect 
high, / Wherein past, present, future he beholds, / Thus to his only Son foreseeing spake” (III.78-
9).91  Here, the only way to view time is as a space, in a potentially confusing mix of past, 
present, and future. “Forseeing,” is present tense but refers to the future, while “spake” is past. 
Similarly, “foreseeing spake” is also mixing, as both verbs can have God as their subject. God 
potentially moves in both the future and the present with these verbs.92  
Escaping historical time and representing temporality through God is not novel. Diffusing 
temporal tension among future, present, and past in the phrase “foreseeing spake,” as Paradise 
Lost does, can be found in the orthodox understanding of Augustine. He argues that unitary 
objective time is only real for God, and only humans know it as a confusing and subjective 
experience.93 But Augustine, complicating this representation, uses poetry to illustrate time’s 
subjectiveness—while reciting a poem initially “all expectation is directed to the whole poem, 
but once I have begun…the vital energy of what I am doing is in tension between [memory] and 
                                                 
91 Spatial concepts are key to the narrative of Paradise Lost. Gilles, John. “Space and Place in 
Paradise Lost.” ELH. Vol 74. Number 1. (Spring 2007), 27-57 reads the epic’s insistence on 
“place” as a resistance against growing notions of “space” in the 17th century, tying it to Milton’s 
drive to elaborate space in terms of the body rather than the mind. 
92 According to Stanley Fish’s influential method of reading, both could appropriately describe 
the action and any confusion is due to our fallen, sinful perceptions. Fish, Stanley. Surprised By 
Sin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
93 The limited descriptions of God’s knowledge of time are in spatial, object-oriented terms in 
Augustine as well as Milton. I only mention this to emphasize that time as space is not a modern 
phenomenon as some might imagine. 
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[expectation].”94 God may move outside the linear, tripartite, time but both man and poem move 
in one based in potentially confusing and subjunctively associated expectation, Augustine thus 
maintains the standard categories of time by propping its subjective experience on God’s fixed, 
infinite, temporality. The underlying metaphor of both is spatial. For Augustine, the human 
experience of this temporality, in turn, holds the past as “dead,” fixed, flat, and unchangeable 
(XI, 28, 37). God’s words in the ensuing lines of Paradise Lost express the same idea by 
comparing Man’s impending fall with the narrative past of Satan’s fall, entirely in the past tense, 
“I made him just and right, / sufficient to have stood, though free to fall. / Such I created all the 
ethereal powers and Spirits, both who stood and them who failed (III.98-101).  Although God is 
discussing the future and the past, spatial metaphors of standing and falling evoke time as space. 
Still, a reader like Stanley Fish might conclude that this reading of “forseeing spake” as 
problematically human rejects Augustine’s (and Milton’s after him) outline of post lapsarian 
confused experience of time.95 God is not confused, we are. 
However, as God continues speaking, his verbs, which begin in the subjunctive, call 
attention to the startling comprehensibility of a supposedly being unbound by sequential time. 
Looking down, God predicts Lucifer’s “desperate revenge shall redound / Upon his rebellious 
head.”  Even further into the future, God conjures alternatives and then predicts the temptation of 
Adam:  “If him by force he can destroy, or worse, / By some false guile pervert; and shall 
pervert” (III.84-5, 91-2).  After his omnipotent consideration, God switches to the verb “will.”96 
                                                 
94 The competing temporalities are also in Augustine. Confessions. XI.28, 37. The poem 
comparison actually has two durations—the length of time in the tale told and the length of time 
intoned by the speaker. 
95 See De Doctrina Christiana X for some of Milton’s thoughts on time.   
Space and Place in Paradise Lost that God’s exists in a parallel, “homogenous, empty” plane. 
96 God is similar to the wizards in romance, such as Merlin in The Faerie Queene, who similarly 
speaks in the subjunctive when predicting the future. Spenser, Edmund.  The Faerie Queen. 452. 
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Here God works through abstractions, considering possibilities as anyone can. Yet we might be 
tempted to posit that God speaks in something akin to Bourdieu’s legal discourse from Language 
and Symbolic Power --“a creative speech which brings into existence that which it utters.”97  
Indeed, the Biblical subjunctive is exactly the logos most theorists have in mind when they 
describe even passive speech acts as simultaneously descriptive and prescriptive. 98 But we have 
to remember that in its future orientations, especially in this “if…then” sequence, the subjunctive 
mood self-consciously announces God’s intention in a field of theoretical alternatives, an 
intention that is necessarily more predictive than prescriptive.99  God seems to be thinking 
through something that he must, by the definition of what God is, already know. But we also 
have to remember that God’s words here are “dramatic speeches,” as John Creaser argues, “and 
not how Milton would conceive an omniscient, all-loving deity.”100 God extensively justifies 
free-will in the lines that follow his shift to “will” over “shall.” Based on Milton’s theology in De 
Doctrina Christiana, it is difficult to doubt that God’s future-orientated discussion here has a 
free-will slant regarding human influence of a doubtful future.101 Each moment of a human’s life 
is contingent for the human, even if God knows the outcome, and thus God must speak of it in 
that way. The overall description of God’s language, as he surveys time as a field, allows us to 
                                                 
97 Bourdieu. Pierre Language and Symbolic Power, Trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew 
Adamson (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1991), 42. 
98 “Let there be light.” in the King James Bible and “Fiat lux,” in the Vulgate are both passive 
and subjunctive. 
99 Though it may eventually become both in retrospect. 
100  Creaser, John. ‘“Fear of Change”: Closed Minds and Open Forms in Milton’, Milton 
Quarterly 42 (2008), 168. 
101 This is the converse of Calvinist thought, according to the conceptual historian Reinhart 
Kosselleck in Futures Past, Trans. Keith Tribe (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985) who would align 
Milton’s God with an early modern shift from eschatological Christian temporality to a doubtful, 
secular, modern future.  In support, Kosselleck quotes Guicciardini, a political thinker 
contemporary with Machiavelli, on projective reasoning: “since each conclusion in these 
considerations is developed from a previous one, the whole construction collapses if only one is 
false.” 13. 
 95 
keep the subjunctive as a force for considering possible human futures.  God’s will is certain, but 
he uses subjunctive language to communicate free-will and outline probability. 
 
Unprovidential Genealogies and Narrative Pre-History 
God mixes times because he sees history and pre-history but makes sense of both with 
Providence, Calvin’s notion from the first chapter that all potential outcomes are accounted for. 
Thus, the narrative of in Paradise Lost might be lumped together with Augustine’s history, dead 
an unchangeable. But that ignores the excitement of the poem and the strange meeting of times 
that happens in its words. Paradise Lost’s future tense takes place in the reader’s past. This 
makes the future of the poem a reader’s past, and brings the past, present, and future together in a 
way that requires a linear and historical understanding of time. Yet this understanding is haunted, 
adding elements not recounted in any version of history or pre-history, such as the personified 
Sin and Death. The poem even introduces a new genealogy known beings or connects an 
unknown ancestry to an established one, bringing new creatures into a relationship with existing 
ones. Paradise Lost partially narrates religious history of the Biblical canon. 102 This history is 
often concerned with a genealogy for the human race, and the chosen people in particular. In 
chapter one, I suggested the strange Tudor genealogies of state haunt the notion of Providence. 
Milton’s poem is a self-conscious epic, drawn from a mix of both chivalric romance and classical 
models, as Sergio Zatti argues in The Quest for Epic.103  Both romance and classical epics 
emphasize genealogies for their patron’s ruling families, for example, the Faerie Queene’s 
                                                 
102 De Doctrina’s pronouncements on the truth of scripture and Book XI and XII’s recounting of 
the Bible are to specific about this. See Milton, John. Complete Prose Works  6:578-9. But 
Milton’s prose works like Areopagitica also suggest that he considers the Biblical canon to be 
reliable history. 
103 Zatti, Sergio. The Quest for Epic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 2. 
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insertion of Queen Elizabeth’s genealogy, or Caesar’s descendants in the Aeneid.104  In Milton’s 
own era, and contra Aristotle, early modern historians account for these “may-happen” 
possibilities of mythology as well as any poet, tying family trees into histories even if they do not 
necessarily consider them empirically reliable.105  For example, Stow’s Survey of London gives 
the mythological foundation of Rome attributed to Brutus alongside several other equally 
(un)trustworthy accounts.106  The epic is a playground for mixing genealogies. 
Viewed in this light and using Freccero’s argument in Queer / Early / Modern, an 
argument that aligns with Paul Riceour’s mutual definition of history and fiction, we might read 
a historically grounded genealogy as a “heteronormative” if-then statement that winkingly 
assumes a dubious ancestor from a myth, pre-history, or fiction. This creates a tautology that 
ratifies history as a trustworthy discourse in addition to current rulers and their accompanying 
power structures.107 This history is fixed, both making and ratifying its origin moment with the 
current descendant and vice-versa.  But as the epic performs this strange mutual support of 
known and unknown, it contains a new genealogy for the Biblical rolls of time—a heretical one 
that might threaten the very meaning of the word origin.108 Sin, who springs from Satan’s mind 
and then sexually engages with him, is no longer original with Adam and Eve. Here, in Satan’s 
seemingly incestuous but also uniquely non-incestuous relationship with a feminine being who 
calls him both father and lover, is a dramatically marked paradox of possibility—one not found 
                                                 
104 Spenser. The Faerie Queen. III.iii, Virgil. Aeneid. VI.890-990. Some other examples: 
Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso contains a genealogy for his patron.  Tasso’s Gerusalamma Liberata, 
while it does not emphasize a familial line as much as Ariosto, is perhaps a more apt a 
comparison for Milton because it takes place in the recorded historical time of the Crusades. 
105 For an extensive discussion of this in regards to late Elizabethan chroniclers, see Braunmuller, 
A.R.. “King John and Historiography.”  
106 See Harris, Jonathan Gil. Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare. 105. 
107 Freccero, Carla. Queer / Early / Modern. 53. 
108 Ariosto, Spenser, Tasso, and Virgil all rework tradition in potentially heretical fashion. 
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in the canonical history of Genesis—of an historical account outside what Jonathan Goldberg 
after Derrida, Judith Butler, and Freud calls the “Law of the Father.”109 The Law of the Father 
points to the origin of all taboo in incest and the prohibition against future incest, and is at once 
the origin of society, of civilization, gender roles, and time keeping. In Goldberg’s brilliant 
diagnosis of the problems involved in critiques of The Law of the Father’s origin in the 
transgression of the law by committing incest, he shrewdly notes that most contemporary 
thinkers have turned to Foucault for help. They turn to him, in Goldberg’s words, at least partly 
because of Foucault’s “multiplicity.” Quoting Foucault at length, he writes, “This power had 
neither the form of the law, nor the effects of the taboo. On the contrary; it extended the various 
forms of sexuality, pursuing them according lines of indefinite penetration. It did not exclude 
sexuality, but included it in the body as a mode of specification of individuals.”110 In Goldberg’s 
words, “Incest is lodged at the heart of sexuality” only when law becomes the “relay point for 
vast mechanisms” Or, according to Foucault, discovering the supposedly ‘universal law of incest 
as foundational, the law is resecured, and modern power thereby made acceptable.”111 I have 
argued that the Subjunctive Aesthetic is defined by multiplicity. But Goldberg, as I suggested in 
chapter one, only sees multiplicity as a field for a “relay point,” for fixing identities. Even as he 
struggles against teleology, Goldberg assumes how integral planning is for Foucault’s fixing of 
human categories. Even Foucault treats plans themselves as self-evident institutional artifacts 
that the mechanisms of power impose. But by pushing a bit more, we can see that Foucault’s 
                                                 
109 Goldberg, Jonathan. “The History That Will Be.” Premodern Sexualities. (Routledge: New 
York, 1996), 6-7. 
110 Foucault, Michel. History of Sexuality Vol I, Trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 
1978), 47. 
111 Goldberg, “The History That Will Be.” 9. 
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institutional plans and the distribution of power among society do not easily mediate the before 
and after suggested by the prohibition against incest. 
Satan’s Sin, like the law of the father mentioned by Goldberg, happens in human 
prehistory, before day and night even exist. But the transgression against God leading to Sin’s 
birth also happens in Satan’s own prehistory, and also takes place in a narrative that predates 
every major narrative arc in the epic save for the very brief appearance of Christ before the host 
of angels. Discounting the deification of Christ in Heaven, Sin’s birth takes place in the earliest 
recounted narrative within creation, in a confused time that is recounted only as a secret in a 
flashback. Within the flashback, it is not clear that Satan has even technically sinned against God 
yet. He hasn’t taken his hosts to the North of heaven. He hasn’t even finished deliberating how 
he might attempt to overthrow God. At the time of Satan and Sin’s affair, Satan has not “fallen” 
yet, and thus the sinful incest cannot take the name of sinful until after the “general fall” and 
Sin’s “charge” by God to guard the temptingly Freudian Gate of Hell (II.765-790).112 I attribute 
part of the reason for this strange anachronism because Sin appears in a moment of deliberation, 
of working through probability. 
Sin’s genealogy, critics often forget, is not the end of her tale, as Sin enters the human 
world and follows Satan after Adam and Eve eat the fruit of the forbidden tree. She becomes a 
figurative child of Adam and Eve’s decision in Milton’s imagining of the Biblical story. As she 
and her son cross the bridge that Satan made over chaos to connect Hell to our universe, she 
participates in the same temporal connection that Raphael makes between heavenly and earthly 
days. Death, the loose and baggy eater of material, will consume everything until Christ returns 
                                                 
112 Sin appears to happily consent in being in “love” with Satan, but also calls him “father”.  She 
is still Sin, of course, but Satan has not technically committed a sin yet, he has only considered it, 
which as Adam later tells Eve, is not a sin on its own. 
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to judge and imprison him in Hell. He receives the benefits of Satan’s seduction and Adam and 
Eve’s decisions. In contrast to her son, Sin is strangely associated as both a cause and effect for 
the fall. She must necessarily be present at the moment when Adam and Eve commit their sin, 
but she only arrives on earth after an extensive travel through Chaos.113 In addition, the narrative 
does not give Sin credit in the same way Satan receives blame for his rebellion against God. Yet 
overall Sin seems to be some sort of narrative bridge between Satan’s fall and Adam and Eve’s 
fall. In both cases she is the apparent effect of a decision, and the instigator of yet more potential 
sin.114 In addition to her theological power, Sin’s importance can be attributed to her character’s 
connection of the two major narratives of the epic.  
Again, I recall that Sin springs from Satan’s mind and appears on Earth only after 
extensive deliberation by Adam and Eve. Because Sin actually appears from Satan’s head in an 
act of reproduction that seems foreign even to Milton’s sexually active angels, her specific 
origins are difficult to ascertain. Readers know that Satan’s sin is pride, but not from whence the 
pride comes. There are several explanations for what makes Sin: Satan’s desire to be higher than 
God, Satan’s self-love producing a turning away from God, a mythological birth of a new agent 
symbolizing the change from pre-fall to post-fall Lucifer. Sin might even be a fabrication or 
allegory—a temptation to follow Satan’s story of ungodly generativity for the unwary reader of 
Milton’s epic. Rather than foreclosing any of these explanations, I believe that Sin’s birth is best 
understood as the outcome of a moment in the Subjunctive Aesthetic. Sin happens when Satan 
begins to plan out how he might rebel against God. Multiplicity is activated in this plan, but 
                                                 
113 This is in opposition to readings that see Sin as an “incestuous image…when Satan genders 
with her, he donates only thoughts, and so materializes only the phantasy products of primary 
process.” Grossman, Marshall. “Servile / Sterile / Style Milton and the Question of Woman.” 
Milton and the Idea of Woman (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1998), 155. 
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Milton’s version of planning adds a wrinkle to the calculation of probability. Satan’s Sin is a 
being in her own right that owes her existence to a navigation of possible narratives. Satan 
claims not to know her, and she decries that he has “forgot” her, finding especially heinous that 
she once knew him “at the assembly, and in sight / of all the seraphim with the combined / in 
bold conspiracy against heaven’s king” (II.747). The famous ensuing “surprise” rings hollow, 
not only because the moment might be Fish’s temptingly incorrect reading, but because her 
appearance follows a “conspiracy.” She is the child of design. A mixture of desire and impulse, 
thought and communication, allegory and action, contributed to Sin’s birth. But though her 
origins lie in multiplicity, Sin actually becomes a character in the narrative and appears “familiar 
grown” and capable of bearing Satan’s child. She becomes complete after deliberation, but 
before decisive action against God has been taken. She appears when plans begin to crystallize 
and Satan actually takes the impossible possibility of overthrowing Heaven’s king seriously. She 
is a creature of probability that connects the before and the after in Satan’s personal history as 
well as the pre-history of Satan’s fall and the historical origin of Adam and Eve. She appears 
when Providence becomes haunted by potential. 
Sin’s birth in the a moment of planning is an inverted mockery of God’s ability to create 
life ex nihilo, as Satan births a being in his “perfect image” and loves it to conceive a child 
(II.764). The moment also gives a satanic inverse God’s Providence. Satan’s planning conceives 
Sin and leads him into an unintended Hell. But God himself also engages alternatives, such as 
when he predicts Adam’s fall, deliberating in a familiar way.  “Whose fault?  Whose fault but his 
own?  Ingrate he had of me all he could have; I made him just and right, / Sufficient to have 
stood, though free to fall” (III.97-9). In a move that parallels Sin’s Satanic origin-story in a 
strangely expansive prehistory (a story which God later acknowledges as true by letting Sin and 
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Death into Earth after the fall) God dictates what “shall” happen” and what “will happen” by 
relying on a past so expansive that the sentence ends in two infinitives: “to have stood” and “to 
fall.”  Placing a tension between probability and the certainty of the past tense at the fore, God 
claims he gave Adam “all he could have” even while discussing future events. This seems 
obvious, since God knows the outcomes of future events in the same way humans know what has 
gone before. It would be easy to claim that God speaks in St. Augustine’s vision of temporal 
categories, where the past is dead and fixed. But that ignores the subjunctive activity in God’s 
words. He may know what happens, but he deliberates and delineates other possible outcomes 
that could have happened. These probabilities linger even while surrounded by a pre-historic 
eternity and a linear history of Biblical canon. In the case of God, the past tense, negative-
potential subjunctive (“He had of me all he could have”) can only condemn and control human 
behavior by relying on a fixed, infinite notion of time (“I made him…free to fall”).  Without the 
fixing of infinity, of actions that have always taken place in prehistory, God’s potential 
discussions of man’s behavior might overwhelm a linear and chronological movement through 
time, resembling Satan’s plans and encoding possibility as an essential feature of defining God’s 
temporal view. If God simply stated things as they will be, the linear chronology offered by 
history as touted by Aristotle and Augustine makes the future fixed as much as the past, ignoring 
the necessity of the subjunctive for rendering temporal categories intelligible.  
God’s prediction of Adam and Eve’s fall, and his turn of their failure into the Fortunate 
Fall, is only one of a few versions of events centered on Sin. Raphael’s version of Satan’s fall 
does not describe the birth of Sin, perhaps unsurprising since Sin claims that Satan kept her 
existence a secret during her own tale. Raphael’s version does, however, use the language of 
pregnancy, claiming that the appearance of Christ as Lord of all angels gives Satan a pretext for 
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“malice thence conceiving and disdain” (V.666). Raphael’s version also emphasizes Satan’s 
attempt to control heaven via planning. Taking the suggestion contained in Sin’s story of her 
birth a step farther with the Subjunctive Aesthetic, Raphael makes the connections of space more 
explicit. In his version, Satan suggests his hosts move “To the quarters of the north,” eliding 
military planning with Satan’s turn from faithful service (V.689). But in the most marked 
difference from Sin’s version of Satan’s fall, Raphael emphasizes Satan’s reaction to the way the 
falling angel perceives god’s thought-process. At the key moment of Satan’s first steps against 
God, Sin’s birth is spurred on by Satan’s interpretation of God’s own plans, as if Satan imagines 
himself his plans as God’s Providence Satan’s words to his lieutenant at the beginning of the war 
in heaven, like Sin’s story of her birthday, emphasize planning: 
And rememberst what decree 
Of yesterday, so late hath passed the lips 
Of heaven’s almighty? Thou to me thy thoughts 
Wast wont, I mine to thee was wont to impart; 
Both waking we were one; how then can now 
They sleep dissent? New laws thou seest imposed; 
New laws from him who reigns, new minds may raise 
In us who serve, new counsels, to debate 
What doubtful may ensue, more in this place 
To utter is not safe. Assemble thou 
Of all those myriads which we lead the chief. (V.674-84) 
 
According to Raphael, Satan frames his grievances with God in terms of “new laws.” 
These new laws in turn lead to “new minds” and “new counsels” and “debate.”  Like Sin’s 
account of her birth, Raphael’s story places an onus on quasi-parliamentary deliberation. Unlike 
Sin’s version, there is no apotheosis of evil to spring into the tale and mark a clear moment 
where Satan falls. Instead, Satan suggests the appearance of a new origin as he claims “new 
minds.” The difference between the stories calls up comingling probabilities of the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic. Both are accurate versions of the same event that nonetheless do not exhaustively 
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define what happens. There is a before the fall, but the moment when the fall becomes complete 
is muddied by the other potential choices that Satan might have made. Perhaps Satan might have 
even undone some of his actions by stopping at any point before being cast into hell. Supporting 
this reading, Raphael’s language of Satan’s first steps makes the subjunctive a stylistic feature of 
Satan’s thought-process with “new minds may raise” and “what doubtful may ensue.” But the 
feature that unites both Sin’s version and Raphael’s version is the multiplicity of doubt that 
springs from self-conscious deliberation. In both versions of Satan’s first sin, deliberation allows 
all the subsequent events of the war in heaven to occur. Another similarity is that in neither 
version of events can a moment of before and after the fall be simply defined. “New” resounds 
several times in Satan’s angelic mouth, according to Raphael. This newness reflects Satan’s 
preoccupation with Christ’s installation as a specific and distinct event, as he views the 
appearance of the Son of God as a novel stage in development. New can only be defined relative 
to something old, a historical and narrative process. But the irony of Satan’s word choice when 
discussing the unfolding providence of God is, whether or not God is omnipotent, God’s plan 
reconciles and unites the two distinct phases of before and after. To God everything is both new 
and old, flattened into space by Providence. In addition the networks of other potential ways that 
events could proceed via God’s plans connects through different categories of time, suggesting 
that new and old laws may exist, but that God’s providential intentions underlie both the 
historical and pre-historical notions of time. When deliberation comes into play, however, the 
Providential connection of the two frames becomes destabilized, hence Satan’s shock at the new 
appearance of Christ. 
Only by ignoring the negating the operations of probability can Satan achieve his 
rhetorical aim of separating distinct eras of time. Despite Satan’s attempts to work through 
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probability and his success at achieving the avowed aims of his journey to earth, he finds no 
contingent other ways for the universe or his being to take. In a similar yet meaningfully 
different comparison with God’s Providential view that concluded in the infinitive, Satan 
solidifies his past by negating all probable outcomes. In his moment of doubt as he looks on 
Earth and considers the possibility of pardon, Satan soliloquies, “Say I could repent and could 
obtain / By act of grace my former state” (IV.94-5). Instead of dwelling with these contingencies 
or even acknowledging a degree of likelihood, he quickly mobilizes other probable narratives 
working against his initial subjunctive foray, such as “how soon would height recalls high 
thoughts” and “ease would recant / Vows made in pain. He concludes “For never can true 
reconcilement grow / where wounds of deadly hate have pierced so deep” (IV.94-99). The past is 
fixed and severely limits even the imagination of potentials for Satan. Even without God’s 
experience of infinity, Satan nonetheless imposes a “never” on the future in another mockery of 
God’s power. God’s future appears in his fixed language of what will be, but he keeps the other 
ways things could have preceded close to his indicative statements. Satan achieves control of his 
emotions by trying to ignore counter-possibilities and affirming the path he has already chosen. 
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, Satan’s final thought, “where wounds of deadly hate have 
pierced so deep” is a falsehood that relies on a fixed past. The phrase has no clear subject and 
object, but God does not seem to hate Satan even by Satan’s own standards. And at no point in 
the war in heaven did Satan harm God or Christ. Satan needs this myth of a mutual conflict to 
continue, however, but he also needs the consideration to accomplish the complex task of taking 
his false premise and connecting it to his ongoing narrative. 
These moments dramatize the process of what the poem does as a whole. Planning 
bridges and reconciles disparate storytelling formats. Overall, Sin is the figure performing this 
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connection in Milton’s epic, taking on a role in Greek mythology influenced tale of birth from 
Satan’s head as well as a more mundane persona as one who unlocks the gate of hell and enters 
the Earth after Satan shows her the way.115 Planning mediates between Book III’s mythical 
journey across chaos and Satan’s theatrical monologue and metatheatrical viewing of Adam and 
Eve in Paradise. The structure of Milton’s epic also evokes a multiplicity in the filling in of 
space. Paradise Lost fills in the space between a few of lines from Genesis. Satan and God’s 
competing designs create a massive narrative from the scanty account of the Bible. Within 
Paradise Lost, Milton’s poetry reflects this by using poetry to flesh out the plot of each book 
described in a presaging argument. Both argument in each book and the relationship between the 
Bible to the poem as a whole take a narrative skeleton and add multiplicity to it, describing 
probable narratives that are not incommensurate with the source narrative but that are also not 
explicitly contained within it. The argument of each book and the ensuing poetry mirror history 
and the multiplicitous cloud that haunts its linear progress. They formally and spatially reflect 
what happens in the narrative. 
The skeleton of each book’s argument and Biblical account thus form a mythic 
framework for Milton to elaborate on, much like Satan’s Sin provides a starting point that joins 
the Biblical account to the story of Paradise Lost. Andrew Marvell defines Milton’s potentially 
heretical elaboration of Biblical canon as a “vast design” in his prefatory poem from the 1674 
version of Paradise Lost (53). He also calls Milton’s work a “project,” only mentioning poetry in 
the final stanza. Design is a term used for everything from architectural plans and military 
campaigns to God and Satan’s own ideas in Paradise Lost. To call the poem a design and a 
project suggests that planning is an important element for reconciling what Dryden in his poem 
                                                 
115 Lucifer’s designs also combine mediums. After deliberating as to whether or not he could 
repent, for example, he looks on Adam and Eve as if they are in a “woody theatre” (IV.141).  
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calls a combination of Greek and Italian poets (55). Between Hell and Earth lies chaos, and Sin 
connects hell to chaos, and chaos to Earth. Paradise Lost begins with a supernatural lake of fire 
and proceeds through council, design, action, and reversal to the entire description of human 
history and Adam and Eve’s simple walk through the newly fallen landscape. Sin’s appearance 
in moments of planning helps reconcile the two spheres. But even before Sin appears, the 
language of probability and planning helps launch the poem. In the argument to Book I, which 
takes place in hell, Milton carefully outlines in a parenthetical that “heaven and earth may be 
supposed as yet not made, certainly not yet accursed” as opposed to the possibility that it is 
located at the center of the earth (55). In a fascinating move, the “may be supposed” suggests 
that the whole poem is a potential possibility, a supposition. With this in mind, Marvell’s 
reference to the piece as a project takes on another narrative resonance. 
Sin’s birth thus ties together myth and history, by connecting Satan’s oldest 
remembrances that he initially seems to have forgotten with Adam and Eve’s own march through 
time. The connection of myth to history has an uncanny quality, as Sin’s original appearance in 
our world emphasizes that Adam and Eve’s place in humanity’s narrative also takes place in 
Christian pre-history. In addition to this connection, Sin’s special creation pivots between the 
comparison of God to non-God being in moments of serious deliberation, without action being a 
necessary component in the registering of evil. For Satan, his plan alone is enough to give birth 
to Sin. For Adam and Eve, they must actually eat the fruit for Sin to enter the human universe. 
As the worlds of Hell and Earth connect, the history and pre-history also connect. Differing 
measurements of temporal categories run into each other. Initially forgotten, Sin becomes 
important again as Satan attempts to work his new design on the beings of earth. The warning 
given by Raphael temporarily put out of their minds, Adam and Eve also conspire to become 
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Gods themselves. Thus, in two key moments in the narrative, Sin and planning overlap. Her birth 
within planning opens established origin stories such as Original Sin to be moved through time—
in this case, back into forgotten memory, back into pre-history. This movement, in turn, reveals 
probability as a constitutive element in defining historicity. 
 
Critiquing Theories of History and Prehistory 
Taking Sin’s birth as emblematic as one potential of probabilistic image-narratives, I now 
turn to the theoretical implications of Milton’s story for the way we understand the interaction of 
myth (or prehistory) and history in theories of subject formation, especially of subject formation 
that incorporates gender as a foundational category.116 Although many theories of subject 
formation antedate Paradise Lost by hundreds of years, the intertwined reading makes sense for 
several reasons. First, Sin’s place in the narrative looks ahead to the future, much as Milton’s 
poem as a whole does. As we saw in the first chapter, looking backward at moments of planning 
shows individuals in the past looking toward the future, even if they cannot quite recognize the 
future through the multiplicity of probability. The final two books of Paradise Lost give a 
momentum to movement through time that does not stop in Milton’s contemporary moment, but 
looks far beyond. Sin, according to Milton, will continue to have a place in our world long after 
the poem is forgotten. But more than that, the epic suggests that forward and backward may not 
be the only way to think about the relationship of past and future, as probability gives rise to 
coexistent accounts in multiple time periods. As a second reason it makes sense, within Paradise 
Lost, the birth of Sin seems to be moving toward a conception of subjectivity incorporating 
gender. She springs full-grown from Satan’s mind, but has an agency all her own. We must 
                                                 
116 Although the argument that theory inherently incorporates gender makes sense, I am referring 
to theories that are more explicit. 
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remember that Satan is an angel and not a person, despite his person-like qualities. But Sin is a 
different sort of being than angel or human as well. Her agency is different from Satan’s, and she 
is daughter and mother in one, giving birth to Death but in a manner different from her birth 
from Satan. She is a creature of both thought and body, becoming a figure in the narrative at a 
moment where probability is being explored and pre-history and history come into a relationship 
with each other. Angels, as Raphael notes, do not have gender like Adam and Eve do. If so, this 
makes Sin the first woman in creation, and makes Satan’s plan leading to her birth the first 
recorded birth in our universe. 
Using these parallels, I will turn to Sigmund Freud’s theories not because they are easy to 
debunk, but rather because they remain a model for cultural theorization and gender formation 
despite their perceived out-of-date status. Turning to Freud’s theories is useful because Original 
Sin is an important mythical element in Psychoanalysis. Freud transforms the context of the 
religious idea, but still treats it as a locus of analysis. Furthermore, as with Sin’s birth, Freud 
treats gender as an integral component of subject formation. Additionally, as Goldberg, Foucualt, 
and others make clear, long after his ideas have been popularly debunked, literary critics still 
turn to Freud’s categorical explorations of the mind for a means to tap into the unconscious of 
cultural prejudices. I would suggest that critics and philosophers who claim to have no truck 
Freud’s work in particular or theory in general, nonetheless incorporate basic assumptions from 
his ideas, especially his pieces Civilization and Its Discontents, Totem and Taboo, Interpretation 
of Dreams, and Moses and Monotheism. The most obvious assumption drawn from Freud is the 
notion of the unconscious—the pattern beneath intention that might be likened to Providence. 
But one of the most persistent mysteries Freud grapples with, one found even among the most 
anti-theoretical thinkers, is the difficult division between history and prehistory that still allows 
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for the prehistorical expression within history. Finally, Freud is a useful point of comparison 
because like Milton, he attempts to use narrative to define the non-narrative age before a 
recorded reckoning of time.  
I want to focus on one important example of thinking in this vein from Civilization and 
Its Discontents. One of the metaphors that Freud uses in an attempt to untangle human 
development focuses on spatial planning. “Let us, by a flight of imagination, suppose that Rome 
is not a human habitation but a psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past—an 
entity, that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence will have passed away 
and all the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the latest one.”117 Gil 
Harris, who reads buildings constructed with the remains of other buildings to define overlapping 
temporalities, would find this formulation familiar, perhaps even drawing on it as an inspiration. 
But unlike Harris’s palimpsests of space and time, Freud does not think the present alters the 
past. Prehistory can be expressed through in history, but not vice versa. 
Milton’s poem gives us some productive parallels that feed into Freud’s work as well. 
Death’s rape of Sin after his birth in Hell, for example, violently marks the moment where the 
oppression in women might begin with an incestuous relationship. In Freud, this incestuous 
desire happens in each individual subject and family, but also occurs in the social pre-history of 
tribal humans.118 For Freud’s personal and social prehistory, as in Milton’s poem, the incestuous 
desire marks an ascendency of masculinity and provides a source for all later taboos. In both 
Freud and Milton, incest marks a moment of secrecy and shame that must be hidden when 
viewed in retrospect, and Freud is explicit that this shame causes the past to be purposefully 
                                                 
117 Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, Trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1989), 18. 
118 See Freud, Sigmund. Moses and Monotheism, Trans. Katherine Jones (New York: Vintage, 
1967).  
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forgotten only to be recalled in moments where one undertakes an effort to alter one’s status. In 
Milton, however, unlike in Freud, the incest connects to recorded history via an established and 
connective narrative, in a clearer and more concise version of Freud’s often complicated attempts 
to untangle history from pre-history. 119 In particular, Milton’s account of Sin’s birth resembles 
the notion of personal prehistory and development that we find in Civilization and Its 
Discontents. Speaking of “clear and sharp lines of demarcation” between self and other melting 
away in “in love” Freud claims that “the feeling of our own ego is subject to disturbances and the 
boundaries of the ego are not constant.”120 The Freudian tale of love recalls Milton’s account, 
where Satan’s self-love redraws the map of self and other by creating a new being.  
Following immediately on his observations on love and incest, however, Freud hints at a 
difficult idea that has not been seen as having the wide-ranging implications that it does, which 
brings the Subjunctive Aesthetic into central importance for theories involving history and pre-
history:  
“Further reflection tells us that the adult’s ego-felling cannot have been the same from the 
beginning. It must have gone through a process of development, which cannot, of course, be 
demonstrated but which admits of being constructed with a fair degree of probability.”121 
 
The construction of the self is not a particularly alien idea in any era, and even the idea 
that there can be no evidence of the creation of a self is not attention-grabbing. What remains 
unexplored is what Freud means with “a fair degree of probability” and why he connects 
probability to the reconstruction of the ego within a broader discussion about civilization. 
Hinting at the importance of the Subjunctive Aesthetic, Freud himself teases us by connecting 
                                                 
119 Much like Hell is connected to Earth via a bridge once Sin and Death arrive in it. Freud’s 
division from history and prehistory is complicated, but persistent. Shame and taboo are among 
the levers that pivot between the two, and Freud is committed to maintaining categorical 
differences between the two. 
120 Freud. Civilization and Its Discontents. 13. 
121 Ibid. 13. 
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probability, planning, and the pre-history of human civilization with his thought-experiment of 
Rome, where all its buildings of the past still stand in the present moment. In language that 
recalls the Great Yarmouth image, Strachey translates Freud’s words like this,  
On the Piazza of the Pantheon we should find not only the Pantheon of to-day…but…the 
original ediface erected by Agrippa; indeed the same piece of ground would be supporting the 
church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva and the ancient temple over which it was built. And the 
observer would perhaps only have to change the direction of his glance or his position in order to 
call up view or the other.122 
 
The observation of multiple views on the same space of all different times is familiar, and Freud 
places this suggestion in a sentence marked by a “would perhaps.”123 He can only imagine the 
confluence of prehistory and history in space by resorting to probability. 
The other notion implied by Freud’s “fair degree of probability” is that there is a process 
of development in time and something that happens before that process which cannot be shown 
or seen. After imagining all of the Pantheons there have ever been, he writes, “There is clearly no 
point in spinning our phantasy any further, for it leads to things that are unimaginable and even 
absurd.”124 The unimaginable potential of this image haunts the perceptible world. Freud thus 
establishes some sort of break between development and a beginning marked by “phantasy” or 
“probability.” He suggests we might posit pre-history as something akin to biology, a state that 
cannot be defined and only approached retroactively by its development. Furthermore, I would 
align this personal movement of Civilization and Its Discontent, in conjunction with his ideas 
from Moses and Monotheism and elsewhere, that the beginning is the space of myth, and that 
history reworks these prehistoric myths in development through time.  
                                                 
122 Ibid. 18. 
123 The phrase in German is “wurde vielleicht,” also subjunctive. 
124 Ibid. 18-19. 
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Paradise Lost forces us to rethink Freud’s notion of pre-history, as the epic’s pushing 
back of the original appearance of sin is a simultaneous subjunctive-historical movement, which 
does not seem to depart radically from dominant Christian narratives because it retains a 
genealogy for Sin and Death. Milton’s work asks where the source of Sin might have come from 
before Adam and Eve, and how it could have entered the world. The poem’s movement keeps 
the narrative of Eden found in the Bible intact, but also opens up a past where there was not 
supposed to be a past. Sin’s birth challenges a notion of a fixed foundation of Biblical law by 
giving an alternative narrative account of origin that re-enters the historical narrative only after 
making the previously abstract Sin a personified agent—one who aids Satan against God. Not a 
philosophical result of Eve and Adam’s decisions, the heretical genealogy of sin transforms Sin 
into a being that gives birth to Death, producing a doubled genealogy in prehistory that also 
blends with the fixed chronology of history when Sin enters the fallen world. In turn, this allows 
for the production of a familiar but new account as Sin takes a central role in the Christian 
history revealed to Adam and Eve by the Archangel Michael. 
Adorno and Horkheimer claim that myth and history are the same, they just have 
different frames. Freud also addresses this potential overlap. According to a friend of Freud cited 
at the beginning of Civilization and Its Discontents, religions draws its source from a “sensation 
of ‘eternity,’ a feeling as of something limitless, unbounded—as it were, ‘oceanic.’  This feeling, 
he adds, is a purely subjective fact, not an article of faith.”125  Although Freud quibbles with the 
“illusion” of religion, he nonetheless agrees that the “indissoluble bond” that an ego feels with 
the external world is an intellectual perception while the boundary between the ego and the 
external world “cannot have been the same from the beginning.  It must have gone through a 
                                                 
125 Ibid. 11. 
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process of development.”126  As the sentences show, this past ”development” is couched in the 
subjunctive mood, speaking in probabilistic terms about an inaccessible ontogeny.  But even 
Freud’s critical ontogeny relies on a calcified past for the meaning of his suppositions—he can’t 
use “must” without mentioning “eternity” first. In this, he approaches Augustine’s discussion of 
God’s eternity in tension with human consciousness of time.127 Anchoring suppositions in a 
tautologically reliably unknown pre-historical past as Milton’s God does hinders Freud’s critique 
by restricting him to the way things must be, to a vision resembling Providence. But within these 
restrictions, the subjunctive language struggles against fixed borders between time periods. 
With Milton and Freud’s contrasts of history and myth, of prehistory and history in mind, 
I return to Freud’s statements about the development of the self. Freud’s “fair degree of 
probability” in the construction of the ego might initially seem to be a modern statement about 
statistical significance and the demands of scientific peer-review. Sin’s experience in Paradise 
Lost suggests that even for beings that have decided origin stories, the boundaries of a fixed and 
eternal past remain malleable when probability enters the definition. I would not take Freud out 
of his time. He is defining his reconstruction of the psyche in terms of a statistical likelihood, 
trying to suggest that his account is close to the one that actually happened, a developmental 
story that is scientific and statistically reliable. Embedded in this more recent definition of 
probability, however, is the anachronistic idea of coexisting spatial-narrative probabilities, such 
as the twin accounts of Sin that we find in Milton. Freud’s metaphor of the many overlapping 
Pantheons illustrates this connection. But Freud also acknowledges a blending of coexisting 
narratives of subjectivity, when he states, “An infant at the breast does not as yet distinguish his 
                                                 
126 Ibid. 11. Lacan’s “jouissance” draws on a similar intellectual perception, but for the purposes 
of this essay I am more interested in critical understandings of religion, time, and the subjunctive 
than in psychoanalysis itself. 
127 Augustine. Confessions. 
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ego from the external world, as the source of the sensations flowing upon him. He gradually 
learns to do so.”128 Despite the fact that Freud’s story seems to rely on a before ego and after 
ego, and despite his ability to actually demonstrate the process of subject formation, there is a 
blending, a “gradually” learned process. In this sentence, the creation of a new being does not 
come about in moments of deliberation or decision-making as with Sin’s birth from Satan’s 
mind. Sensations teach the baby the difference between self and non-self, ego and non-ego, 
dividing the prehistoric non-subject from the historically verifiable and identifiable one. 
In a way, however, the process of ego-creation only becomes conceivable once Freud 
turns his attention to figuring the process out. His backward projection relies on self-conscious 
intention. “One comes to learn a procedure by which, through a deliberate direction of one’s 
sensory activities and through suitable muscular action, one can differentiate between what is 
internal—what belongs to the ego—and what is external—what emanates from the outer 
world.”129 The process of cause and effect in this process are striking, with Freud repeatedly 
emphasizing what “must be” and what can and cannot happen.130 Yet despite what seems to be a 
straightforward process, Freud’s ideas embed numerous other explicit and implicit contingencies. 
Freudian followers like Lacan and Laplanche have extrapolated these coextant possible courses 
of development at great length in their works to discover non-heternormative subjectivities. But I 
would like to suggest that Milton’s notion of Sin as original in both heaven and earth, provides a 
paradoxical forbear of the tension between what must be in the development of a Freudian ego 
and the countless ways that the development can go awry, all the ways in which the 
polymorphous perversity of subjects can express through what seems to be a fixed 
                                                 
128 Freud. Civilization and Its Discontents. 13. 
129 Ibid. 14-15. 
130 Ibid. 14. 
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developmental trajectory. Freud, in attempting to uncover the developmental process, comes up 
against a modern eruption of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
Sin’s story, like Freud’s narrative, makes claims to be about universal issues and big 
origin moments like Civilization or Man’s First Fall. But the tale is also a personal one for Sin, 
as she becomes a self-aware being in a world with other creatures related to and yet unlike her. 
Beyond this somewhat transparent moment of new consciousness, the event also suggests a 
personal transformation for Satan as well. Satan becomes the individual he remains throughout 
the narrative of Paradise Lost in the moment when he gives birth to Sin and differentiates an 
action or aspect of himself from what he once was. The moment not only mediates between 
prehistoric mythology and historical record, but also between self-awareness and non-self-
awareness in Sin and Satan themselves. The moment is a personal awakening, when the 
undifferentiated mass of potential selves begins to actualize into defined identities. Similarly, 
Satan’s crisis of doubt in his anti-God mission after he crosses chaos illustrates this same 
negation of other potential selves in a ratification of existing self. Satan’s strangely deliberate 
non-choice to do as he must and continue into Eden suggests that carrying out his plan against 
God’s new creations requires negating other possibilities in order to affirm the handful that he 
might do. Attempting to figure out the range of possible actions, even in a social situation as 
Satan does, makes probability a constitutive element of selfhood. For Freud as well, what one 
must or can do is an important if un-emphasized aspect of the formation of the ego. 
Freud’s work is not the only theory in which the self-conscious intentionality of planning 
forms an important assumption for theorization. Planning mediates between the realization of 
non-I and I in more modern theories of subjectivity as well. In John Rawls’ political philosophy, 
for instance, the ideals he proffers for the foundation of a society involve a blind deliberation 
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about what a being with no identity would like from a potential society. Only after moving 
through this deliberative and unknown phase of selfhood can this non-being proceed into more 
concrete aspects of what justice looks like for specific individuals. This deliberation never 
happens and can never happen, and yet defines notions of what should be. In other theoretical 
terms, the heresy of pushing back the timing of sin is, in Bourdieu’s terms, a “subversion” that 
“exploits the possibility of challenging the social world by changing the representation of this 
world which contributes to its reality… counterposing a paradoxical pre-vision, a utopia, a 
project or programme, to the ordinary vision which apprehends the social world as a natural 
world: the performative utterance, the political pre-vision, is…a pre-diction which aims to bring 
about what it utters.”131 Prediction for Bourdieu, in short, helps define the past and the future, but 
only through a paradox. I want to suggest that the “programme,” he points to, are the 
probabilities that linger in plans. They haunt these notions of sequential or linear time in the 
creation of any subject that exists in time. 
I do not mean to suggest that planning or the Subjunctive Aesthetic is a universal aspect 
of selfhood, representation, or thought. But the subjunctive must appear in a mediating role when 
identities come to be formed. This is because deliberation allows for the non-contradictory 
tension of multiple possible lines of action without allowing for an overwhelming degree of 
possible narratives to overwhelm a coherent identity. Planning gives theoreticians of self-hood a 
range of motion that beings can move through and still remain recognizable to themselves. 
Individuals can alter or modify these plans, or even surprise themselves by moving outside of 
their bounds due to unexpected events, but the Subjunctive Aesthetic will appear in the transition 
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of between these phases, transforming the past into a mythic foundation for a linear and 
chronological narrative of selfhood. 
 
New Subjects in Forgotten Times 
In this last section, I would like to return from theory to a more simple narrative of 
planning, in order to outline that the probable thinking of plans helps reconcile huge narratives 
with the small application. I see the overlap of large swaths of probable narratives with small-
decision-making by looking in particular at conversational deliberation. The coincidence, I 
contend, comes not because the big categorical notions are attempting to latch onto specifics, but 
because the verbal and narrative styles overlap. By looking at Sin and another moment of sin, 
specifically the moment where Eve makes her decision to eat the forbidden fruit, Paradise Lost, 
and the epic genre more generally, has the potential to do more than threaten patriarchy with a 
new genealogy for Sin. Instead of the placing familiar characters in new potential situations, the 
Subjunctive Aesthetic can render beings previously unimaginable into historical agents. The 
most obvious of these beings are Sin and Death, but I also include angels and the false but 
believable serpent that Satan inhabits to trick Eve 
The epic’s form suggests the connection of minor deliberation to sweeping ones. Satan’s 
journey has its impetus in the counsel of Book II. This counsel corresponds to God’s counsel 
with Jesus in Book III and Satan’s own self-reflection in the same book. These discussions of 
probable courses of action are bookended in Book IX by Eve’s deliberations with Satan and 
Adam, usually understood as a seduction, a temptation, or a trick by Satan.132 Although many of 
                                                 
132 Even in an avowedly feminist reading: “Satan’s initial temptation included many inversions 
of hierarchy.” Miller, Shannon. Engendering the Fall, 94. For a reading that attempts to work 
outside the patriarchal version of authority in what she calls a “Gnostic” form that exposes the 
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these readings maintain Eve as an agent and some place an extreme focus on the exercise of her 
will as she sins, interpretations of the sequence tend to elide the strange subjectivity of the snake, 
and they also, I argue, misconstrue the nature of Satan and Eve’s interaction. In the original ten 
book publication, the correspondence between Book III and VIII would have been much more 
apparent. Book III contains not only God’s extensive deliberations, but also Satan’s deliberations 
with himself about his course of action as he beholds Earth. In the ten book publication, the 
mirroring of deliberation in Book III and the deliberation between Eve and Satan would have 
been much more apparent. This reflection emphasizes Eve’s choice—she could deliberate as 
God does or as Satan does. But it also requires that she deliberate with a serpent, a non-human 
who previously has no importance to human experiences in Eden. 
Before I analyze how non-human beings become comprehensible to human experience of 
narrative, I will simply note how important they are Milton’s poems and the epic in general and 
what makes them strange to human characters. The most obvious is the angels, who 
communicate with humans, but are also baffling. This confusion is suggested at least partially by 
the fact that they experience potentially non-heteronormative sexuality. Raphael tells Adam—
“Whatever pure thou in the body enjoyst …we enjoy / In eminence, and obstacle find none / Of 
membrane, joint, or limb, exclusive bars: / Easier than air with air, if spirits embrace, / Total they 
mix, union of pure with pure / Desiring; nor restrained conveyance need / As flesh to mix with 
flesh, or soul with soul” (VIII.622-9).  Angels desire, embrace, and love but not like Adam and 
Eve do, and yet the angels and humans communicate, and even seem to come to some accord 
about how pleasure works with each other. We also saw Sin’s strange birth that somehow 
allowed her to give birth as humans do, although it was with the angelic Lucifer. Shannon Miller 
                                                                                                                                                             
“hidden” power that Eve maintains in spite of Satan’s rhetoric that describes her as oppressed see 
Foula, Christine. “When Eve Reads Milton.” Critical Inquiry. 10. (December 1983), 329. 
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notes that the epic hides a hidden history of femininity that upsets Patriarchal distinctions of 
gender.133 I have suggested that between verses two and three of Genesis, Milton expands a 
narrative based on apocrypha and oral traditions of Lucifer’s fall to radically re-contextualize 
history and canon without dismissing them. With the angels, Paradise Lost rolls in these oral 
traditions to literary text, granting something like citizenship to a type of being that many of 
Milton’s fellow radical Protestants would be loathe to acknowledge.  
Milton’s decision is not entirely unique. From the unborn Roman ghosts of Virgil’s 
Aeneid, to an underworld Achilles who renounces war in the Odyssey, alternate worlds that 
overlap with supposedly established ones can alter and create new agents in epic narratives.  In 
Paradise Lost, an entire world predating recorded history is heavily populated with angels. 
Angels are comparable to and communicative with human beings, and even the dour Michael 
comforts Adam and Eve in the final two books.  But angels also make meaningful choices, and 
both fallen angel and angel alike have influence in the secular historical (i.e. non-Christian) and 
material world, as the demons’ activities as ancient Greek Gods in Book II demonstrates. Sin and 
Death, although they have a firm place in Christiian history, are also new characters, made 
comprehensible through eroticism and the connective tissue offered by the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic. Two final characters that receive very little space in the narrative, but who are also 
novel to Milton’s poem are the King Chaos and his Queen Night, who grant Satan his passage 
over their domain. Milton is drawing on Greek and Roman traditions in his depictions of these 
beings, and they receive so little narration in the narrative that I do not think I should devote the 
space to an extensive analysis. I will note, however, that these characters have a connected and 
yet confusing connection to the spaces they inhabit along the lines of Alma’s Advisors. Like her 
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counselors, they become both agents and places. I have been focusing on time more than space in 
this chapter, but I would like to mention Milton’s description of Chaos as a topos “without 
deminsion, where length, breadth, and height, and time and place are lost; where eldest Night 
and Chaos, hold eternal anarchy” (II.893-6). The organizing principal of the section, then, is not 
space or time, but Satan’s plan and the probability of success that carries him on his mission. His 
plan also seems to make the previously unrepresentable Chaos and Night into avatars who can 
speak and aid or hinder Satan on his quest. Like Milton, Satan’s project makes characters were 
there was only a confusing mixture of time and space. 
Turning to a different sort of deliberation and decision-making, Eve’s calculation of 
probabilities also incorporates a non-human agent—the serpent. Importantly, and as with the 
angels, before the conversation arrives at deliberation, the eroticized intercourse begins with Eve 
wondering at “language of man pronounced by tongue of brute, and human sense expressed” 
(IX.553-4). In Eve’s deliberation that leads to her decision, a gendered subjectivity and 
deliberation become intertwined just as with Sin’s birth. In fact, she explicitly ties subjectivity 
and deliberation to the use of language. Although earlier Eve does not wonder at the fact that 
Raphael can speak human language, her question to the serpent is the same question that Adam 
asked of Raphael, “how?” “How cam’st thou speakable of mute” (IX.563). The question, like 
Freud’s work, attempts to work through the before and after of consciousness by tracing a 
process that can only be reconstructed in the past tense. Eve is trying to reach into the serpent’s 
prehistory. Satan, of course, gives her a lie and even that lie only glosses what Satan calls a 
“strange alteration.” Much like Freud’s theory and Sin’s birth, Satan’s his falsehood provides the 
basis for a fascinating sequence of deliberation, with the basic assumption that the fruit gave the 
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serpent the ability to make “speculations high or deep” (IX.662). But as I have argued with Sin, 
it is never clear when Satan himself became Satan. 
Without many promptings, Eve quickly begins to employ a subjunctive language of 
probability to converse with the serpent. After learning of the snake’s apparent intelligence Eve 
first asks for proof of this in the form of the source tree for the serpent’s magical fruit. Upon 
discovering that it is the forbidden tree, she can only say “”of this tree we may not taste nor 
touch” (IX.652). Although absence is not evidence, I note that God’s injunction is not, “you will 
not.” Even Adam, attempting to steel himself for Satan’s mission, never says, “We will not eat.” 
In this moment, Eve repeats the language she has heard from Adam, who heard from God. All 
these repeated prohibitions were monologues that left the possibility of tasting or touching the 
fruit implied by the “shall.” Although the option was previously unthinkable, Satan picks up on 
Eve’s “may,” to open the door to counter possibilities. He begins with a simple one-word 
question, “Indeed?” His follow up question is scarcely much longer but opens up a discussion 
using the very language of God’s probabilistic prohibition, “Hath God then said that of the fruit 
of all these garden trees ye shall not eat, yet lords declared of all in earth or air” (IX. 656-8). 
Eve’s “may not,” becomes Satan’s “ye shall not,” and Eve picks up on this in her response to 
Satan’s question. The difference is one of forcefulness. May and may not imply a gentle 
suggestion away from options, and “shall” gives God’s words an edge of negativity that they 
may not have otherwise had. But this small shift is only one of Satan’s rhetorical flourishes about 
what could happen, as he launches into a tour-de-force argument that throws at least four 
possible scenarios into a jumbled deliberation and advise asking, essentially, what’s the worst 
that could happen? Look at me, I ate the fruit.  
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Satan ends his extensive deliberations of options by asking, “These, these and many more 
causes import your need of this fair fruit” (IX.731-2). The repetition of “these” and the 
suggestion of causes and multiplicity expand probable courses of action that was already latent in 
God’s prohibition. Furthermore, the deliberations themselves seem to make the serpent into an 
agent. Like God, his plotting moves through probability. Satan has an ulterior motive, as he 
attempts to expand the range in order to place a new emphasis on the possibility of eating the 
fruit. He shifts the narrative focus of probabilities to make taking and eating seem more 
appealing than it once did, and his appearance as the serpent ties this expansion of possibility to 
the expansion of subjectivity to the animals of Eden. But his deliberation is not action. It is not 
seduction or trickery, per say. Furthermore, the ruse does not immediately work. But the 
conversation does aid Eve as she thinks, “thus to herself she mused” (IX.744).  
The language of Eve’s deliberations is not in the subjunctive, and is in fact 
overwhelmingly indicative. But the key verb that switches Eve from focusing on God’s 
prohibition to asking Satanic questions of what could happen is “infers.” The questions following 
the inference lead then to her picking the fruit and eating. All of this is to say that Satan’s 
subjunctive explorations set the stage for Eve’s shift, providing the background of probability 
that haunts God’s providence. As with Sin’s birth, it is difficult if not impossible to point at a 
moment where her decision changes. Understandings of the sequence have focused on choice, as 
Satan out options for Eve to choose from and she makes the fateful decision. But by paying 
attention to the language we can see that Satan’s plans provide a stylistic juncture that tells us 
how Eve makes a choice and how Satan helps define the choice as such. The Subjunctive 
Aesthetic gives a range of probabilities that Eve then sifts through to make a final decision. 
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The sequence is in many ways then a return of Sin’s birth through Satan. Just as before, 
Satan’s plan provides a key source for Sin. Only here the counsel that leads to the fall is actually 
narrated. We never saw the angelic parliament that produced Sin from Satan’s skull in the 
presence of his lieutenants. But we do see the conversation that helps give Eve a chance to alter 
her own subjectivity and translate herself to the level of God. Eve, like Satan, seems to have a 
compulsion to repeat her Sin and transmit it to another being. She does so by offering Adam a 
choice, but again, her choice derives from a plan. She asks herself, “But to Adam in what sort 
shall I appear? Shall I to him make known as yet my change, and give him to partake full 
happiness with me, or rather not, but keep the odds of knowledge in my power without 
copartner” (IX.816-21). She plans what she should do, but she is asking if she should let Adam 
follow in her developmental pattern, if she can create a new being from him just as she has 
become new herself. 
At this moment, the connection Eve and Adam with Sin and Satan reveals how 
deliberation creates new beings from within what seem to be the defined borders of old ones. It 
passes between subjects. It makes the serpent into a conversationalist. Satan is the fable or 
mythical or prehistoric version of this transformation, while Eve and Adam are the historical 
type. Their deliberation creates the awareness of a new range of probable actions, which in turn 
give rise to new sorts of self-definition that to not involve obedience to God. This leads to the 
ejection from Paradise that reifies the hierarchy of genders according to God. Yet Eve’s 
deliberation in Eden also reverses the gender dynamics of the earlier birth of Sin, allowing Eve 
the power to rethink her position, to craft a new being from herself as Satan does from his mind. 
The connection of Sin to Eve is an ancient and pernicious one, but Milton’s epic does more than 
simply dismiss Eve’s decision as weakness or malice, as patriarchal interpretations would imply. 
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My reading of the sequence suggests that deliberation creates agents in non-heteronormative 
ways. Deliberation is queer not because it seems incestuous as in the case of Sin or because it 
works against God as in the case of Eve, but because it ties these moments together with implied 
and yet unrepresented potential courses of action. Sin is not a human woman like Eve, yet 
because of her multiplicity she can resemble one. 
At the gates of hell, after Adam and Eve fall, Sin speaks to her Son and says,  
Methinks I feel new strength within me rise, 
Wings growing, and dominion given me large 
Beyond this deep; whatever draws me on, 
Or sympathy, or some connatural force 
Powerful at greatest distance to unite 
With secret amity things of like kind 
By secretest conveyance (IX.243-9) 
 
Sin speaks here of “greatest distance” and “secret amity.” I connect the distance and overlap to 
the gulf and resemblance between history and pre-history. It resembles a moment of queer 
haunting by one of Freccero’s anachronistic ghosts. But there is a difference. Sin’s amity derives 
from the ostensible overlap of the conditions of her birth with Adam’s and Eve’s rejection from 
the garden. Yet Sin’s story is never fully told here or anywhere else in the epic, and remains lost 
in an implied and potentially contradictory prehistory. The instantaneous transmission of the fall 
suggests an overlap in Sin’s perception of time when it comes to origin moments, such as the 
eating of the forbidden fruit. But we do not know exactly when Sin leaves her post at the gates of 
hell and heads to earth. Does she fly when Eve falls? When Adam falls? When they have post-
lapsarian sex and experience shame? I say yes to all of these. There is simultaneity in Sin’s 
perception of the fall. But it is a hazy and overlapping simultaneity defined by probability. She 
moves in both history and pre-history but renders the two categories locally destabilized. 
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 According to Sin, the “secretest conveyence” connects her to the birth of history as Adam 
and Eve fall. Shedescribes this connection in a range of overlapping options— in an 
indescribable sympathy, or connatural force, or a “whatever.” All of these narrative options are 
connected by the “or” and none are final or clear.134 This reflects Sin’s character as well as the 
multiplicity of Eve’s conversation with Satan. Sin has her first appearance in pre-history and 
history, and the multiplicity of deliberation is what connects the two moments of falling in the 
two different temporalities. Sin leaves not because of simple compulsion, but rather due to the 
acknowledgement of a range of options is what allows her to choose to move across the night, 
allowing her probalistic narrative to haunt God’s providence. Following her will come a forged 
path for Satan’s crew and along with her will come Death. But what Sin initially offers is “new 
strength,” and “wings growing.” Before the straight line and the road to the fallen earth is 
constructed, Sin has a motion of her own, circumscribed by Christian tradition, but multiplicitous 
in origin. Although it may seem strange to discuss Sin as an agent, even tinged with the 
positivity that implies, she has as much agency as Eve, Adam, or Satan in the narrative of 
Paradise Lost. In my chapter on Shakespeare I will again look at the connection of agency and 
plans, at moments in historical tragedies when plans seemingly gain the capability to act or exert 
pressure under their own power and resound on their creator. But in Paradise Lost, Sin is not 
herself a plan as much as she is the outcome of one. She becomes defined as evil in retrospect 
based on the products of Satan’s designs in both pre-history and history. Yet the concept of The 
Fortunate Fall implies that Sin’s perceived evil is a malleable, perhaps suggesting that such 
categories are the outcome of the probable designs that swirl around her.  
                                                 
134 For an entire chapter on the Miltonic “or” see Herman, Peter. Destabilizing Milton: “Paradise 
Lost” and the Poetics of Incertitude, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).  Herman does not 
tie this to a narrative form, but rather to a poetics. 
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Sin’s ever-receding origin in probability lies between a tiny choice and the grandest 
epoch-spanning design. With grand designs in mind, I now turn to more practical projects of 
early modern Science. Though they seem in some ways more practical than Satan’s plots against 
God, their projects also reach into the supernatural world of magic. 
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Chapter 3: Bacon and Dee’s Planned Epistemologies: The History of Probability in 
Science and Experiment 
 
This chapter explores two works defined by the Subjunctive Aesthetic by situating these 
pieces within these authors’ wider textual productions.  If Chapter 1 is a broad overview of what 
sort of texts comprise the Subjunctive Aesthetic and Chapter 2 is a specific example of the 
Aesthetic’s impact on Paradise Lost, then this chapter is an experimental case study connecting 
two very different pieces of writing that deal with planning. My use of the term “experimental” 
is calculated. I use the word in a provisional sense, and not to refer to a controlled event that 
would take place in a sterilized laboratory. In an experiment that exposes a range of options 
rather than one that fixes a fact, I recover the sense of experiment as a range of probable 
outcomes. In using the term in this way, I want to do justice to two of the strangest and yet most 
familiar figures of the Renaissance in language they helped popularize, but also to expose the 
strange etymology of the word experiment and its long relationship with projective narratives 
and images. In addition, I hope to bring a broader range of meaning to ongoing scientific 
practices and expand how critics imagine the history and pre-history of Science. I argue that a 
notion of an “experimental method,” at least for these two thinkers, is a fraught term that 
navigates the tension between a defined system and that system’s probable effects. The two 
figures I explore in this chapter, Dr. John Dee and Sir Francis Bacon, have a deep and lasting 
influence in the fields of epistemology that contemporary thinkers now associate with Science. 
But the epistemologies that later critics attribute to Bacon and Dee never existed in their day. 
Instead of a system in practice, the two natural philosophers offer a system in proposal. They 
offer a vision of the future in their writings that attempts to be practical. In this chapter, I uncover 
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the Subjunctive Aesthetic in the sweeping projects of Bacon and Dee, primarily by focusing on 
Dee’s “Mathematicall Preface” to Euclid’s Geometry and Bacon’s Novum Organum. I argue that 
Bacon’s work grapples with probability and incorporates it into the essential features of his text 
and project, while Dee’s writing and imagery relies on linear and fixed definitions of planning 
that become haunted by probability. 
Although Dee and Bacon begin their publishing careers nearly fifty years apart, they live 
in the same England and communicate with the same people. They occupy a similar space as 
self-conscious intellectuals who also have close entanglements with state machinery and its key 
figures, including Queen Elizabeth, King James, and Lord Burghley. They are natural 
philosophers, both at odds with the university curriculum.135  They both argue for a new 
epistemology. They both construct an imaginary future, and they do so through visual and spatial 
representations. In addition to all these personal similarities, this chapter’s comparison of Dee’s 
“Preface” and Bacon’s Novum Orgnaum is apt for two major reasons. First, both pieces are 
introductions to larger texts that plot where the subsequent implications of the texts will go.  
Although Novum Organum is much longer than Dee’s “Preface” to Euclid’s Geometry, it is 
essentially a preface to the proposed Great Instauration.  Secondly, the projects represented in 
these texts describe epoch-spanning endeavors that neither man believed likely to be achievable 
in their lifetime. In Bacon’s case, this intention is first announced by the title of his massive and 
incomplete work The Great Instauration, enhanced by the proem announcing “FRANCIS OF 
VERULAM  REASONED THUS WITH HIMSELF  AND JUDGED IT TO BE FOR THE 
                                                 
135 Nicholas Clulee uses the term natural philosophy to describe the general trends of Dee’s 
works, while Peter French and Frances Yates use terms like Hermeticism, Science, and Magic. 
Clulee, Nicholas. John Dee’s Natural Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1988). Yates, Frances.  
The Rosicrucian Enlightenment (New York: Routledge, 2001). French Peter. John Dee: The 
World of an Elizabethan Magus (London: Camelot Press, 1987). 
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INTEREST OF THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS THAT THEY SHOULD BE 
MADE ACQUAINTED WITH HIS THOUGHTS.”136  
A major and misleading continuity between Bacon and Dee is their relationship to 
Science and magic.137 Bacon is typically seen as more modern in the sense that he deals less with 
magic, while the confounding Dee happily peers into crystal balls. Recent scholarship has 
rejected this division that distorts their milieu for anachronistic notions of Science. Although 
Bacon rejects explicit mentions of hermetic philosophers and alchemists such as Dee, he uses 
their methods and even explicitly mentions magic in Novum Organum. Dee, meanwhile, 
embraces alchemical figures like Agrippa and Friar Bacon and uses mathematics in a way that 
resembles the later and widespread use of statistics. Both figures, then, seem to be both proto-
Scientists and magicians. Early Modern magic presents problems for modern academics for two 
reasons. First, because alchemical methods often overlap with what historians now call Science, 
readers tend to place them in a teleology that distorts elements of their work that buck other 
frameworks, such as mysticism or religion.138 Secondly, when magic does not overlap with 
                                                 
136 Bacon, Francis. The Works (Vol. VIII), Trans. Ellis, Robert, Douglas Heath and James 
Spedding. (Boston: Taggard and Thompson. 1863). Bacon’s text is in Latin, but there is no 
shortage of translations. In this chapter I refer to the most recent Oxford edition of Bacon, but the 
above translation gives a better sense of the forward-looking aspects of Bacon’s work. The Latin 
privileges position as well as time with the verbs “viventibus” (those living) and “posteris” 
(those coming after).  Posteris is temporal, looking to the future, and positional, with the thing 
coming physically behind.  This seemingly minor detail is a pattern in Bacon’s writing, and the 
spatilization of time hints at his widespread engagement with the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
137 I capitalize the first letter of Science to indicate the modern institutional system.  
Rossi, Paulo. Francis Bacon, From Science to Magic (New York: Routledge, 1968), places 
Bacon in a contentious relationship to the hermetic tradition that Dee seems to inhabit. Although 
it once was problematic, it is no longer controversial to align Bacon in this tradition for most 
historians. Rossi’s work builds on Frances Yates’ work on the hermetic tradition. 
138 For a positive view, see Yates The Rosicrucian Enlightenment. For negative views that 
nonetheless assume the teleology, see Latour, Bruno. We Have Never Been Modern Trans 
Catherine Gallagher, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993) and Adorno, Thedor and 
Horkheimer, Max. The Dialectic of Enlightenment. (New York: Continuum, 1989). 
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science, magic still seems to be at odds with scholarship in a few important ways. At least one 
historian argues that Dee’s position and Hermetics/magic in general can never be properly 
situated because it relies on a lost oral tradition.139  Other scholars who work with magic seem to 
have to go out of their way to explain why they write about a pursuit that does not currently exist 
as an object of academic inquiry. One recent historian argues, “The story of Dee’s life opens a 
doorway into a forgotten Tudor landscape, not so much a world that we have lost but more a 
strange, unfamiliar place that few modern readers can imagine.”140 In Dee’s case, proto-
Scientific pursuits comfortably support mystical and magical intellectual pursuits and vice versa.  
As an example of a scholar trying to unite these disparate movements, Peter French’s exhaustive 
biography of Dee concluded with a claim that his wide-ranging research only formed a first step 
that would require the work of “a historian of science…a historian of politics” and also more 
research to fully unpack the “Hermetic tradition.”141 But more recent scholarship argues that the 
genealogy of alchemy to Science is not accurate either.142 Along with these critics of Scientific 
modernity, I doubt whether Dee or Bacon would recognize the Scientific Method’s relationship 
to the systems they espoused. Even the famously skeptical Bacon mentions magic in Novum 
Organum, a fact that scientists would like to forget and that Bacon historians tend to ignore. 
As a result of these issues, I believe science is a misleading term for what both Dee and 
Bacon do. I do not make this claim based only on an anti-teleological ground. To be glib—
neither Bacon nor Dee actually do much of anything that can be said to resemble science or 
magic in much of their writing. Instead, they offer an intellectual plot for what might be done 
                                                 
139 Forshaw, Peter J. "The Early Alchemical Reception of John Dee's Monas Hieroglyphica". 
Ambix (Maney Publishing) 52.3 (2005), 247–269. 
140 Parry, Glen. The Arch-Conjurerer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), Xi. 
141 French, Peter. 208-9. 
142 Latour, Bruno. We Have Never Been Modern. 
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under the aegis of science and magic. Thus, this chapter approaches the “Preface” to Euclid’s 
Geometry and Novum Organum as if they are plans, albeit sprawling and epistemological. 
Although I come at both pieces with the Subjunctive Aesthetic in mind and suggest a similarity, I 
think the differences between the two figures is more important in that the contrast illuminates 
divergent ways the Aesthetic can appear. I argue that Bacon defines his knowledge-project as an 
uneven spatial expansion into unknown possibility. The image and narrative of his system moves 
in the familiar range of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. The expansion of knowledge outlined in 
Bacon’s text is uneven because Bacon works to incorporate probability into his system. Novum 
Organum has the signature of the Subjunctive Aesthetic—a forward looking anachronism that is 
nonetheless open-ended and multiplicitous. He opens up a space for probability in the gap-filled 
process of mental exertion that comes with his classification techniques. His system of 
knowledge circles around the seeming gaps, so that others can label these gaps at a later date.  
Dr. Dee’s “Preface” to Euclid’s Geometry, at first glance, makes him seem to be a 
planner like Bacon—a practically focused thinker who incorporates experiments that could be 
called empirical. But John Dee’s project in the “Preface” to Euclid is more obscure than Bacon’s. 
The major problem with understanding the text is that John Dee published few texts in his life 
and few posthumously appeared in public.143 The Preface is broad ranging but has little context 
beyond Euclid’s ancient collection of geometric proofs that follow it. Even Dee’s manuscripts, 
which were preserved and copied by early English book-collectors such as Elias Ashmole and 
others, are only a small trace of what was a massive body of writing, much of which was 
destroyed or lost. These problems are not unique to Dee’s corpus, but the scale of this loss in 
                                                 
143 This is at odds with his surviving library catalogue, one of the largest in Europe, as well as the 
scraps of Dee’s writing that do survive suggest a huge output. Roberts, Jullian and Andrew 
Watson Eds. John Dee’s Library Catalogue (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
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Dee’s case is striking. Dee had perhaps the largest library in Elizabethan and early-Jacobean 
England, and one of the largest in Europe. His surviving manuscripts point to a body of his own 
writing on a similar scale. The many gaps in his writing make it very difficult to discern a 
comprehensive program from the Preface to Euclid, especially in comparison to Bacon’s large 
body of work. Nonetheless, Dee accomplishes much in the tiny space at the beginning of what is 
essentially a textbook, and his work there is cited and reproduced to this day as an important 
marker of the evolution of thought during the Renaissance, specifically in regards to 
mathematics, physical mechanics, and architecture. Furthermore, from the pieces that do survive, 
certain tendencies become apparent. 
I argue that Dee’s project in the “Preface” allows for no probabilistic gaps or hazy visuals 
in workings of the world. Dee defines his universe in terms of clean lines that interact throughout 
the cosmos and through time. The future, as well as the past, can be revealed by linear 
geometry—it waits predictably for those with the correct knowledge of its divisions and 
hierarchies and can even be glimpsed in the present moment. Unlike Bacon’s Great Instauration 
of knowledge, Dee’s “Preface” to Euclid’s Gemoetry insists that he need not initiate a structure 
for his project. The structure pre-exists his proposal in a regular spatial form. He only needs to 
see the pattern and fill in the blanks through experimentation. The only thing hiding this defined 
future of Dee’s system is the experimenter himself, who must be physically and spiritually pure. 
The results of any experiment reflect the essential identity of the experimenter. Dee’s system, 
like Bacon’s, offers an image and narrative of the future. Unlike Bacon’s future, Dee’s future is 
linear—it can be confirmed or denies like the visions of Providence outlined in Chapter 1. As the 
Subjunctive Aesthetic haunted Providence in Chapter 1, I argue that Dee’s epistemological plan 
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is haunted by the Aesthetic, by probability that renders the progression of time in non-linear 
ways.  
Both Dee and Bacon encounter probability with their methods, but the stylistic difference 
between the two proposed epistemologies can be seen in Dee’s use of numbers and geometry in 
comparison to Bacon’s narrative forms. Dee argues he decodes a future contained in any given 
moment while Bacon imagines he can arrange the future like a sentence, communicating through 
time.  Although both writers attempt to test, use, and define their epistemology through 
experiments, Dee has two options. He can confirm a linear vision of providence or fail, but in 
both cases Providence remains sure. From the inception of his system, the scepter of probability, 
which Dee defines as interpretive failure, haunts the providential timeline in his numerically 
inflected epistemology. For Bacon, experimental failure blends gradually into success, aligning 
his plan for epistemology with the Subjunctive Aesthetic. Both Dee’s “Preface” and Bacon’s 
Novum Organum reveal spatialized probability and the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
I begin my argument by surveying Dee’s proposed epistemology, and situating it within 
the practices he describes and attests elsewhere. I especially focus on the use of parallel lines in 
his images and narratives. Next, I analyze the style of Bacon’s projects in terms of a range of 
probabilistic narratives. I connect these probabilistic narratives to the building process that 
Bacon describes elsewhere in his Essays. In the third section I compare the way the two thinkers 
utilize and define experimentation in terms of their larger projects, suggesting that they offer two 
different kinds of experiment, Bacon’s version utilizes the range of probability of the 
Subjunctive Aesthetic, while Dee’s linear providence that is haunted by predictive failure, by 
ranging probabilities that the format of his plot cannot avoid. In the final section of the chapter, I 
connect the two versions of experimentation to modern experimentation, arguing that ranging 
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probability, like magic, haunts the providential narrative currently that preoccupies experimental 
notions of science. 
 
Dee’s Architecture of the Universe 
 Frances Yates credits John Dee with popularizing a brand of Neo-Platonism in England 
through his use of Vitruvian principles.  As I discussed in my first chapter, Vitruvian principles 
find expression in England before John Dee’s birth in various forms and to different degrees. For 
example, Vitrivius’s proportions appear in The Faerie Queene and architectural plots. Yet Dee is 
important in the spread of the directly related but more occult branch of Renaissance neo-
Platonism that engaged in fortune-telling, astrology, and holy contemplation. From a modern 
vantage point it may be most surprising that his obsession with numbers, magic, astrology, and 
his use of various Platonic principles held a meaningful appeal to those in the highest levels of 
government.  Dee had the ear of Queen Elizabeth, casting her astrological chart before she even 
became queen, a fact he often tried to leverage for official support after her ascension and that 
got him into serious trouble with the Marian Inquisition.144  Dee spied for Burghley, informing 
on the movement of Jesuits while abroad.  In one letter reporting on his spying activities, he even 
gives advice on foreign policy in the Low Countries immediately before he gives reports of 
alchemical experiments.145  When Elizabeth considered calendar reform, she turned to Dee for a 
carefully crafted proposal explaining the methods of calculating time and how the calendar 
                                                 
144 For a summary of Dee’s interesting relationship to the Catholic regime see Woolley, 
Benjamin. The Queen’s Conjurer (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), 39-53. 
145 “A Jesuit named Parkins is sent and come from Rome, fraught with diverse suttle devises, of 
most damnable treason…I fynde my coniectures, there ratified, day by day…Zealand and 
Holland.” Dee, John.  “Letter to Burghley.” Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Lansdowne 61.  Fol 
159. 
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“should” be arranged.146  Dee personally met with Gerard Mercator, famous as the designer of 
the most widely used projection for the globe.  Dee also carefully critiqued Copernicus, rejected 
positions at various continental and English universities, and made proposals on policy to the 
Holy Roman Emperor.147  He even wrote advice at the behest of local communities on how best 
to drains fens and dig ditches.148  Although few of his ideas were adopted wholeheartedly by the 
regimes he advised, the fact that he gave advice repeatedly to both Catholics and Protestants is 
striking in an era when advisors like Raleigh fell into and out of favor so quickly. Dee clearly 
had information that the elite of both England and Europe found appealing, and delivered it in a 
way that made him consistently useful to leaders. He was a planner—an architect and an advisor. 
He was also a prophet. Although Dee aligns the two roles, I argue they pulse with tension. 
 Despite the tension of the two roles, Dee’s Mathematicall Preface to a new English 
translation of Euclid’s Geometry is a key piece in the propagation of Vitruvian architecture and 
neo-Platonism more generally in early modern England.  In the words of the historian Peter 
French, “Dee was making such theories—the heart and soul of the neoclassical revival—
available in English to the rising class of Elizabethan artisans.” French argues that for Dee 
architecture is the “queen of arts and science” because all fields must be mastered to engage 
design properly, making the architect the “universal scholar who must be able to teach, 
demonstrate, describe, and ‘judge all works wrought’, whether it be a house, a church, a city or 
the structure of the universe.” This universal scholarship of architecture also has “a magical 
                                                 
146 Dee’s proposal is in Oxford, Ms Add. B. 1. It describes “A memorial what is done, and what 
ought to be done, in this Reformation” of the calendar.  The pages are carefully written in 
multiple colors and often use gold ink.  The reform was never adopted. 
147 Woolley. The Queen’s Conjurer. 253. 
148 Dee, John. “On Draining Fens.” Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Ashmole 242, fols 156-4. 
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dimension because ideally structures were patterned after potent celestial harmonies.” 149 The 
magical celestial patterns of Dee resemble the divine shapes of Vitrivius I outlined in the first 
Chapter. But a close-reading reveals an architecture distinct from the multiplicity of Spenser’s 
poem The key difference between the ranging shapes drawn from Vitrivius in that setting and 
Dee’s use of structures lies in what French calls Dee’s “universal” positioning. 
 Like Bacon’s proem to Novum Organum, Dee begins his preface with an 
acknowledgement of expectations. “If, for my sincere endeuour to satisfie your honest 
expectation, you will but lend me your thankefull mynde a while: and, to such matter as, for this 
time, my penne (with spede) is hable to deliuer, apply your eye or eare attentifely: perchaunce, at 
once, and for the first salutyng, this Preface you will finde a lesson long enough.”150  Dee makes 
the claim of educating his reader, but he does not seem at first to be advocating a long-term 
project as much as he is introducing a lesson. He announces a specific goal and a defined plan. 
He is going somewhere. Unlike other plans I have outlined, I think it is important that Dee’s 
language is indicative, despite starting with an “if.” He outlines a future that is, not one that 
might be, even in the simple “lesson” of describing his project. 
 As Dee continues, he makes it clear that the stakes of this preface and for Euclid’s 
Geometry more generally reach to a cosmic level.  Dee’s universe can be divided into three 
broad categories. “For, either, they are demed Supernaturall, Naturall, or, of a third being. 
Thinges Supernaturall, are immateriall, simple, indiuisible, incorruptible, & vnchangeable. 
Things Naturall, are materiall, compounded, diuisible, corruptible, and chaungeable. Thinges 
Supernaturall, are, of the minde onely, comprehended: Things Naturall, of the sense exterior.”  
                                                 
149 French, Peter. 58. 
150 Dee, John. “Preface,” The elements of geometrie of the most auncient philosopher Euclide of 
Megara (Imprinted in London by Iohn Daye, 1570), 5. 
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The third category of being “are called Thynges Mathematicall,” and bridge the other two.151  
This description of the categories of the universe is broad. But this broadness indicates a 
consistent style. Dee’s syntactically parallel description of Natural and Supernatural sets up a 
spatial parallelism that runs throughout his epistemology. The Supernatural, in Dee’s vision, is 
separate from the Natural. Each description runs alongside each other in the first sentence, with a 
one to one match of adjective antonyms.  But in the second sentence their parallel structures 
junction on a verb, suggesting they can move in a similar narrative arc, going forward in the 
same direction. After this verbal connection of the Natural and Supernatural, Dee unveils the 
category that connects the two. The verbal parallelism, the “third being,” “Thynges 
Mathematicall” run between both and connect both categories.  
 “Thynges Mathematicall” is the key to the plan for Dee’s project. According to him,  
“A meruaylous newtralitie haue these thinges Mathematicall. and also a straunge participation 
betwene thinges supernaturall, immortall, intellectual, simple and indiuisible: and thynges 
naturall, mortall, sensible, compounded and diuisible. Probabilitie and sensible profe, may well 
serue in thinges naturall: and is commendable: In Mathematicall reasoninges, a probable 
Argument, is nothyng regarded: nor yet the testimony of sense, any whit credited: But onely a 
perfect demonstration, of truthes certaine, necessary, and inuincible: vniuersally and necessaryly 
concluded:”152 
  
In the first chapter we saw Queen Elizabeth deny the machinations of policy in her poem 
on future doubts.  Here, Dee makes a similar claim that “mathematicall” thinking eschews 
“probablitie and sensible profe,” and requires a “perfect demonstration.” But by now this is 
familiar, resembling Calvin’s Providence in the guise of mathematical certainty. As with 
Archtur’s brush with Providence in my first chapter, Dee’s subsequent application of 
“Mathematicall reasoninges” to practical matters and the Mathematical third thing’s “straunge 
participation position betwene thinges supernaturall… and thynges naturall” belie the claim of 
                                                 
151 Ibid., 5. 
152 Ibid., 5. 
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certainty, suggesting a hazy range that upsets a clean parallel between natural and supernatural. 
As he attempts to describe his project in a way that eschews “probabilitie,” he nonetheless fails 
to escape from other forms of projection and planning. His geometry seeks a “perfect 
demonstration,” but by plotting a plan for Euclid’s method, he must necessarily call on a 
movement between the internal consistency of geometric abstraction and the uncertainty of 
material objects. Notably, Dee explicitly brings up the word probability in this discussion. But he 
is not discussing mathematical probability. He only mentions the word so to decry the operations 
of probability in the use of mathematics, even while he acknowledges its operation in the Natural 
world.  
The mention of probability connects the Natural and the Supernatural in a tense standoff 
even while seeking to reign in the multiplicity of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. Dee goes on to 
claim, for example, that geometry can describe soldiers in the field. At the same time 
mathematics describes the probable field of war, mathematics also allows for the representation 
of the supernatural realm. Math, for Dee, offers a “perfect demonstration,” and yet also describes 
the more messy applications of war. This problem can be explained by Nicholas Clulee’s 
analysis of Dee’s natural philosophy throughout his published texts, where each visible and 
invisible thing in the universe exerts influence in all directions, with earthly material influencing 
the Supernatural as well as being influenced by them via beams of light.153  Beginning and 
ending with these cosmic rays, probability has no place in Dee’s system because the universe is 
comprehensible, fixed by the straight lines of celestial influence. Past, present, future, 
Supernatural and natural—all exist in a defined and accessible state that must be understood by 
lines. Probability, for Dee, enters only when human error colors enlightened attempts to access 
                                                 
153 Clulee.  John Dee’s Natural Philosophy. 54. 
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this predictable, cause-effect based universe. And yet, Dee cannot align mathematics with the 
“immortal” power of the Supernatural world without the “mortal” natural world. Although the 
“Preface” attempts to shift the focus onto perfection, the multiplicity that Alma’s house defined 
in Chapter 1—where moral and immortal were combined in the multiplicity of architecture— 
pushes against the parallelism of separate lines. 
 Failure haunts the plan for Dee’s future, and Dee’s “Preface” spends time denying the 
operations of probability while also explicitly admitting the numerous possible failures of 
representation. This is necessary for the reasons mentioned above—Dee outlines an accessible, 
defined universe that is knowable to the proper student. Furthermore, Euclid’s geometry 
traditionally demands internal consistency, proof, and certainty.  Suggesting otherwise renders 
the exercises contained in his Geometry less reliable than they might otherwise be. But one of 
the most important reasons why Dee denies the operations of probability even while consistently 
defining his project against failure is because Dee is attempting to construct a persona of mastery 
in the preface. To do so, he turns to space because according to him the ideal master is the 
architect: 
And the name of Architectur, is of the principalitie, which this Science hath, aboue all other 
Artes. And Plato affirmeth, the Architect to be Master ouer all, that make any worke. Wherupon, 
he is neither Smith, not Builder: nor, separately, any Artificer: but the Hed, the Prouost, the 
Directer, and Iudge of all Artificiall workes, and all Artificers. For, the true Architect, is hable to 
teach, Demonstrate, distribute, desribe, and Iudge all workes wrought. And he, onely, searcheth 
out the causes and reasons of all Artificiall thynges. Thus excellent, is Architecture: though few 
(in our dayes) atteyne thereto: yet may not the Arte, be otherwise thought on, then in very dede it 
is worthy.154 
 
Parallel constructions continue in Dee’s description.  The architect is the “Master over” and the 
Architecture’s “Science hath, above all other artes.”  Like the advisors in Alma’s house, or God 
in Milton’s heaven, the Architect is the “hed, the Provost, the Director, and Judge of all 
                                                 
154 Dee. “Preface.” 26. 
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Artificiall workes, and all Artificers.”  The manipulation of space becomes defined by spatial and 
hierarchical metaphors.   
At the same time architecture’s control seems to soar above lesser pursuits, the mastery 
also seems to be constrained by restricting control to “worke” or the “Artificiall.”  But Dee 
immediately expands this restriction by including the architect’s ability to judge “Artificers” as 
well. In addition to things, persons also bow to the architect’s control, which Dee makes explicit 
when he compares the architect to his “mechanicians.”  “The Architect,” he writes, “procureth, 
enformeth, & directeth, the Mechanicien, to handworke, & the building actuall, of house, Castell, 
or Pallace, and is chief Iudge of the same: yet, with him selfe (as chief Master and Architect,) 
remaineth the Demonstratiue reason and cause, of the Mechaniciens worke in Lyne, plaine, and 
Solid.”155  The temporal relationship of the “building actuall” is strange.  As we might expect, 
the planner “enformeth & directeth the Mechanicien” of the “building actuall,” but he also give 
the “reason and cause of the Mechaniciens worke in Lyne, plaine, and Solid.”  Reason and cause 
are backwards looking abstractions of completed buildings, but like an architect “enformeth” the 
construction of the “actuall” with geometry, the architect also reconstructs the “cause” using 
“Lyne, plaine, and Solid.” As I suggested above, space, specifically lines, planes, and solids, 
makes sense of a completed temporal process here. Time moves in cause and effect relationship 
that reflects the clean lines of the project’s description. Dee’s architect, master of all, remains 
within specific lines, shapes, and solids. 
Regular shapes also inform Dee’s use and understanding of plotting in the “Preface.” For 
example, in his “groundplot” that describes the layout of geometry’s epistemology, parallelism 
structures the way that Dee understands plotting.  
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In some ways this page is singular for its time, but in many ways it is extremely familiar.  
Outlines and charts have made sense of the structure of texts at least since the inscription of the 
Homeric stories on ancient Greek pottery.  Early modern charts much like Dee’s were also used 
to organizes masses of information into clearly visible chunks. Bacon, for example, had a chart 
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strongly resembling the above that enumerated Henry VIII’s forces in Northern France during 
his early skirmishes for maintaining English continental possessions.157  But few authors 
immediately revealed their own plan for a text in the text itself.  When a table of contents does 
appear, it does not usually organize its information in parallel yet merging lines as Dee does 
here, and it rarely appears after the text in question.  Yet Dee claims that this “groundplat”—one 
of the earliest uses of the word “plot” to describe the structure of a text—is delivered “according 
to his Promise.”  Like the architect describing the “reason” for the building in his Preface, Dee 
here looks backward over the text we just read to describe the outline for what he just explained. 
The linearity of Dee’s geometric epistemology, then, is only available in retrospect. Yet at the 
same time, the groundplat could precede his writing, or inform its layout. The plot for Dee’s 
preface to Euclid thus describes what already happened, but in a way that retrospectively predicts 
the organization the text itself.  The plot renders the reader’s awareness of the Preface’s 
construction heightened by flattening our reading process onto a single page. Doing so makes the 
plan for the process seem descriptive and not prescriptive. 
 As Dee’s backwards looking plan suggests, the groundplat is haunted by Dee’s parallel 
and interacting planes of existence.  Each major field is discrete, from Astrology to 
Thaumaturgy.  But each field also melds into the overall rubric of “Sciences and Arts 
Mathematicall.”  The “Principles” form the top branch of these Sciences, with the “derivate” 
appearing below. In spite of seeming divisions, the Principles enumerated at the top of the page, 
“Arithmatick” and “Geometrie” reappear under the “derivative rubric.”  The slight curves of the 
flowchart similarly hint at a non-linear contrast to the relationship of the parallel lines. Like the 
Supernatural and Natural influencing each other in various predictable and unpredictable ways, 
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through a disclaimed probability, the lines on this chart also seem to exert and influence on each 
other beyond their hierarchical separation into parallel lines. This is only a hint, however. The 
image insists on the clean separation of lines in a way that architectural images do not. 
Dee’s groundplot image builds an organized structure, akin to Chapter 1’s architectural 
designs. Only here, the structure is the visual representation of an epistemology. Dee is gesturing 
to a type of architectonics, a means of hierarchizing and systematizing intellectual practice. 
Unlike the multiplicitous image-narratives of architecture in Chapter 1, Dee’s groundplot treats 
textual description as line. The lines of text are fixed on a line, and so is their indicative 
grammar. The descriptions of fields of knowledge do not gesture to a range of probable 
narratives. Yet a strange anachronism persists, called up, I argue by the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
Dee’s “Preface,” with its groundplot and description of using geometry in these varied 
endeavors, is a plan without a first step. The plan only becomes clear once Euclid’s images have 
been constructed in the text that follows the “Preface.” For example, a reader could never 
understand how to construct a map using the principles of proportionality without first 
understanding how to divide a circle into its component parts, or more basically, to make a 
circle. Unlike Dee’s descriptions of geometry, the tiny figure of his groundplot does not directly 
unpack the larger practice of geometry. At the same time, it has a relationship to it. By looking 
ahead to these practical applications Dee can justify and make sense of Euclid’s abstract 
exercises. In doing so, the “Preface” clarifies the stakes of Dee’s ideas.  He believes that this new 
English translation will start a long-reaching process whereby mathematics will play an 
important role in the day-to-day lives of most individuals. Yet this is only justified by an 
imagining backward. 
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Dee’s design obscures itself and the operations of planning. The capstone of this project 
is not plotting or architecture, even though it attempts to draw on the power of that discipline. 
Architecture provides a parallel once again, but “Archmastrie” holds primacy among all the 
Mathematical Arts and Sciences Dee outlines, and his description is worth exploring carefully: 
 
NOw end I, with Archemastrie. Which name, is not so new, as this Arte is rare. For an other 
Arte, vnder this, a degree (for skill and power) hath bene indued with this English name before. 
And yet, this, may serue for our purpose, sufficiently, at this present. This Arte, teacheth to bryng 
to actuall experience sensible, all worthy conclusions by all the Artes Mathematicall purposed, & 
by true Naturall Philosophie concluded: & both addeth to them a farder scope, in the termes of 
the same Artes, & also by hys propre Method, and in peculier termes, procedeth, with helpe of 
the foresayd Artes, to the performance of complet Experiences, which of no particular Art, are 
hable (Formally) to be challenged. If you remember, how we considered Architecture, in respect 
of all common handworkes: some light may you haue, therby, to vnderstand the Souerainty and 
propertie of this Science. Science I may call it, rather, then an Arte: for the excellency and 
Mastershyp it hath, ouer so many, and so mighty Artes and Sciences. And bycause it procedeth 
by Experiences, and searcheth forth the causes of Conclusions, by Experiences: and also putteth 
the Conclusions them selues, in Experience, it is named of some, Scientia Experimentalis. The 
Experimentall Science.
158 
  
The end of “Archmastrie,” according to Dee is “Experimentall Science,” because he searches for 
the “causes of Conclusions, by Experiences.”  This method is no “Arte” but a true “Science..for 
the excellency and Mastershyp it hath” over other formal systems of knowledge.  Again, the over 
and beneath levels of knowledge are in place, but again they are mutually influential.  Dee can 
only explain Archmastrie in this space by offering a probable comparison.  “If you remember,” 
he suggests, “how we considered Architecture…some light may you have, thereby, to 
understand…this Science.”  As in the parallel lines of his flow-chart of mathematical knowledge, 
architecture and spatial explanations reappear in helping to define what “Archmastrie” is. 
Dee refuses to carefully define the practice of these arts here, but Nicholas Clulee has 
convincingly argued that they are each based on seeing through time by manipulating material 
                                                 
158 Dee, John. “Preface.” 26. 
 145 
and light.  The practice, “Sintrilla” in the words of one historian, “enabled seers to divine the 
past, present and future, by using polished surfaces to reflect celestial rays onto semi-precious 
stones submerged in three different liquids.”159 Once again, the structure of the universe 
reproduces itself within Dee’s epistemology, and once again the parallel yet mutually influential 
practices and objects of inquiry define Dee’s method.  These overlapping means of glimpsing the 
established future using space define the work Dee engages in with his Preface.  He is working to 
use Euclid’s methods of defining space in order to fill in a future that he has seen—a universal 
future where both “marchants” and alchemists use numbers and shapes to plan their lives. The 
archmastery he describes rises above architecture, attempts to work architectural representations 
into a single line. Probability can only provide a persistent problem for this natural philosophy, 
and he tries to declaim probability even while acknowledging the constant likelihood of failure in 
his experiments.   
According to the above paragraph’s meditation of arch-mastery, the way that Dee 
navigates the connection of Supernatural and Natural is through his use of experiments—what 
we might call spells or alchemical processes—that called Supernatural forces to accomplish 
goals.160  These recipes or directions had specific step-by-step directions and explanations for 
why certain objects or activities achieved certain effects.  At first glance, these experiments 
resemble Dee’s preface in their denial of probability. They claim certainty.  However, the 
possibility of failure riddles even the simplest spell.  For example, if a practitioner is not properly 
cleansed in body, or his motives are not pure, the experiment will fail. Even if one is, the 
outcomes are often self-consciously murky. The most prominent and persistent example of this is 
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160 Dee’s own experiments can be seen in various documents, but especially Oxford, MS 
Rawlinson 241.  He also owned manuscripts of earlier “experiments,” such as Oxford, MS 
Ashmole 337. 
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the cloudy visions that Dee sees in his scrying glass. The probability of improbability of success, 
then, depends on the practitioner and a degree of mystical mastery that cannot be simply 
represented.  In the same way, Dee’s representation of the universe incorporates probability 
through the interpreter’s viewpoint. At any point, an observer can make a mistake as to how the 
Supernatural plane and natural plane interact with each other. 
Dee’s experiments often incorporate the geometry that he praises at great length in this 
Mathematicall Preface to Euclid.  A specific sort of alchemical experiment demanded careful 
construction of proportional geometric shapes to summon Supernatural forces.161  These shapes 
could be rearranged for different purposes, but the most common usage was to build a ring or a 
square to contain a certain power and another shape, usually a rearranged version of the 
container, to repulse a certain power.  Dee’s Monas Hieroglyphica, another one of the few texts 
he published, is a fair representation of the degree of thought that goes into these shapes.  The 
Monas Hieroglphica itself is a single shape that Dee believes is the key to understanding 
mathematics, alchemy, religion, and politics. He spends many pages explaining how to properly 
construct the symbol and its various meanings. The shape of this design is a perfect 
demonstration of Dee’s essential nature of the universe. Although the component parts of the 
shape can be moved around to demonstrate different aspects of the perceptible world, his 
proposed epistemology never alters the lines or implies a range of outcomes. Dee also owned and 
used a geometric seal for alchemical experiments.162 The probability for failure again appears 
with the construction of these shapes, which must be carefully proportioned, measured, and 
inscribed into the proper material. Constructing these shapes, as Dee’s library shows, is a means 
to experimentation. But the proper implementation of spatial representation defines their success 
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or failure. The failure of experiments is often blamed on the incorrect rendering of the shapes. 
There is no range of outcomes in their lines.  
Dee ends his work with a push for experiment.  When he uses the word “experiment,” he 
is referring to practices such as producing and consuming alchemical mixtures, peering into 
glasses to consult with angels, or using astrology to predict the motions of stars.  The texts in 
Dee’s library and his own writings use the word experiment in these and many other possible 
contexts. But the essential feature of these experiments is not usually to find the unpredictable, 
but to establish Providence.  Like Dee, Bacon moves toward experiments in the second half of 
his work, using the last quarter of his Novum Organum to describe experiments and the 
conclusions drawn from these experiments. He gives them much more space. As we will see in 
the next section, he also imbues a different meaning into the practice. 
 
The Plan of Bacon’s Knowledge 
 Bacon’s Novum Organum, unlike Dee’s “Preface,” does not refer to mathematical, 
astrological, or astronomical calculations. Most of the last quarter refers to experiments of 
natural philosophy, and Bacon gets quite specific with what the experiments are and what their 
results could be. Bacon has an impressive list of physical experiments that reflect the strange 
breweries of liquids, gasses, and solids found in other alchemical distilling devices, and initially 
seems to focus only on the physical sensations they offer. For example, Bacon offers certain 
liquids, such as “vinegar” as associated with “heat” because they cause a similar sensation, and 
suggests further experiments be done on the nature of heat, such as, “taking a lens and observing 
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whether or not it makes the sun’s ray more intense in one’s hand.”163  Yet by the end of Novum 
Organum, Bacon also to “Magical Instances,” to explain the difference in “magnitude” between 
peculiar instances of “cause and effect.”  His practices are wide-ranging and owe an obvious debt 
to earlier alchemists, but with an important difference. Bacon is never sure what will happen and 
he makes suggestions that others try his proposed experiments to see what might occur.  His 
experiments do not reflect strictly on one experimenter, but on a group of similar and yet 
multiplicitous individuals. He incorporates probability into his experiments. 
 He also indicates the provisional nature of the text by pointing to the probable ways it can 
be completed.  In Novum Organum, Bacon structurally represents the many possibilities for his 
New Instruments of scientia primarily through a self-acknowledged incompleteness. In many 
places the text refers readers to look elsewhere or wait for the missing parts.  For the 1620 
publication, Bacon begins by pointing to the future with the “plan” and partitions of the Great 
Instauration.  “It is made up of Six parts,” which begin with “The Partitions of the Sciences,” 
moves through “Novum Organum,” “The Phenomena of the Universe,” then the “Ladder of the 
Intellect,” and then look at “Anticipations of the Philosophy to Come” and finally, “The 
Philosophy to Come.”164  But this outline is provisional. He only includes small sections of the 
Preliminaries, Part II, and Part III of the proposed six books of the Instauratio, with later 
publications or manuscript pieces working to fill in the “absent” text.165   
In addition, the text incorporates the directed probability of projection by calling this list 
of possible books a “Distributio Operis,” which the Oxford version translates as a “Plan of the 
                                                 
163 Bacon, Francis.  Novum Organum Ed. Rees, Graham, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 223. 
164 Ibid., 27 
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Work.”166  This translation is particularly meaningful in terms of the Subjunctive Aesthetic and 
reveals an important connection between Bacon and Dee.  Distributio, in addition to, Ordinatio, 
is one of the many words Vitrivius uses to describe his architectural plans or the process of 
direction undertaken by an architect.167  The word could easily be translated as “groundplot,” the 
word that Dee uses to describe the outline of his Mathematicall systems in the Preface.  The 
translation and structural placement of Bacon’s plan also reveals an important distinction 
between Dee and Bacon. Bacon labels the work to come, but he does so in textual form, without 
the parallel lines that Dee uses.  Novum Organum also places its plan at the front of the text, not 
at the end.  In conjunction with the incomplete nature of the text, this front-loaded plan suggests 
a speculation and labeling of absence that Dee’s preface will not engage.  Just as the plans in the 
first chapter, these two uses of plots and plans reflect the anachronistic narrative of planning.  
Both Dee and Bacon are attempting to look ahead, or in Bacon’s words, to anticipate the arrival 
of a new system of thought, but in order to do so they have to look backward and survey the 
present.  Dee uses the parallel lines, but Bacon’s style points to a textual focus that emphasizes 
spaces between blocks of text as much as it emphasizes what the texts say. 
The space between the work’s “Plan” and “Book II,” is taken up by an acknowledgement 
of the “Partitions of the Sciences” which are “Absent.”  But, the author helpfully adds, “They 
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can to some extent be retrieved from Book Two of The Advancement of Learning.”168  In Latin, 
this can is not declined in the subjunctive, but instead uses the word “possunt.”  Although the 
word is indicative, the meaning of the word translates most effectively as “can,” and in general 
refers to the operations of a probable outcome.  The reference to the probable in the indicative 
conjugation suggests a reliance on the movement of probability in a nonetheless empirical 
project. But it also points to Bacon’s sense of an uncertain narrative time as essential to the 
completion of this often-unpredictable movement.  He uses the word “possunt,” or “can,” instead 
of “sunt” or “is.”  The Novum Organum demands certainty, but here, at least, Bacon tries to 
make probability work for him as well.  Furthermore, this gap in the text calls attention to itself 
as a moment of collapsed time by pointing not just backward to a previous publication, but to the 
next chapter, “Now Comes the Second Part of The Insaturation” it ends.  But again, the text is 
incomplete—“not set out as a finished treatise but only as a summary digested in aphorisms.”169  
To get a better sense of what this incompletion means for the projection of Bacon’s project, I will 
now turn to the text that Bacon omits and cites in his pause between Plan and Book II, and use 
portions of his essays for context. This aside defines why The Novum Organum should be placed 
the planning-focused flows of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
 
A Broken Knowledge in the Essays and The Advancement of Learning 
 In Book XVII of The Advancement of Learning, Bacon outlines out a subtle yet 
polemical critique of logical method as he associates it with Aristotle.  In a few paragraphs 
Bacon places his hopes with “aphorisms” as “a knowledge broken” requiring men “to inquire 
further” for knowledge.  He dismisses “method” because it can only “carry a kind of 
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demonstration in Orb or Circle, one part illuminating another.”170 Bacon’s problem with method 
overlaps in many ways with later critiques of scientific method, specifically Shapin and 
Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump, which outlines Boyle’s attempt to create a vacuum.171  
In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour draws on their research to argue that Boyle’s airpump 
experiment is not only the foundational abstraction of modern science, where “natural laws” are 
created in laboratories, but like Bacon, is also skeptical of fabricated demonstration.  In this case, 
the artificial vacuum in the air pump acts as a constitutional guarantee of objective reality, 
designed, as Bacon might say, “to secure men.”172 Bacon doesn’t believe in control groups as 
modern scientists do, nor does he require the unified proof of geometry, as John Dee does in his 
Preface to Euclid. Instead The Advancement suggests, as Novum Organum does, that readers 
inquire further, without any objective guarantees of certainty. But Bacon also doesn’t veer into 
radical skepticism that denies the possibility of knowledge.  Bacon mainly moves through 
probability.  He refuses certainty and demands inquiry, and the “broken…circle” suggests that 
space and shapes can help in understanding this movement. 
 Bacon’s phrase, “a kind of demonstration in Orb or Circle, one part illuminating 
another,” connects Bacon’s assessment of method to a critical engagement with Dee’s geometry. 
Although we have seen that Dee is also not as simply reliant on the proof of geometry as parts of 
his preface might suggest, Bacon is openly critical of geometrical demonstration.  Yet he still 
uses the language of geometry in his critique, and I would also argue that he uses a time-based 
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and fragmentary understanding of the way space can be defined. Bacon’s understanding of 
geometry then, resembles one outlined by David Lachterman in The Ethics of Geometry.  
Lachterman reads against timeless, “homogenous,” and unified geometric forms to emphasize 
even visibly closed figures in geometric proofs as narratives “performed before the ‘present 
moment.’”173  Connecting this definition of geometry to early modern architectural discourses 
through his Essays, I argue that Bacon takes the obscured narrative movement of probability 
found in geometric method and expands on it to create a plan incorporating divergent 
probabilities.  In this vein, Bacon’s Essays also demonstrate a refusal of spatial and temporal 
unity, which The Advancement of Learning derides as a “show of a Total.”174  By doing so 
Bacon suggests that the shapes he uses to define time are mutable, expansive, and modified by 
the operations of probability. 
In the essay “Of Building,” Bacon proposes to “describe a princely palace, making a brief 
model thereof.” Bacon’s model is brief in the extreme—only “two sides…a side for 
banquet…and a side for the household.”175  Having established these, the narrator walks through 
the model to create the rest, first by noting the “land,” then “the stairs,” then “beyond this front is 
there to be a fair court,” and “beyond this court…an inward court.”176  Bacon transforms the 
“model” into a first-person narrative of walking through and observing the various component 
modules of the estate as a whole.  Instead of claiming that he offers a view of the building as a 
whole, he offers only glimpses of parts. To put together the house, a reader must move through 
the text of the narrative, and take the various stairs, courts, and walls into their mind, 
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constructing the house as an architect of builder would.  Unlike Dee, who would make the 
physical laborers tools of the architect, Bacon obscures the difference between the two. This 
narrative technique reflects his definition of “method” as “knowledge broken.”  The broken 
pieces of the house he describes in his essay demand an inquiring reader capable of mental 
construction. 
 By requiring a narrative to connect the pieces of a broken house, Bacon implicitly 
invokes one of the most understated parts of Vitrivius’s De Architectura.  Vitrivius, as might be 
expected, emphasizes geometry in his overview of architecture, but he also emphasizes 
“literature” for a “dependable record” of the building process.177  Vitrivius himself gives no 
involved records of building, but he also does not give images or descriptions of the buildings as 
a whole. In many ways, this absence of images or descriptions spurred the architects of the 
Renaissance to reconstruct and construct the buildings mentioned in Vitrivius based on 
fragmentary material ruins and the principles the ancient architect defined. Bacon also calls on 
the more contemporary architects who helped publish the floor plans and cross sections derived 
from Vitrivius.178 These architects follows the Vitruvian example and pair each building plan 
with a narrative describing his successes and difficulties—for example, fitting his plan in spite of 
the “awkwardness of their sites,” narrating his patrons’ requests, and his imaginative process.179  
Palladio also draws floor plans and cross sections of buildings based on Greco-Roman ruins, but 
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in spite of the seemingly unified appearance of these drawings, his narratives tell of the 
fragmented “ruins” and their history, emphasizing the interpretive work he does on these pieces 
by repeatedly using the phrase “one can tell from the surviving remains…”180 The practical 
application of architecture, then, used broken knowledge. It used gaps and potentials. 
 In contrast to this understanding of the narrative application of geometry in architectural 
discourses, John Dee’s “Preface” states that architecture uses geometry, “so, Ye whole frame and 
figure of the buildying, may rest in the very Lineamentes. Etc.  And we may prescribe in mynde 
and imagination the whole frame, all materiall stuffe being secluded” (emphasis mine).181 Dee is 
more interested in a totalizing system of knowledge than Bacon, although my analysis of the 
constant presence of failure in Dee’s efforts to reproduce the structure of the universe suggests a 
haunting by the Subjunctive Aesthetic. Paolo Rossi’s Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science 
argues that Dee was an important forbear and antagonist for Bacon’s philosophy. Rossi traces the 
magus ideal of hermetic philosophy—the isolated, secretive hoarder of knowledge—to Bacon’s 
rejection of hermetic forms of thought as imposed systems that refuse empirical experience.182 
And as Dee’s remarks indicate, not only magical discourses are part of Bacon’s critique, but 
geometric systems as well.  Dee’s plans are “secluded” in order that geometry can “prescribe” 
the “whole frame.”  For Dee, a part contains the structure of the whole.  
 Bacon’s “Of Building,” from his Essays takes the opposite direction from Dee. His 
narrative uses the component pieces found in Palladian architectural discourses to emphasize the 
“materiall stuffe” as much as possible by unfolding each piece in a self-consciously continuing 
narrative that ends by offering another yet-to-be narrated space in the future (“As for offices, let 
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them stand at distance, wish some low galleries to pass from them to the palace itself”).183  If 
Bacon has a system, he summarizes it best in “Of Gardens.”  The essay is “not a model, but some 
general lines of it”—“partly by precept, partly by drawing.”184 
 The general editors of the Oxford edition of Bacon’s works acknowledge the importance 
of absence in Bacon’s works, but they also qualify this claim.  In their words, he “adroitly (and 
as ever) turned incompleteness to his advantage to corroborate one of his main and (in 1620) far 
from obvious contentions---that the reconstruction of the sciences was not to be the work for one 
man a single generation but of many men in many.”185 But as I have argued, this incompletion 
was not a rhetorical tactic, or even a contention, but an essential feature of the way that Bacon 
approached communication and interpretation.  Readers must always take the broken parts of his 
texts and use them to build a new text.  In this way, Bacon consistently looks to the future with 
his texts and leaves a space for the future through the narratives in his texts. A.P. Langman’s 
essay on “Chance, Time, and Natural Divination in the Thought of Francis Bacon,” argues this 
focus on the future is a result of Bacon’s “theory of a mutable future” and that Bacon ultimately 
brings the future into the present.186 I would agree, and I would emphasize that this is one of the 
features of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
Langman also argues that Bacon lived in the future because he found the readers of his 
time lacking.  According to Langman, Bacon “believed that eliminating chance as a method of 
discovery would bring the future closer as it accelerated the rate of the discovery of the laws of 
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nature and new technologies,” as an “experimental” philosopher.187 I believe that Langman is 
pointing to an important feature of Bacon’s method by suggesting the importance of probability.  
But I take issue with the word “eliminating.”  I have been arguing that Bacon seeks to harness 
divergent possibilities instead of doing away with the operation of chance. For instance, in 
Novum Organum he often defines the outcomes of his experiments in terms of probability.  
Langman is correct that Bacon emphasizes the reproducibility of his experiments, but no more so 
than Dee or other alchemists, and not to the extent that later scientists such a Boyle will attempt.  
This, as Adorno suggests, is one of the problems that Boyle and other Royal Academicians and 
Scientists have with Bacon—he is not as meticulous or reproducible as they would like him to 
be.188 
Comparing Bacon’s method to architecture and planning make his utilization of 
probability easier to uncover.  But thinking of his writing in terms of the Subjunctive Aesthetic, 
with a narrative technique of self-conscious incompletion and a framework of defined probability 
seems appropriate.  Bacon uses narrative techniques and takes up the subjects other planners of 
his era also explore.  But in addition, Bacon repeatedly uses the language of building for his 
work. I already mentioned the “plan” laid out at the beginning of Novum Organum, As another 
example, he describes the experimental basis of his project as its “foundation” (Fundamenta) in 
the “Preparative to Natural History” that immediately follows the text of the Novrum 
Organum.189 This metaphorical description of the process of writing as building or architecture is 
not novel or unique to Bacon.  But because Bacon is constructing an architectural plan for a 
system of epistemology, his metaphorical use of the terms of building gains a new significance. 
                                                 
187 Ibid.,142-3. 
188 Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment. 3-4. 
189 Bacon. 451. 
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The overlaps are striking.  The Great Instauration begins, according to its plan, with the 
“partitions of the science,” (partitiones) which suggests that Bacon understands the process of 
constructing a system of thought as somehow equivalent with thinking architecturally. This is not 
to say that Bacon has a Gramscian layout of architectonics or that he begins the Foulcauldian 
process of breaking the human body into its component piece.  But the overlap of his novel 
epistemological techniques with the language of building blurs the line between description and 
speculation in a way that reflects the narrative operations of planning and the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic. 
 
Where Projects Meet 
With this blurring between description and speculation in mind, I will now put Dee’s 
style and Bacon’s spatial styles into conversation. To begin, I must point out that in Novum 
Organum, Bacon’s new techniques for experimental science have no avowed end goal of 
projection.  An often overlooked, but extremely important word choice reflects this absence— 
the word “hypothesis” never appears in the Novum Organum or The Advancement of Learning.  
Translations that include the scientific term often use it for the word “theoria,” a choice 
reflecting anachronistic sensibilities. For example, a great debate between culture warriors 
hinges on the Theory of Evolution, and whether or not the term holds meaning as speculative 
guesswork or provisional organizational system.  Bacon’s writing occasionally differentiates 
between the two, but not in great detail and not in a way that reflects the split between 
speculation and fact.  In fact, Bacon works hard to connect these spheres with his epistemology.  
For example, Novum Organum explores the operations of “induction” for many pages, but this 
version of induction only follows after a collection of existing propositions and then eliminating 
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incompatible claims.190  Then, after the collection of experiments, the rejection of faulty 
conclusions, and supposedly valid conclusions demonstrated, more explorations follow. These 
explorations involve time and reconsideration, beginning with a “first vintage,” or “provisional 
interpretation” (Interpretatio inchoata).191  The subsequent steps in his new technique are often a 
confusing mixture of abstract and observational, but attempt to speculate probable categories of 
phenomena from physical experiments.  
 This is not to say that Bacon outlines a knowledge-belief free-for-all.  In Bacon’s terms,  
 
“We should not let the intellect bounce and fly up from particulars to remote and almost 
the most general axioms…and from their fixed truth to prove and settle intermediate 
axioms…But we should hope for better things from the sciences only when we ascend the proper 
ladder by successive, uninterrupted, or unbroken steps, from particulars to lower axioms, then to 
middle ones, each higher than the least until eventually we come to the most general.  For the 
lowest axioms barely differ from naked experience.  The highest and most general now available 
are notional, abstract, and without solidity.  But the ones in between are the true, solid, living 
axioms on which men’s fortune and affairs depend, but above them again we come at least to the 
most general ones themselves, such as are not abstract but properly limited by these middle 
ones.”192 
 
This might seem to reverse the claim made in The Advancement in praise of broken knowledge, 
by arguing for “unbroken” and “uninterrupted” steps to knowledge.  But the space of Bacon’s 
system is not in the axioms, or in the organization of lower to higher claims, but rather in the 
spaces between axioms and which steps are the central focus.  He places special emphasis on the 
middle axioms, the space between high theory and basic observation. In my interpretation, 
Novum Organum focuses on a form of knowledge that is neither abstract nor material, but rather 
provisional.  For Bacon to call these “true, solid, living axioms on which men’s fortune and 
affairs depend,” is a strange claim to make.  But with the architectural terms in mind and the 
                                                 
190 Ibid., 162. 253. 
191 Ibid., 268-275. 
192 Ibid., 161. 
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efficaciousness of projection, we might not be so surprised to discover this assertion.  He is, in 
short, arguing for a probabilistic understanding, where “solid” material “properly” constraints 
abstraction but without severing the connection between the two categories. 
An important contrast to Dee from section is the use of parallel and potentially 
hierarchical spatial organization for a system of knowledge.  Ascending Bacon’s steps of 
knowledge very closely resembles the levels in Dee’s universe. The upward ladder promises a 
parallel structure of forms of knowledge.  Ascending the steps of these orderly parallels promises 
broadly true knowledge about the universe.  But Bacon believes that the middle divisions of his 
axioms have the capability of restraining or modifying the higher levels. Dee also believes that 
the material world influences the spiritual world and vice-versa, but Bacon embraces the area 
between material and theoretical without clear separation. He attempts to give specifics, but his 
experiments and distillations never fall on one side of abstract or material.  Any given step on the 
rung of his epistemology can be material, abstract, or both.  Furthermore, Bacon’s parallel lines 
do not inscribe the structure of the universe as Dee’s three parallel orders do, but rather promise 
to ascend beyond.  Or, to put it another way, this ladder of axioms can continue into division 
until specific axioms become a spectrum connecting experience to knowledge. They are 
potentially infinite, and ascension upwards is no more revealing than ascension downward. 
In addition to these different modes of deploying spatial metaphors, one key difference 
between Bacon’s experiments and Dee’s experiments likely lies in the way Bacon incorporates 
potential experiments and leaves open the possibility for their interpretation.  Dee emphasizes the 
possibility of failure by his minute records of repeated tasks.193  Bacon emphasizes the 
                                                 
193 Bodleian Library, MS Rawlinson, D 241. These experiments are tedious in the extreme. For 
more spectacular failures, see Casaubon, Meric. A True and Faithful Relation of What Passed for 
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possibility for the unexpected in his promises of future experiment within repeating the same 
tasks.  Both forms of repetition incorporate the possibility of change contained within repeated 
tasks.  These possibilities are unpredictably predictable—both Bacon and Dee acknowledge their 
limited knowledge of how an experiment can turn out and yet also have ideas of what can 
happen.  For both thinkers, each experiment brings with it a penumbra of possibility, a range of 
possible outcomes. But Bacon and Dee give differing connotations to these (un)expected 
outcomes.  Bacon finds the possibility of harnessing possibility intriguing, exciting, and useful.  
Dee finds the unexpected failure of his experiments frustrating and limiting. 
The overlap of alchemical language in Dee and Bacon has already been suggested by 
previous work that connects Bacon to the magus tradition the Dee seems to personify.  But the 
specifics are striking and revealing.  Dee writes the Monas Hieroglpyhica to unpack the monadic 
shape that contains all the secrets of the universe. Bacon ends Novum Organum by mentioning 
“monadic instances” and “magic” in his explanatory schema.194  In another work, De Augmentis, 
Bacon even uses Dee’s experimental methods as a metaphor for knowledge about the future.  
“Natural divination,” or predicting the future, can be either primitive or “by Influxion.”  The 
primitive prediction of the future happens in “sleepe, in extasies, and near death.”  The other 
method, however, is “grounded upon this other conceit; that the mind, as a mirror or glass, 
receives a kind of secondary illumination from the foreknowledge of God and spirits.”195 Bacon 
plays on Dee’s reflecting glass experiments by transforming them into mental metaphors. Dee 
imagines he sees the shapes of creation, and the future itself in his polished glasses. Yet while 
                                                                                                                                                             
Many Years Between Dr. John Dee and Some Spirits (London: Printed by D. Maxwell, for T. 
GARTHWAIT, and sold at the Little North door of S. Pauls, and by other Stationers. 1659). 
194 Bacon. Novum Organum. 445. 
195 SHE 4.399.  I am indebted to Langman for unpacking the significance of this work by Bacon, 
and although I disagree with his conclusions I could not have made this argument without his 
observations. 
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Bacon does not seem to think that a single session with a crystal or glass can reveal the future or 
causes and effects, He does take the method and applies it to the mind.  For Bacon, “The mind,” 
functions as Dee’s beams of light do.  This metaphor makes the brain a mediating organ between 
sensory input and categories of phenomena, not structured and calculable like Dee’s geometric 
beams of light, but irregular and spotty. Indeed, Bacon makes this a critique of the mind.  “Men’s 
minds are so marvelously beset that they altogether lack a clear and polished surface to focus the 
true rays of things.”196  Novum Organum provides new techniques for polishing the surface of 
the mind’s glass.  But more importantly, Bacon’s project admits that the glass is opaque, beset, 
and misleading.  The rays of light the mind tries to unravel are broken, like his forms of 
knowledge.  They do not pass in straight predictable lines as Dee’s cosmic rays do. 
In Bacon’s own words,  
“Natural divination is sometimes more certain, and sometimes more slippery according to 
the subject under consideration.  But if that subject be of a constant and regular nature, it makes 
for certain prediction; but if it be variable and a mixture as it were of natural and accidental, the 
predication may let you down. Nevertheless even in a variable subject, if it be carefully reduced 
to rules, a prediction will generally hold good, and if it does not hit on the right time, it will not 
wander off the point by much.”197 
 
In many ways and at many moments in his writings, Bacon lends himself to science’s promises 
of a predictable certain world according to certain theoretical laws.  He connects knowledge and 
power, writes about reproducibility of experiments, and attempts to skeptically fix material 
causes.  But Bacon has taken Dee’s Natural Philosophy of optics, lights, and rays that encode the 
structure of the universe and unstructured them or at least pointed to their “variable” and 
“accidental” aspects.  He writes, a “prediction will generally hold good,” but that is not the stuff 
of a scientific system.  This is the language of planning, of provisional projection, of the 
                                                 
196 Bacon. Novum Organum. 11.35. 
197 Ibid. 12.23.  107 
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Subjunctive Aesthetic.  Time becomes space to be sought out through probability and intention, 
and even if the exact goal cannot be achieved, Bacon’s natural divination “will not wander off 
the point by much.” It will, however, wander. 
 But if Bacon’s Organum forms a provisional narrative of possibility that leaves gaps for 
the future in the present moment, what then does John Dee describe in his Mathematicall 
Preface?  Bacon deals with Dee’s methods on a very specific level, to an extent that historians 
have not quite registered.  But I do not believe that Dee provides a basis for Bacon’s forays into 
possibility.  Dee’s fixed divisions of knowledge arise from an attempt to reduce the operations of 
probability, while Bacon acknowledges the power of probability and attempts to make it work.  
Both draw on architectural imagery and language to make their arguments. The difference may 
lie on the competing meanings of “plot” in the early modern period.  Dee believes he records the 
structure of something that exists, even if only in an imaginary form.  Bacon’s plot for his 
epistemology attempts to bring something into being without too closely defining contingent 
features.  
 In terms of textual-imagery, Dee’s use of a genre of writing called ephemerides may 
reveal how he imagines the way time, space, and probability work, especially in comparison with 
Bacon’s representation of time.  Dee kept no diary as such, but made notes in at least three 
volumes of works called Ephemerides.198  These are charts of astrological positions for the 
constellations and the planets at various dates.  They may cover fifty years of time or more, with 
space in the margins.  Dee usually uses this space to record important births as a first step toward 
                                                 
198Oxford MS Ashmole 487, “Ephemeris Ioannis Stadii” is the main example for this chapter.  
There are others in the Bodleain including Ashmole 488, and Ashmole 423 (423 contains 
Ashmole’s notes on Dee’s annotations) 
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making a horoscope. 199  But over time he begins to record mundane or personal events in this 
makeshift diary, for example on “Junius 1594 23” he writes, “I discharged Robert Web of my 
service and gave him 40 for full satisfaction of all things.”  One sad entry on Julius 13 records, 
“Michael Dee did give up the ghost after [he] said O Lord have mercy upon me,” on the day of 
his son’s death.  Dee takes the structure of time as a given in these gaps. The Ephemerides are a 
tool used to predict the future, and Dee fills in the blanks of the future with the present quite 
literally, often writing in the spaces left by the grids.  But the structure is a given, with lines 
defining the way different moments interact.  But this structure’s format is haunted by 
annotations and footnotes in the margin, drawn by unknown hands. In these emendations, 
narratives proliferate.  In contrast, Bacon has gaps for his future as well, but he believes that his 
program offers at least one alternate future and suggests multiple probable possibilities. 
 Finally, I return to experiments, where I began.  In the Preface and the Organum we can 
see where Bacon and Dee, alternately called Magi, Scientists, or Philosophers differ and overlap.  
They both believe in repetition of physical behavior, Bacon through his categories of phenomena 
and Dee through the geometric expression of the cosmic structure.  Both use architectural 
narrative techniques and metaphors of architecture to construct their programs.  Both are 
attempting to fix a future through the use of experiments.  But the difference between the two 
lies in the way their experiments are represented in terms of intention—not authorial intention, 
but the self-conscious intention of a text’s announced goal.  Dee’s experiments seek to 
rediscover and confirm his structure of the universe.  Probability becomes expressed only in his 
failure to make his experiments meet the geometric ideals expressed in his Preface to Euclid.  
Bacon experiments with unknowns, transforming the process of experimentation into a mainly 
                                                 
199 In Ashmole 487, he records the birth of” “Sebastianus: Rex Portugal” on 1554 Januarius 19-
20.  He also records the birth date of his medium, Edward Kelly in the following year. 
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mental process that draws its conclusion from physical phenomena.  Intention is also self-
consciously directed in his experiments, but Bacon directs them to discovering patterns across 
experiments instead of an individual one.  In his system, probability is not the expression of 
random chance alone, but also the marker of various competing explanatory schemas for 
observed phenomena.  Yet despite these important differences in the way that Dee and Bacon use 
projection in their projects, both have methods and concerns that overlap closely. Dee may place 
his faith in mathematics and image where Bacon places his emphasis on anachronistic narrative, 
but both utilize the tropes and tools of the Subjunctive Aesthetic in their work. 
 
Dee and Bacon: Magicians, Scientists, Planners 
I conclude this chapter by connecting my analysis of Dee and Bacon to the current 
critical understandings of science. I initially stated that science and magic misstate Dee and 
Bacon’s projects, and offered the Subjunctive Aesthetic as a more satisfactory explanation. But 
with the haunted parallel lines of Dee’s “Preface” in mind, I want to suggest a similar haunting 
of modern Science by probability. Though Dr. Dee’s influence on epistemology and Science 
though remains opaque relative to the genealogy of thought centered on Bacon, his efforts align 
relatively closely with the concerns of Boyle, Newton, Margaret Cavendish, and other self-
described natural philosophers and Royal Society members. Dee himself worked hard to 
cultivate and yet also to decry a public persona as a master of natural magic, a pursuit that he 
called a “science.” In his own moment, Dee’s persona influences how characters as familiar as 
Prospero and Faustus signify to an audience—the power-mad magician and careful sorcerer can 
seem to describe Dee at different moments and in different contexts. The sorcerer persona he 
popularized still haunts representations of Science and scientists to this day in characterizations 
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of the Wizard of Menlo Park and Dr. Frankenstein. Furthermore, Dee’s focus on numbers, 
algebra, and other mathematical methods in conjunction with alchemical “experiments” arguably 
makes him more important in the history of statistic-based science than Bacon. In short, the 
figure of Dee as mathematical conjurer, and the uncontrollable suggestion of probability that 
accompanies that identity, has defined the mad scientist figure that haunts the Scientific Method. 
Bacon’s relationship to Science is the inverse of Dee’s haunting. As many historians have 
noted, Bacon’s writings were important to members of the Royal Society in the late 17th and 
early 18th century, and Scientific Method is usually attributed to him.200 This is in spite of the 
magic that he repeatedly invokes, and the range of options that his texts incorporate. He works to 
incorporate a range of probable outcomes into his experiments. Nonetheless there is a strange 
transmutation that happens in the institutionalization of the Scientific Method that seems to 
reduce probability’s hazy range. Despite some historical readings that situate Dee and Bacon as 
Rosicrucian freethinkers, as enlightenment figures before the enlightenment happens, I do not 
believe that there is a linear way to connect these figures to the later Scientific Method.201 Parts 
of this chapter may demonstrate the importance of Dee for the history of science, and many 
historians focusing on Dee have already attempted to do exactly this.  Other moments of analysis 
in this chapter may bolster Latour’s critique of modernity by historicizing the methods of 
Science to demonstrate the magical roots of Bacon’s natural philosophy. My arguments have 
important implications for both Bacon’s and Dee’s relationship to Science if one believes in the 
fixed Scientific method. A more important implication, however, is that multiplicity and 
probability haunt experimental science to this day. 
                                                 
200 Many thinkers, including Adorno and others, are skeptical of this attribution, but only because 
Bacon is not “modern” enough. 
201 Yates, The Rosicrucian Enlightenment. 
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One main locus of this haunting, as I gestured to with its absence in Bacon’s work, is the 
hypothesis. A hypothesis is an essential feature of any experiment, but we often forget that it is a 
proposal. A hypothesis is an engagement with an unknown element in terms of probability. It is a 
future-looking narrative that spells out what experimenters believe to be the likely outcome of an 
experiment, relying on interpretation, assumptions, and a range of outcomes. A commonality of 
experimentation is that the biggest breakthroughs occur when trying to explain why a hypothesis 
failed. But Bacon has no hypothesis, and his oftentimes confusing practices such as freezing 
chickens and the like make no specified assumptions as to an outcome. And indeed, the results of 
these experiments often confuse Bacon. Dee’s occult experiments, in contrast, can only confirm 
one outcome—the providential establishment of a fixed future. Modern experimental method 
tries to restrict all variables save one, reducing the impact of probability on an experiment’s 
outcome. If we keep Dee and Bacon in mind, then the modern Scientific method seems like a 
compromise between fixture and wide-ranging probability, a modern spin on what came before. 
But this too is wrong. Modern experimental method makes no claims of completely fixing 
probabilities. No matter how controlled, no experiment is one hundred percent repeatable. 
Instead, science requires scientific significance to its results, relying on statistical calculations of 
probability. This method, unavailable to Dee and Bacon, suggests that calling these men the 
forbears of the modern experiment is strange.  
The experiments of Dee and Bacon have an oblique relationship to contemporary 
Science, with controlled experiments and calculated statistics. Yet the debate between the two 
illuminates debates in the history of science, particularly in Schrodinger, Einstein, and other 
physicists’ opinion that probability is absurd, that God does not play dice with the universe, that 
there are unified answers to the movement through time and space. Schrodinger initially assumes 
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that the Cat of his probabilistic experiment—simultaneously alive and dead—is a joke. He only 
tarries with quantum physics and the multiplicity of superposition in order to arrive at position, at 
fixity, at matter and knowability. Of course, many quantum physicists or experimental scientists 
would suggest that an experiment can have multiple outcomes, even if all the variables are 
completely controlled. A notion of facts that resembles Dee’s Providence nonetheless persists. 
In Bacon’s incorporation of defined lacuna and an openness to mutual contradiction, in 
contrast, I see a proposed epistemology that can intellectually sustain a range of probable 
outcomes. I do not mean to reduce the differences between Bacon and Dee to modern debates of 
probability and physics. But I think that Dee’s experience in particular reflects Einstein’s idea 
that science is about certainty, about achieving a fixed and verifiable version of the universe that 
resembles Providence. My comparison is mediated by wildly different material and intellectual 
milieus, but the problem of probability in both cases suggests that a range has the potential to 
haunt the fixed outcome of even modern experiments. 
Even if science can occasionally grab attention, scientists are generally not scandalous in 
contemporary times. In contrast, Dee and Bacon are surrounded by controversy—Bacon for 
bribery and Dee for conjuring. These are scandals of policy-making, and as critics and 
proponents of Science have repeatedly suggested, Science is often explicitly related to policy-
making in our own area. Both Dee and Bacon also perceive themselves as figures of transition, 
looking ahead to the fruition of their own projects. This tendency helps explains why scholars 
position Bacon and Dee across the Medieval and the Modern. This can generate a satisfying 
movement through history and buttress the historical claims of scientific ascendency, but also 
skews interpretive efforts toward the modern. Both Dee and Bacon take themselves out of their 
own time, and in turn, scholars are happy to do so as well. But finding the Subjunctive Aesthetic 
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interacting with these two texts of “natural philosophy,” provides a historical context around 
Science and magic and expand the conversation surrounding these fascinating figures. I hope to 
side step some of the problems of focusing on loaded terms like Science, Magic, Hermeticism, or 
Natural Philosophy.  These huge systems are slippery and unwieldy, and alter their relationships 
in specific historical moments. In fact, the contrast between Bacon and Dee’s interaction with 
probability suggests that there may still be multiple visions of Science, multiple means of 
experimenting. But I want to finish by suggesting that a portion of Science and Magic’s 
complexity can be attributed to the fact that Bacon and Dee are making proposals. In their 
plotted epistemologies, not only do I find a way to reconcile Science and Magic in their time, but 
also see a parallel between the magic and certain branches of Science today. Whether one result 
of an experiment or many, probability provides a problem that has the potential to haunt Science 
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Chapter 4: 
Multiplicity, the Moon, and the Subjunctive: A Gendered Critique In the Utopian Genre 
 
In 1666 Margaret Cavendish publishes The Blazing World, 150 years after Thomas More 
printed Utopia. Between the two publications the English population experienced the fall and 
restoration of the Stuart regime, a short-lived Republic, a Commonwealth, and the creation of the 
Church of England. Between the two publications a wider European audience also read hundreds 
of other texts about imaginary institutions and nations that would eventually become known as 
the utopian genre, after More’s Utopia. Like More and Cavendish, many of the authors of these 
utopian texts had close connections to governments. Similarly, a connection of utopian fiction to 
policy-making is demonstrable but indirect.202 For example, some of the institutions and 
technologies More describes in Utopia are eventually adopted in More’s homeland. Despite this 
connection, however, the path from imaginary-island to government policy and/or practical 
application is a twisting one.  
In this chapter, I argue that the strange connections of policy to utopias are best 
understood in terms of the overlapping storytelling techniques and imagery of the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic.203 In the pages that follow I compare utopias to each other but keeping in mind the 
                                                 
202 The most obvious is probably Utopia’s five-day work week or the full employment of men 
and women. 
203 For the connection of modern architecture to utopianism that construes them as both ideal and 
practical, see Tafuri, Manfredo. Architecture and Utopia Trans. Barbara Luigia La Penta, 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976). “Architecture now undertook the task of rendering its work 
‘political.’ As a political agent the architect had to assume the task of continual invention of 
advanced solutions, at the most generally applicable level. In the acceptance of this task, the 
architect's role as idealist became prominent. The real significance of that utopianism which 
modern historical study has recognized in Enlightenment architecture is thus laid bare. The truth 
is that the architectural proposals of eighteenth-century Europe have nothing unrealizable about 
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massive projects of Bacon and Dee in chapter three also helps situate these utopian works in a 
broader continuum of planning. More than Dee and Bacon’s experimental and epistemological 
plots, I argue that the early modern utopian form is the literary genre that most clearly inhabits 
the Subjunctive Aesthetic, demonstrating the blurred boundaries of material and imagination.204 
In short, each utopia I analyze hinges on the likely and unlikely, springing from where the two 
merge. This argument focuses on genre, and builds on the dissertation’s earlier momentum in 
this vein. Narrative genre has already appeared in chapter one and two, where the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic has typically mediated between disparate genres, such as Romance and history in The 
Faerie Queene or history and pre-history in Paradise Lost.  Now I will turn to utopia to 
investigate a genre that defines and is in turn defined by the Subjunctive Aesthetic. In particular I 
will focus on texts from individuals close to the center of various Tudor and Stuart regimes; 
                                                                                                                                                             
them.” 12. Although he analyzes from the enlightenment into modernity, his notions apply even 
more clearly to early modern utopias, which have vastly different standards of what is realizable. 
204 Criticism on the utopian genre is prolific, and often seems to offer a bellwether of modernity 
for critics. As I have throughout the dissertation, I argue against a simple connection of the two 
periods, and focus on early modern treatments. Additionally, though many critics do not, I treat 
utopia and dystopia together for reasons that will become clear in my analysis of Donne. A 
helpful summary of the genre is Susan Bruce’s introduction to Three Early Modern Utopias 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). For current early modern studies, the most 
influential analyses is probably Greenblatt, Stephen. Renaissance Self-Fashioning from More to 
Shakespeare (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980). In more recent years, the genre has 
become associated with historicizing modernity and capitalism. See Jameson, Frederic. 
Archaeologies of the Future (New York: Verso, 2007). For an indication of how utopia has 
become a ranging description of almost any piece of prose, see Siebers, Tobin eds. Heterotopia: 
Post Modern Utopia and the Body Politic (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). 
Although, I address literary critics in this chapter and restrict myself to early modern analysis, 
my argument is also inspired by the critiques of Margaret Atwood’s dystopias, especially Oryx 
and Crake and Octavia Butler’s utopian pieces, both of which explore and expand notions of the 
probable. 
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More’s Utopia, Donne’s dystopian Ignatius, His Conclave, Cavendish’s The Blazing World, and 
Bacon’s New Atlantis.205 
In order to contrast the early modern foregrounding of the Subjunctive Aesthetic in 
utopias with the earlier and less probabilistic ideal organizations I also reference Plato’s 
Republic.206 With this grounding contrast, I argue each utopia’s text blends with the others 
through the multiplicitous image-narratives of probability. Ultimately, like an architectural plot, 
utopias represent a space between material and imagination, invoking the narratives of other 
utopias because utopias evoke a in a probalistic narrative space. In doing so, each text exposes 
the fixed borders and institutions of utopia as hazy, malleable, and provisional. At the same time 
I emphasize probability, I am also tracing the development of the genre over time. Each 
successive utopia critiques earlier utopias. Unlike Harold Bloom’s notion of weak model theory, 
however, where each author attempts to subsume and surpass a previous master, early modern 
utopias attempt to expand multiplicity from within the bounds of previous ideal spaces. Utopias 
envelope and construct with each other, they do not willfully objectify previous utopias.207 The 
utopian tendency to find multiplicity from within culminates in Margaret Cavendish’s infinite 
worlds within The Blazing World, which expand the assumed gender-related divisions of earlier 
utopias to render the probability of the form an essential feature of the story.208 She attains this 
                                                 
205 More, Thomas. Utopia Ed. David Wootton, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999). Bacon, Francis. 
Three Early Modern Utopias. Ed. Susan Bruce, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
Cavendish, Margaret. The Description of a New World Called the Blazing World (New York: 
New York University Press, 1992). Donne, John. Ignatius, His Conclave Ed. T. S. Healy, S.J, 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969).  
206 Plato. Republic Trans. Grube, G.M.A., C.D.C, Reeve. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992). 
207 Contrast this with Bloom’s “misprision,” which suggests a categorical division of past from 
future while also directly connecting the two time periods. Bloom, Harold. The Anxiety of 
Influence (New York: Oxford, 1997), 30. 
208 Although I’m working in the English literary tradition, a similar argument could be made in a 
French context with Anonymous. Isle of Hermaphrodites. (1605). 
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blending of previous texts by incorporating them, but not subsuming them in an individualist 
fashion. Cavendish’s world, like the other texts in this chapter, exposes that utopias transition 
with the world outside the text. Like plans, utopias move between material and a representational 
imagination, ultimately blending into a communal authorial effort of multiplicity.   
The texts I explore give a wide-ranging cross-section of the early modern construction of 
the genre. To sketch out some of the outlines of the genre for the purposes of this chapter: Each 
text engages in self-conscious world building and the concocting of policy. They each use forms 
of narrative to discuss institution, government, and policy. More’s Utopia is perhaps the most 
familiar for our time. And despite the recent mass of publications on her work, Cavendish’s is 
arguably the most obscure for influential critics.209  In The Blazing World Cavendish uses 
citizens of the real world as characters alongside fantastic and impossible characters, with a 
Romance narrative of shipwreck and travel that connects multiple possible worlds.  Bacon’s New 
Atlantis describes an island where many of the policies he outlined in Novum Organum and his 
other writings are put into literary narrative. Donne’s Ignatius, His Conclave may initially appear 
out of place in that it describes the capital city of Hell and it various historical figures that strive 
for political power. But planning forms key features of Donne’s work, allowing him to 
springboard into multiplicitous points of view that resemble free indirect discourse. Cavendish 
takes all of these elements and transforms them into characters or plot devices, crafting a utopia 
of utopias, expanding on the blending of imagination and material that the earlier pieces 
approached in their probabilistic narratives. Each text heightens the probabilistic narrative-spatial 
blending that appears in More’s work. Each new iteration embraces this multiplicity more than 
the ones before. 
                                                 
209 Jameson calls Cavendish particularly strange in Archaeologies of the Future, 8-11. 
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The stakes of my criticism are high, pushing against the boundaries of literature itself and 
modern notions about the temporal development of genre. Michael McKeon’s influential 
discussion in The Origins of the English Novel offers one strand of criticism I hope to complicate 
and build on.  He argues that the “early modern crisis in standards of truth” and the “origins of 
the novel are…coextensive and…specifically generic.”210 Part of the origins of the novel he 
analyzes include utopian fictions, although he never analyzes any 16th or 17th century utopian 
works at length.  However, following his lead, critics of utopian fiction have found the truth 
claims put forth in utopian works also tend toward the rise of the realistic novel.211 McKeon has 
been criticized for his teleological progress of thought and genre.212 I am not interested in piling 
on these criticisms, and prefer to define how a genre such as utopia can develop anachronistically 
in the Subjunctive Aesthetic more than other forms of prose, as other utopias are connected to 
the other utopian instantiations. Despite my criticism of McKeon, I agree that truth-claims are 
important for defining early modern prose pieces, and especially utopian fictions.  But I would 
like to put this into conversation with the self-consciously mediated narratives of the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic that I find in utopias. The language philosopher Donald Davidson unintentionally 
buttresses my attempt when he claims, “a non-indicative sentence can not be said to have truth 
value.”213  Although Davidson’s investigation is philosophically focused, he is discussing 
language, and specifically the subjunctive. His claim is striking in the sense that even a lie has a 
                                                 
210 McKeon, Michael.  The Origins of the English Novel 1600-1740 (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), Xxii. 
211 Bruce, Susan. “Introduction.” Three Early Modern Utopias. 
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also says that linear chronology does not ipso facto mean teleology. 
213 Davidson, Donald.  Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 121. 
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negative value with regards to the truth.  What does it mean then for the non-indicative moods to 
have no truth-value at all, not even as a negative version of the truth, even when works tell 
extensive narratives using it?  What sort of meaning-making is involved?  What type of rhetoric 
or narrative would take place in a genre with no truth value? The answer, I suggest, is in utopias, 
which embraces probability, provisionality, and multiplicity. 
Finally, this chapter speaks to Marxist critiques of utopian thinking that date from The 
Communist Manifesto.
214 For example, Frederic Jameson’s uncharacteristic contention that 
utopia can be an "imaginary enclave within real social space” that "offers the figure of a closed 
space beyond the social, a space from which power distantly emanates but which cannot be itself 
thought of as modern.” He even goes so far as to claim that in contrast to the “bustling 
movement of secularization and national and commercial development” a utopia is “something 
like a foreign body within the social: in them, the differentiation process has momentarily been 
arrested, so that they remain as it were momentarily beyond the reach of the social and testify to 
its political powerlessness, at the same time that they offer the space in which new wish images 
of the social can be elaborated and experimented on.”215  Utopias seem to be, in Jameson’s 
terms, a unique fantasy that allows for experimentation and elaboration—he compares them to 
childhood imagination play. Perhaps because he focuses on the genre’s compatibility with 
Marxist architectonics, he also claims that planning in its daydreamer’s utopian form is distinct 
from “erotic daydreams,” or the physiological, immediately material forms of image and 
                                                 
214See Marx, Karl. The Marx-Engels Reader Ed. Robert C. Tucker, (New York: Norton, 1978), 
497. 
215 Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future, 15-6.  Krishan Kumar mentions the tension of 
Jameson’s dismissal of early modern utopias as fantasy, but he generally accepts Jameson’s 
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 175 
narrative.216 I reject this easy separation. Part of what I do in this chapter is situate utopia as a 
non hetero-normative form of representing desire that would not register as “erotic” on 
Jameson’s scale, because it is communal and multiplicitous. I do not mean to reduce Jameson’s 
argument to a single point since I do not believe this is the main thrust of his ideas, but by 
working through his oversight I see the potential to uncover an overlap in queer and Marxist 
readings. Part of Jameson’s strange division reflects his focus on More over other utopian 
writers. Only in The Blazing does the utopian potential to queer desire come to the undeniable 
forefront of the form. Nonetheless, Jameson does fix utopias with straight lines, while I argue 
that utopian organizations move in an umbra that connects to the way desires connect to 
representations of the likely and unlikely. Utopias are not a foreign body in the social fabric, as 
Jameson would claim, but a queer presence that haunts the over-idealized conception of utopia as 
a complete flowering of a new world. Jameson is correct that utopias do contain experimentation, 
idealization, and novelty, but he misses the probabilistic elements that would have been familiar 
to early modern writers through the discourses of architecture. By connecting the works in this 
chapter to plans, we can recontextualize them as closer to efficacy than we might otherwise 
imagine, and move away from an anachronistic application of “utopian” for ideas that may not 
have been as distant from practicality as the term now implies.  
Foucault once contrasted a heterotopia with a utopia, placing the utopia, like Jameson, 
outside the physical world. By construing utopias along the narrative-imagistic lines of planning, 
I argue that utopias are heterotopias. That is to say they mediate between an ideal and real world. 
Like plans, utopias mediate between a reality and fantasy, build in a probablistic place connected 
to an imaginary non-place through the Subjunctive Aesthetic. Similarly, by mediating between a 
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self-conscious fantasy and a real world, utopian fictions destabilize any claims to truth even as 
they seek to define the contours of what the truth is. Each work in this chapter addresses this 
simultaneous mediation and definition in a different but related style. Each piece of prose uses or 
references visual narratives and the multiple coexisting possibilities of the Subjunctive Aesthetic 
to craft narrative. Utopias, I demonstrate, rely on the spatial aspects of the Aesthetic because 
narrative alone does not capture the overlapping probabilities that each text engages. But utopias 
also straddle literary and non-literary narrative, compelling because they blend elements of the 
two categories. In the end, utopias, like architectural plots, require a ranging form of image-
narrative. Utopian multiplicity surpasses architectural plots, however, in evoking a range of 
probable layouts in the shared world of author, texts, readers, and characters. 
The chapter begins by laying out how essential probabilistic image-narratives are for 
utopias by contrasting More’s Utopia with Plato’s less architecturally influenced and more 
geometric Republic. Utopia, I argue, initiates the genre in an uncomfortable self-critique that 
grapples with likely and unlikely through narrative and image. Then I turn to Bacon’s New 
Atlantis to uncover a burgeoning sense of multiplicity in narrative, as multiplicitous perspective 
becomes infused in his island’s signature probabilistic institutions. Donne takes this multiplicity 
to the level of inner-monologue, tying multiplicitous representations of subjectivity to plots 
against authority in Ignatius, His Conclave, much like Sin and Satan in chapter two of this 
dissertation. The chapter culminates with Margaret Cavendish’s critique of utopia in The Blazing 
World, finding multiplicity that leverages the genre’s narrative and spatial play. Cavendish does 
not eliminate individual authority from utopia, but suggests that authorship and power are 
distributed among subjects when planning becomes the primary mode of discourse. The Blazing 
World manifests the strange excitement of the Subjunctive Aesthetic.  
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A Geometric Base: The Connected Proofs of Utopia 
By the time Francis Bacon writes New Atlantis near the end of his life (first published 
posthumously in Latin in 1624), the tropes of utopia have become self-reflexive.  One of the 
inhabitants on his imaginary island of Bensalem even “read in a book of [an Englishman], of a 
Feigned Commonwealth,” referring to Utopia.217  But More’s Utopia, while not quite as self-
conscious of its genre, is still engaging with a long tradition of writing that most utopian critics 
trace to Plato’s Republic.218  In fact, each of the works in this chapter specifically mentions 
Plato’s work.  Cavendish in particular deals with Plato at some length.219 Viewing the 
continuities and differences between the early modern works and Plato’s ideal city gives an 
operational definition of the tropes of utopian fiction and also makes the Subjunctive and 
architectural elements more apparent.  In particular, understanding what More does with Plato’s 
narrative use of geometry will help explain what sort of narrative process takes place in Utopia.   
To begin, Plato’s narrative of his Republic is framed by dialogues, winning over at least 
one openly hostile participant through a demonstration of a polity’s organization.220  Plato’s 
work self-consciously relies on rationality to imagine a polity’s organization, as do the early 
modern utopias. For More’s intended audience who reads Greek, Utopia is also transparently 
imaginary, with several puns, such as “Utopia,” which means “no-place” or “happy-place,” and 
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“Ademus,” meaning “ruler without a people.”221  The Republic is more self-consciously 
imaginary as Socrates freely outlines a polis decoupled from any specific physical location.  This 
imaginary seems closer to what Jameson has in mind when he defines utopia as a defined space 
within the social imaginary.  More, in contrast, places his Utopia in the same world as his 
narrators and ostensibly in the same world as the reader of the book. Utopia, then, more than 
Plato’s imaginary city, mediates between a mimetic representation of a world his contemporaries 
occupy and an imaginary non-place. 
 In another key comparison, both More and Plato emphasize the language and use of 
geometry as a means to ground rationality and organization, with several meaningful 
differences.222  The Republic claims that the rulers of the imaginary kallipolis should be 
instructed in the use of geometry in order that they consistently “arrive in full agreement” during 
deliberations.223  Presumably for similar reasons, all the citizens of Utopia learn “geometry.”224  
But Plato takes great lengths to incorporate simple, regular shapes into his discourse and 
emphasize the importance of geometry. The Republic’s most confusing moment might come 
when Socrates attempts to discern the relationship among “Understanding,” “thought,” “Belief” 
and “Imagination” using the ratios on a line. The ratios are not metaphors or explanatory tools.  
                                                 
221 More. Utopia, 101. In Divulging Utopia, Baker demonstrates More’s preoccupation that only 
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223 Plato. Republic. 184. 
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discusses Utopia’s universal education, mainly because its logic creates conflict.  
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Each of these characteristics and even the line itself relates directly to a ratio of truth-value.225  
Also important to note, the truth-value expressed here via geometry is separate and closed-off 
from the material world in a fundamental way.  The ratio of truth, not the line or the concepts of 
understanding, etc. marks the key idea of both line and words. Truth and the line are parallel, 
much like Dee’s universe in chapter three. 
One might be tempted to conclude that More’s fictional world outstrip even Plato’s 
Pythagorean obsession with geometric unity,226 based on the woodcut cover of the 1516 first 
edition.227  In the image, the island is a circle surrounded by water, seen from above (as a circle 
would be in early modern editions of Euclid’s Geometry), with another circular river inscribed 
within it to reinforce its peculiarly regular shape.228  The 1518 edition’s woodcut is even more 
regularly circular.  Indeed, these images reproduce the rigorously defined shape found within the 
text.  The island’s natural cliffs are “treacherous” and “only the locals know the safe channels.”  
Yet in what I would argue is one of the most important differences from Plato, these ostensibly 
natural coasts are artificial—the founder of the republic “cut away” land that connected an 
ancient peninsula, creating the circular island.229  Utopia‘s space is regular, but it is produced by 
human exertion in a social and material world.230 In this, More’s Utopia emphasizes the 
intellectual and physical labor of constructing a geometric shape in the material world beyond 
Plato’s ideal forms.  Both More and Plato share an emphasis on geometric principles in 
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education and style, but More emphasizes the intellectual and physical labor required in 
imagining and translating this into material constructions.231 
Unlike Plato’s polity that denies its plasticity, More’s utopia allows for change through 
human effort even if it gives little time describing that effort.  Presumably, the separation of 
Utopia from the mainland required extensive intellectual and physical labor in disciplines we 
might call engineering and architecture. One could argue that Plato’s Republic also uses human 
intellectual labor to define its contours, specifically though the conversation of Socrates and his 
interlocutors.  But even Socrates goes through great effort to efface his ideal city as the work of 
construction. He reiterates over and over that he only uncovers the truth—he does not build it.  
This claim may be disingenuous, but the degree it dissimulates is somewhat unclear.  The 
Republic’s humor and irony have been a matter of debate since Socrates said in its pages that he 
would ban all forms of fiction from his republic’s educational program, even while admitting 
that the state would incorporate self-conscious lies.  Classicists have attempted and will continue 
attempting to untangle the nuances of Plato’s narrative.232 But the overall interpretation of the 
Republic is that the ideal social layout emulates ratios, shapes, and ideas that for some reason or 
another we must claim exist outside our world.  These ideal forms connect in a unified whole, 
whether in an actual afterworld, as in the myth of Er, in the world of geometry, as in Socrates’ 
line demonstrating truth, or in the baffling narrative of Plato’s cave, which transforms material 
things into the shadows generated by a fire in a cave and the truth into the light of the sun.  These 
unified connections always end in regular, and usually simple, shapes. 
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Utopia incorporates geometry in its narrative, in the curriculum of the island’s own 
educational program, and also in the description and woodcuts of the island.  But More departs 
from Plato’s adherence to regular ratios and clearly defined forms.  If the Republic has a shape, it 
would be a Pythagorean one—perhaps a circle like the universe in the myth of Er, or a triangle 
like the tripartite division of his gold, silver, and bronze castes.  More’s island, although its 
general impression is circular, incorporates both an artificial and natural gap. Returning to the 
woodcut, at the center of the island’s layout a careful viewer can see this gap behind outline of a 
ship. This gap, although a naturally occurring harbor, according to the text, is not regular. This 
gap gives the island an overall shape of a crescent.  A crescent is not a terribly complex shape by 
most standards, but Utopia’s narrative implies it requires more work than a circle or a triangle.  
I argue that this crescent shape defines the key departure that early modern utopias make 
from Plato’s regular world. The shape implies some sort of otherworldly connection to the moon, 
although the woodcut’s shape does not overly play up the lunar connection.233 Later utopias will 
make much of the moon, however, as in Donne’s Ignatius. The shape calls up other-worldliness, 
as well as an outsider femininity for the patriarchal Utopia. But the separation implied by the 
crescent is undermined in demonstrating the separation’s construction through labor.  “It is 
said—and the appearance of this coastline seems to confirm the claim—that this country has not 
always been surrounded by the sea.  But…a fifteen-mile-wide stretch of land that linked the 
peninsula to the land should be cut away, turning it into an island.”234  Although Utopia’s 
crescent island is blotchy at best, not matching the actual shape of the moon, the effort in cutting 
away fifteen miles of land implies grounding in materiality. True, the effort is not extensive as 
stereotypical physical labor, being quickly passed over. Instead, the labor is the mixed 
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imaginary-physical labor of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. The cutting away of Utopia from the 
mainland is a design that gets carried out. It is labor that blurs the boundaries between the 
naturalized experience of the world and a non-earthly body. The island’s regularly-irregular 
shape is made in the world from the material of the world, but incorporates an overlap of moon 
and earth in Utopia’s shape that initiates a haunting spatial probability. 
 
Narrative Geometry 
 More takes what I have called Plato’s geometry and modifies it, blending and connecting 
the role of construction and practice with abstract consideration. Although I do not discuss 
shapes in every text, so does each other piece in this chapter. Despite this elevated self-
consciousness, however, More does not abandon an emphasis on Plato’s geometry. Before I 
move on to other English early modern works that depart more drastically from a geometric 
basis, I will examine the narrative techniques of Utopia and the Republic to locate a similar 
overlap in the way they craft narrative. Before I do that, however, I must acknowledge that Plato 
and More write with the separation of nearly two thousand years.  Plato’s work, most certainly 
read out-loud in Plato’s Academy at some point, maintains an element of performance even in 
the writing and translation that most of the Western world finds familiar.  More’s work, in 
contrast, begins with letters from various famous intellectuals of the day.  Many of the 
differences between More and Plato might thus be attributed to a differing focus on textual or 
oral transmission.  But even admitting these differences, both More and Plato begin in dialogues. 
These dialogues become charged with argument in both works very quickly, with distinct and 
controversial opinions becoming expressed in a social setting.  Furthermore, a first person 
narrator defines the perspective of each of these works. In The Republic’s Socrates and Glaucon 
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are the narrators, in Utopia, the narrator claims to be the same Thomas More who is the author, 
as well as Raphael Hythloday. 
 The first person narrator and the dialogue form require a reader (or listener) to quickly 
evaluate the truth-value of any utterances made by the characters involved. The fact that many of 
the characters in both dialogues are presumably real people—Socrates, More, Cuthbert Turnstall, 
etc—intensifies the demands that we treat these events as having happened.  Utopia pushes 
harder than the Republic for recognition as ontologically trustworthy with its many prefatory 
letters attesting to the truth of its narrative.235 But once the characters have been established and 
the stakes of the argument demonstrated, both works move quickly to describing an ideal 
political structure. Although the Republic never forgets its dialogue form, Socrates voice 
eventually comes to dominate the description of his ideas, with only the occasional assent by his 
interlocutors.  Utopia divides its introductory dialogue from the description of Utopia proper, but 
the effect only makes explicit what happens in the second half of Plato’s Republic.  Overall the 
effect of moving from dialogue to an almost monologue description draws the audience deeper 
into institutional planning after beginning in a relatively mundane deliberations. 
 The city that Plato describes in the Republic begins as a consideration, almost as a 
counterfactual.  Socrates asks all his speakers to grant him a temporary suspension of the 
true/false dichotomy in an attempt to define what justice is through an imaginary exploration.  As 
he claims to be unable to do this with the example of a single man, Socrates expands the scale of 
his investigation to the size of a city.  This narrative move reflects the operations of Euclidean 
geometry, where scales can change but the essential propositions of geometry remain the same.  
Socrates also promises to return to the question at hand, and he eventually returns to answer what 
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justice is when he discovers what a just city-state looks like.  The first person narrative never 
drops out, and the impression of the section as a whole reflects Euclidean methods as much as 
Socratic dialogues, with a series of questions that in turn receive an answer. These steps build up 
to a unified theory of the perfect social organization and the ideal individual.   
In contrast, More divides the description of Utopia from the framing dialogue in two 
separate books.  A new narrator different from More’s persona—Raphael Hytholoday—frames 
the narrative not by a counterfactual, but by an impersonal description of the island that he insists 
actually exists. He also insists on Utopia as an exemplar to be imitated.  In place of the isolated 
proof, then, we have a distant description of the island that begins on the largest scale (much like 
Socrates claims to do) and moving down through individual institutions that make up Utopia’s 
social structure.  The use of maps and the woodcut on the cover reinforce this “overview,” 
narrative style.  “They,” and “There is,” begin nearly every paragraph, and the narrator’s first 
person reactions disappear until the final few pages. Utopia’s narrative resembles Plato’s abstract 
overview but removes the constant question-and-response style that defines the dialogue.  
The final few pages of More’s narrative depart drastically from the Republic.  Here, the 
persona of More’s narrator stand-in returns to pass judgment on Utopian institutions in a 
markedly different way from Hytholday.  He “was left with impression that many of the customs 
and laws established in that country were simply absurd.”236  Yet despite this challenge to the 
value, and possibly even the truth claims, that Hytholday makes, the narrator never addresses 
him directly.  The disagreement hangs over the close of the narrative, but unlike the Republic, 
which closes with a potentially unbelievable myth, Utopia does not finish with this 
disagreement.  Instead of ignoring everything that Hytholoday has described, the narrator claims, 
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“I am happy to admit that there are many aspects of Utopian society that I would like to see 
established in our own political communities, even though I don’t expect to see my wishes 
realized.”237  These few lines do incredibly complex narrative work. The sentences take an object 
of absurdity, which seems incompatible with the narrator’s lived reality, and break utopian 
policy into discrete chunks available for practical application in limited ways.  Furthermore, this 
connection is enhanced by the letters that close the book and suggest the application of many of 
the ideas expressed in Utopia.  This break renders the text’s abstract parts into potential points of 
activity or plans. The entirety need not be accepted because the unitary whole is actually 
multiple. 
 
Walking Through The New Atlantis 
Bacon’s New Atlantis takes some of the geometric notions found in Plato and More, but 
also takes More’s blending of truth-claims another step and works to emphasize multiple 
possibilities through narrative. In fact, he reworks the utopian genre as a critique of Plato’s 
geometric unity. Like the earlier utopias, Bacon utilizes sections of dialogue.  Portions of his 
work are in dialogue between the credulous narrator and a “Father” of the “Salomon House,” or 
“Joabin…the good Jew.”238 Unlike the earlier works of More and Plato, however, these 
dialogues do not frame the account of the island so much as they give a first-person narration of 
its topography. In fact, there are no discussions until later in the work, and unlike Utopia and The 
Republic, these discussions tend to occur when the text describes Bensalem’s institutions. When 
readers receive systematic overviews of the island as a whole, the descriptions are mediated 
through quotation marks in a conversation, and then again through the perceptions of the 
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narrator, and above all are characterized by the disorienting overall narrative framed by a foreign 
place.239 Unlike Plato’s projective consideration through the perspective of Socrates, and unlike 
More’s report of Hytholday’s visit to a distant land, the narrator of The New Atlantis writes from 
within the place he describes. He captures his confusion in the moment.  The unitary and distant 
descriptions of the Republic and Utopia have been replaced by a limited engagement that critic 
Kate Aughterson has associated with the quest for “fixed reference” in a “realist” empiricism. In 
her close reading of the narrator’s arrival on the island, a system of reference becomes fixed 
through “sequential narrative.” 240 This sequential narrative marks a major narrative difference 
from More and Plato. In addition to establishing an expected empiricism that requires material 
experience of Bensalem’s institutions, Bacon’s narrative also de-emphasizes unitary figures in 
space through a potentially destabilizing narrative.  For example, the narrator sees a 
“haven,…the port of a fair city” as the The New Atlantis begins. Yet despite the work’s title 
readers cannot even tell if this land is an island, as the narrator does not know its contours 
either.241  Along with the narrator the audience waits in quarantine “three hours” before 
glimpsing the island’s institutions, which only unfold as they become available in fragmentary 
perceptions.242  First person sensory experience defines the way one views Bensalem. 
In comparison with Plato or even More, The New Atlantis is anti-systematic in terms of 
its narrative use of topography, and calls to mind Michel de Certeau’s experiences walking 
through New York City as he contrasts them with looking down on a dead city from the top of 
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the World Trade Center in The Practice of Everyday Life.243  In the contrast between overview of 
the city and moving through the streets, De Certeau defines the difference between strategy and 
tactics. De Certeau defines “strategy” as “the calculation (or manipulation) of power 
relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an 
army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated.  It postulates a place that can be delimited as 
its own and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or 
threats (…objects of research, etc.) can be managed.”244  De Certeau may have More and Plato’s 
republics in mind when he writes this, as for More and Plato, the ideal city can be isolated and 
exert its will on its surroundings. Plato’s entire world, in fact, is defined from an exterior point in 
the Myth of Er. The experience of Bacon’s Bensalem, however, corresponds more closely to 
walking through the streets of a city, a move De Certeau associates with tactics. Tactics are still a 
form of planning for De Certeau, but they respond to strategy, retooling the operations of 
institutional power to exploit and create unimagined possibilities. For example, cutting across a 
deer path instead of sticking to the streets. De Certeau finds this response praiseworthy and 
necessary in the face of intuitional control.  In narrative terms, lived experience can’t be defined 
in geometric terms for Bacon. Instead, Bacon, like de Certeau, emphasizes the moving through 
and emphasizing first-hand experience over broad descriptions of institutions. 
Before continuing into what separates Bacon’s narrative besides an increased emphasis 
on a first person experience, I also recall a similar trend in Bacon’s other writings where I tied 
this tendency to probability.  A.P. Langman in his article “The Future Now,” has noted a similar 
trend in Bacon’s Sylvia Sylvarum and New Atlantis with regards to “divination,” as he argues 
Bacon seeks a new foresight by tracing a cause-effect narrative that is observed, experienced, 
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and provisionally extended into the future.245  But a better example from one of Bacon’s other 
works mentioned in an earlier chapter demonstrates his experiential, narrative conception of even 
non-utopian spaces.  In the essay “Of Building,” Bacon proposes to “describe a princely palace, 
making a brief model thereof.” Bacon’s model is brief in the extreme—only “two sides…a side 
for banquet…and a side for the household.”246  Having established these, the narrator walks 
through the model to create the rest, first by noting the “land,” then “the stairs,” then “beyond 
this front is there to be a fair court,” and “beyond this court…an inward court.”247  Bacon 
transforms the “model” into a first-person narrative of walking through and observing the 
various component modules of the estate as a whole.  He builds the house by walking through it. 
 By describing a home this way Bacon uses pieces, requiring a narrative to connect them.  
In this, he implicitly invokes Vitrivius’s De Architectura.  Vitrivius, as might be expected, 
emphasizes geometry, but he also emphasizes “literature” for a “dependable record” of the 
building process.248  Bacon also calls on Palladio and his contemporaries, who began widespread 
publication of floor plans and cross sections derived from Vitrivius. Although de Certeau might 
dismiss modern graphical representations of the city as dead, Palladio’s buildings in The Four 
Books on Architecture, broken in their component pieces via floor plan and cross section, are 
self-consciously incomplete, requiring an experience of the building itself. As Vitrivius 
recommends, Palladio pairs each with a narrative describing his successes and difficulties—for 
example, fitting his plan in spite of the “awkwardness of their sites,” narrating his patrons’ 
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requests, and his imaginative process.249  Palladio also draws floor plans and cross sections of 
buildings based on Greco-Roman ruins, but in spite of the seemingly unified appearance of these 
drawings, his narratives tell of the fragmented “ruins” and their history, emphasizing the 
interpretive work he does on these pieces by repeatedly using the phrase “one can tell from the 
surviving remains…”250  In a similar way, Bacon’s “Of Building,” uses the component pieces 
found in Palladian architectural discourses to emphasize the “materiall stuffe” as much as 
possible by unfolding each piece in a self-consciously continuing narrative that ends by offering 
another yet-to-be narrated space in the future (“As for offices, let them stand at distance, wish 
some low galleries to pass from them to the palace itself”).251  If Bacon has a system, he 
summarizes it best in “Of Gardens.”  The essay is “not a model, but some general lines of it”—
“partly by precept, partly by drawing.”252 In this essay Bacon is self-consciously provisional—
his text is subjunctive and architectural, not a distant overview. 
 Returning to the dénouement of The New Atlantis, the narrator comes to the Father of 
“Salomon’s House…at [his] day and hour.”253  The Salomon House is the representative 
institution of the island, even choosing the government, but the Father unfolds its “true state” in a 
narrative.254  In his words, the “end of our foundation” is “the knowledge of Causes, and secret 
motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire; to the effecting of all 
things possible.”255  Although “Human Empire,” seems to offer a spatial metaphor, the true end 
is in “causes” and “secret motions” and “all things possible.”  Emphasizing probability and 
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space, the ensuing description of the House’s experimental “Preparations and Images,” eschews 
the two dimensional conception of boundaries described by More and outlined in the woodcut 
image of Utopia, since Bensalem’s space, like Palladio’s, extends into the sky and 
underground.256  Yet even these three dimensions require motion for intelligibility.  When 
Salomon house makes “demonstrations” it is not of “geometry,” but of “sounds, and their 
generation” or “lights and radiations.”257  The only outline the narrator gives of Bensalem as a 
whole is quick, uninformative, and oriented toward motion and multiple possibilities; “we have 
circuits or visits of divers principal cities of the kingdom.”258 
 The New Atlantis contains no map or description of the island—even the fact that is an 
island is first mentioned in a parenthetical aside in a conversation.259  Bacon refuses to define the 
contours of its space, and also drops the initial framing story by the work’s conclusion.  Unlike 
More and Plato, who return to their background dialogue, readers never discover how or if the 
narrator returns to Europe to inform the world of his discovery as the Father bade him do.  
William Rawley, Bacon’s secretary, added a note in his hand to the end of The New Atlantis 
claiming “[The rest was not perfected].”260  But based on Bacon’s critique of geometric method, 
his use of architectural discourse, and his emphasis on motion over unity in The New Atlantis, it 
seems equally plausible that the text is indeed “perfected,” in the sense that it demands 
experiential implementation. It is multiplicitous, a probable narrative that resembles a plan, 
calling on readers to construct with it. The narrative demands us to imagine the possible 
applications of Bensalem’s institutions, not based on truth-claims made by prominent 
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intellectuals or the narrator.  Readers themselves must decide how practical or imaginative the 
ideas contained within The New Atlantis are.  These plans have contours, but they also contain 
interpretative possibility, a contingency that is self-consciously open to multiple pathways, never 
constrained or perfected. 
 
Interiority and Thinking Ahead in Donne’s City of Hell 
 A common thread that runs through Plato, More, and Bacon is a demand on readers and 
listeners for interpretation, from the argument and questions of Plato’s dialogue, from More’s 
qualified dismissal of the Utopians at the end of his text, or from the abrupt end of The New 
Atlantis. In each of these texts, an aporia demanding interpretation multiplies the possibilities for 
social organization. The promise of rational reorganization relies to some extent on mapping 
thought onto space, as the geometric narrative techniques and style of these works suggests.  And 
to some extent a first-person narration feed into each of these text’s ability to spatially conceive 
of thought, as in Plato’s line of truth or More’s regularly shaped Utopia. But at the same time, as 
I argued for The New Atlantis, the first-person narration can also use first person narration to 
create a shared sense of reality.  The texts I have analyzed thus far in this chapter utilize a 
connection to an empirical reality shared by the author and reader, even as they blend the 
difference between imaginary consideration and real experience by placing ostensibly real places 
and people into the text itself alongside self-consciously imaginary abstractions.  John Donne’s 
Ignatius, His Conclave, published a decade before Bacon’s New Atlantis, also maps intention 
onto space, although primarily through the creation of defined interiority and the narration of 
projective thought processes.  But Donne encodes inverse of ideal and regular organization by 
outlining a society that negates all positive plans. The confusion of dystopia in Donne suggests 
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that utopia’s multiplicity is relatively easy to exploit for effect, even so near its publication. 
Ignatius makes this clear with a blending of subjectivities as Donne expands the mutliplicitous 
points of view beyond Bacon’s techniques. 
 At first glance, Donne’s Ignatius does not seem utopian by any of the standards of the 
rest of the texts in this chapter, with the aforementioned “Letter” from the Printer emphasizing 
the work as one of satire aimed against the Roman Catholic Church. Donne’s text describes a 
Jesuit’s vision of the capital city of Hell, a city that strongly resembles Rome, with various 
intellectual celebrities of the past century making their case to be admitted to Satan’s inner circle.  
Donne’s nameless narrator never offers the city as an ideal place of political organization, and 
never even praises the figures he sees there. But Donne’s text overlaps with the other texts from 
this chapter on several levels.  Although published under the name of Anonymous, the book’s 
preface begins with “The Printer to the Reader,” where the printer justifies the printing of the 
satire by citing other writers of satire such as Erasmus.The printer’s conversation with the author 
forces us to connect the material of the book to our world, while also surrounding and defining 
the contours of satire from a real world.  But Donne takes the interiority of the first person 
narrator found in the other utopian works to a higher pitch. 
 Beginning with a hail to two angel statues at the “Colledge of Sorbon” and the “Popes 
Consistory,” the narrator claims he once tried to reconcile the two schismatic Catholics of France 
and Rome represented by the angels “in these papers.”261  From this seemingly practical concern, 
the narrator then launches into the focus of his story. He flies in an “exstasie,” where he meets 
the “true enemy” of the battling factions of the church, an enemy that we will come to recognize 
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as Ignatius of Loyola, leader of the Jesuits.262  Like the end of The Republic, while in the throes 
of his religious rapture, the narrator obtains a supernatural view of the world from a point that 
seems to be outside.  Unlike the simple, regular shapes of Plato’s universe, Donne’s picture of 
the world also incorporates the architectural elements of Bacon’s or More’s utopia, as the 
narrator “had liberty to wander through all places, and to survey and reckon all the roomes, and 
all the volumes of the heavens, and to comprehend the situation, the dimensions, the nature, the 
people, and the policy, both of the swimming Ilands, the Planets, and all those which are fixed in 
the firmament.”263  Donne’s world again moves away from geometric regularity and emphasize 
an architectural organization for the universe with “roomes,” but also incorporates regular terms 
like “volumes” and “dimensions” that might be more “fixed.”   
The narrator’s overview promises a “survey,” or the ability to “comprehend the situation” 
in a single glance, which in itself could imply either an architectural plot or Plato’s view of the 
universe.  But I would align Donne’s thinking more with the Subjunctive Aesthetic’s 
architectural representations than with Plato’s more geometric view. Later, for instance, the 
narrator will re-emphasize buildings, rooms, and space. The cosmic view incorporates 
“swimming Llands,” or the “Planets,” which move through the sky as well as objects that “are 
fixed in the firmament.”  Like the architectural images from chapter one that offer fixed shapes 
that describe one possible building out of many, or Bacon’s undefined probabilities from The 
New Atlantis, the image describes a mental space where a single shapes brings with it more than 
that single shape. The swimming motion of planets aligns with the possibilities for the 
organization of space that one finds in an architectural plot, like the flies of Alma’s house. 
Donne’s brief aside is the first of many descriptions that helps set up the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
                                                 
262 This is the inverse of Plato’s Myth of Er. 
263 Ibid., 7. 
 194 
 In a reversal of the hint of otherworldiness that was implied by Utopia’s crescent shape, 
the narrator of Ignatius thinks immediately of astronomers when he enters the heavens on his 
simultaneously spiritual and material journey. He refuses to describe what he sees, ostensibly 
mocking Kepler’s supposed claim that nothing happens “in heaven without his knowledge.”264 At 
the same time he satirizes Kepler, the mention of astronomers in his religious vision and the 
humor make the heavens immediately recognizable, and blend heaven and earth together. This is 
the first reversal of Utopia’s moon on the earth, in Donne’s text. Similarly, after his tour of the 
heavens, the narrator enters Hell, mocking the vision at each step on the way by referencing the 
ridiculousness of spatial specifics, as when he stops briefly to mention the “Suburbs of Hel.” The 
mention critiques Roman Catholic theology, with its well-explored space of hell, but two 
important assumptions are made clear in this mention of “Limbo and Purgatory.” 265 First, 
Donne invokes the possibility of a spatial representation of the underworld. Second, the text 
makes spatial representations self-consciously ridiculous, nebulous, and unreliable. This is the 
mocking and doubtful counterpart to planning’s multiplicity. Ignoring the absurdity of a hell with 
suburbs, the narrative not only continues to use the notions of space it mocks but makes them 
even essential narrative devices. 
 As with Bacon’s New Atlantis, the narrator continues into hell with a very local view and 
does not immediately see an entire city, as the description of Limbo and Purgatory as suburbs 
could signal. Instead the point of view moves through a series of mysterious “inward places.” 
After passing through these quickly readers come to a “secret place, where there were not many 
beside Lucifer himself.”266 Besides Satan, certain individuals such as “Pope Boniface” and 
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“Mahomet” have “a roome” in this palace, which seems to resemble the papal compound in the 
Vatican. As satirical as the spatial description might be for Donne, the narrator uses an 
architectural representation to concoct an inner-circle for Satan’s servants in our world, again 
making a blend of otherworldly and familiar.  Here, unlike in the Republic’s Myth of Er, the 
supernatural areas are not separated from ideal space by moving circles outside material creation, 
but by rooms, specifically a “secret” room somewhere deep in the “inward places” of the Satanic 
Palace.  This secret throne-room and court of Satan provides a metaphorical description of 
Satan’s central importance in the operations of hell, as well as a condemnation of certain 
religious figures. Additionally, the separation of Satan from the rest of his city comes to have 
narrative significance.  “The gates” separating Satan from the rabble of hell, “are seldome 
opened, nor scarce oftner then once in an Age,” but the narrator is lucky enough to be present at 
once such moment.267   
The gate simultaneously provides a narrative break, material barrier, and character 
separation, but connects the real-world architecture of the Vatican with an otherworldly space. In 
this, it resembles the appearance of the astronomers in the narrator’s mention of heaven. And as 
with Donne’s blended heaven and earth, we once again we see boundaries at a moment of 
fluidity. The rest of the narrative of Ignatius, His Conclave will describe the efforts of 
individuals to gain access to Satan’s inner circle by describing how successful they have been in 
spreading sin and evil in the world through their intellectual programs. The gate can be crossed, 
but the means and probability of entering Satan’s inner-circle remain uncertain. In this 
suspension of movement, the supposed separation of the gate becomes probabilistic and 
subjunctive. It resembles the walls of Alma’s house in the first chapter. 
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 As famous Renaissance thinkers from Copernicus to Paracelsus to Machiavelli step 
forward, the reversal of the utopian trope of positive improvement takes central focus. The 
speakers use a dialogue, but not to advance an ideal social organization like Socrates does, or 
attempt to describe the best social organization that takes place in a distant land as Utopia and 
The New Atlantis do.  Instead, each speaker tries to justify how much damage they have done to 
Christendom or to the world, while simultaneously attempting to advance forward into Satan’s 
presence.  Donne’s reversal of the constructive movement of utopias to destructive movement 
may seem to make this more satire than utopian work.268 Donne takes all the tropes we have seen 
in utopias thus far and simply reverses their narrative order. For example, he eventually gets 
around to mentioning “Plato, and other fashioners of Common-wealths” but only at the climactic 
confrontation with Machievelli toward the end of the narrative, and only to mock that these 
writers “allowed the libertie of lying, to Magistrates, & to Physicians.”269  He thus focuses on 
utopian style, rather than the content. The institutions become absurdly probalistic, able to be 
completely reversed on the basic level of positivity or negativity. Furthermore, the fact that 
Donne only specifically names Plato is important, because Ignatius quite specifically reverses 
The Republic’s narrative as well. Instead of beginning with more basic forms of plans as 
Socrates does, Donne’s narrator begins by flying into heavenly ecstasy to view the cosmos in a 
single survey before taking us into Satan’s palace and introducing us to familiar figures as they 
outline more mundane forms of policy. Donne rejects Plato’s correspondence between geometric 
forms and the structure of society. Ignatius suggests that spatial representation in Hell’s cosmic 
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geography comes through via architectural understandings of the universe. Hell, in Ignatius, is 
comprehensible through the plan of the Pope’s abode. 
Ignatius’s reversal of utopian narrative progression and tone all point to multiplicity, 
suggesting that the probabilistic elements of the form lends itself to dystopic resituating even at 
this early moment in the genre’s modern development. But the primary technique that highlights 
probability in Ignatius also blends barriers is a non-architectural style of inward movement.  As 
the narrator moves to the core of Satan’s abode, he also begins to see into the thought processes 
of the individuals there.  Copernicus strikes up a conversation with Satan to justify why he 
belongs beside the fallen angel.  Following the quotation mark that defines the edge of 
Copernicus’s words, “Lucifer stuck in a mediation.  For what should he do?  It seemed dangerous 
to graunt it, to one of so great ambitions.”270  After an introduction that seems to promise 
dialogue, we instead fly into Satan’s mind and find him considering what he “should” do.  From 
this moment on, readers catch glimpses of dialogue, but mostly extensive recitations of 
monologues by Machiavelli and Satan’s puppet-master Ignatius. In addition, a huge chunk of the 
rest of Ignatius describes the thought process of each speaker. As the initial deliberation about 
what Satan should do implies, these considerations are often written in probabilistic terms.  After 
following the narrator move outside the confines of the his body, and then moving with him as 
he exits the confines of the earth, readers then encounter familiar figures, rooms, and move 
deeper into hell.  After arriving at the capital seat, most of the narrative observing the interior 
monologue of the people there. The narrator’s newfound ability to enter their thoughts continues 
his journey that blends the boundary between interior and exterior, rendering even a separation 
of minds hazy. Donne thus heightens the connection of spatial representations of thought to his 
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narrative by aligning thought with space in his narrative movement. In a more extreme version of 
Bacon’s first-person utopian encounter, Donne transforms his dystopia into a multiple first-
person account. 
Despite the reversals and expansion of utopian narrative style, I emphasize that Donne’s 
hell diverges from The Republic, New Atlantis, and Utopia, in one obvious way. Hell, although 
seemingly planned by various figures, often erupts into complete disorder as riotous mobs push 
at the gates of hell, an advisor controls a puppet monarch, and upstarts constantly threaten to 
overthrow what little order exists. By the end of the work, however, these failures define the 
contours of an ideal polity in the negative of all of Hell’s tropes. Again, Hell’s failures illustrate 
a probabilistic accompaniment of utopian success, outlining the negative image of an outcome 
through enumerating all the ways design can fail. If utopias can be aligned with planning and 
calculations of probability, then Donne’s dystopia gives the reverse, recounting all the contingent 
ways a plan goes awry without actually describing the successful plot. Donne’s text makes the 
elements of plotting explicit in the ways I mentioned, but he also suggests that Hell’s anti-
plotting can provide a plan of its own. 
Ignatius even describes the possibility of expanding Lucifer’s kingdom with a new  
“Lunatique Church,” on the surface of the moon.271  Their mentions also makes an important 
connection to gender, as Satan and Igantius’s plan to expand in this area relies on the misogynist 
argument that the Queen of the moon will be easily swayed as other female monarchs have, with 
the extensively qualified exception of Queen Elizabeth.  By claiming that Hell’s model can be 
transposed to the moon, Ignatius, His Conclave makes its utopian connections explicit. The 
lunatic society has clear parallels with other famous Renaissance tales imagining a journey that 
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incorporate elements of an ideal society on the moon. More importantly, it reverses More’s trope 
of the moon on the earth.272   
The mention of the Queen of the Moon and the long and complex comparison Ignatius 
makes with Queen Elizabeth also makes the utopian connection to planning clear. Believing that 
Hell has the ideal form of society, Satan’s personal Jesuit Ignatius plans not just to colonize the 
lunar society the way he notes North America was colonized, but use its model as a plan he can 
impose on an other social organizations. In fact, he compares this organization with the actions 
of Queen Elizabeth to critique specific “innovating” in Church policy that he finds appealing.273  
But the connection of the lunar church to Elizabethan religious policy also makes Donne’s 
mockery of utopian pretensions as actual more credible than most readers would think likely. 
Hell’s idea of exporting its ideal standards and institutions to the moon seems ridiculous, but 
Donne repeatedly condemns this for one specific reason. The Jesuits, on both earth and in hell 
combine, blur, or skip the barrier between praxis and theory.  He claims that Jesuits “never 
content themselves with the Theory in anything, but straight proceed to practise.”274 Later he 
claims that the “Pope and Lucifer love ever to follow one another’s example: And therefore that 
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which the one had done in the middle world, the other attempted in the lower.”275  Thus the 
Jesuits seem to move in a “middle world” where theory is praxis, a world best understood 
through planning’s multiplicitous mediations and the Subjunctive Aesthetic. Donne’s dystopia 
thus makes the operations of planning in the genre a self-conscious object of mockery. 
To push Donne’s satire one step more, the text’s mockery also makes interpretive 
demands on the reader that seems to resemble the close of Bacon’s later New Atlantis. Critically, 
the text is usually understood as ambiguous or is reduced to pointless satire.276 Yet Donne 
himself was famously ambivalent about the Catholic Church, wavering for years before finally 
converting and becoming the famous Doctor Donne at the personal behest of King James. The 
text also seems to invite a degree of sympathy even with the point of view of the villainous 
Ignatius himself.  We spend so much time in his mind as he schemes to maintain his power that 
sympathy becomes a side effect. But even if this affective reading is anachronistic or socially 
impossible, the cases that all the famous figures make to attempt and gain entrance to hell seem 
ambivalent at best.  From Copernicus to Machavelli, each character does their best to condemn 
their own actions, only to be told they just aren’t quite evil enough.  Readers also see these 
character’s thought processes, and their reasoning for how they might best turn the situation to 
their advantage.  Their actual moral fiber, whether or good or bad, is confusingly left open to 
interpretation.  Even Donne’s praise for Queen Elizabeth is mediated through the tepid critique 
and strange praise offered by Ignatius.  The text constructs a dystopia from unconstruction, 
suggesting that utopia can blend into dystopia through probability and point-of-view. This 
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interpretative demand multiplies the possible social institutions that might serve as models by 
offering a negative cloud of failed designs, and also explains why Donne bolsters the first-person 
experience so much in comparison to other utopian tales. Donne may critique utopian visions, 
but he also suggests that the grounds for this critique are many-shaped, requiring an interpretive 
vantage to fix any particular criticism. 
 
Ladies’ (?) Bodies (?) And Utopian Fictions 
I turn now to the longest section of this chapter, to a utopia at the end of the early modern 
period that clarifies many of the tendencies contained in More, Donne, and Bacon, but also 
throws many of their probalistic restrictions into sharp relief. Frances Yates in Ideas and Ideals 
in the North European Renaissance claims that Francis Bacon thought in images, “like a man of 
the Renaissance.”277  Yates’ words suggest a connection of image to masculinity that has been 
explored at great length by a number of critics. All of the writers in this chapter thus far could be 
called “men of the Renaissance,” and I have argued that in their building of the utopian genre 
they do think in images and in turn attempt to use these images to represent their knowledge. 
Bacon, for example, uses architecture in The New Atlantis to unpack imagery only through 
narrative and the promise of continuation. Building on Yates, I argue that although Bacon’s 
images form a key component of his work, his imagery also relies on a moving, narrative 
representation of knowledge that often encounters real material and persons, which complicates 
the masculine assumptions that accompanies authorship. Up until this point in the chapter, I have 
only touched briefly on discussion of gender. But Francis Yate’s comparison and Donne’s 
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comparison of Queen Elizabeth with the Queen of the Moon gives us a very clear connection to 
the much later utopian work by Margaret Cavendish, The Blazing World. Her narrative also 
recounts an imagistic tale of an otherworldly queen. Cavendish’s world engages the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic with intensity, finding multiplicity most especially in utopian texts. The Blazing World 
also incorporates the blending of idea and material, and I argue that Cavendish reveals that this 
blend relies on the construction of gendered categories. The Blazing World leverages these 
categories to participate in the critique of utopias embedded in the form since More, especially 
assumptions about individual authorship. Cavendish’s critique focuses on gendered categories, 
but also suggests that the geometric forms floating behind the utopias in this chapter have 
become obsolete as she introduces a protagonist-driven narrative as a defining feature. 
Stylistically, The Blazing World reflects an image-narrativity by defining a parallelism that is not 
parallel, but rather that blends in a materially non-material cloud. Cavendish, more so than any of 
the other authors in this chapter, exposes the queer heterotopic elements of utopia, the form’s 
multiplicity and probability.  
First, I want to briefly re-survey the utopias of Cavendish’s predecessors. Gender is 
important to the institutions, narrative, and imagery of the earlier texts I have explored in this 
chapter. However, the authors seem to deal directly with women or gender in a handful of 
sentences. Plato gives the most space to gender roles, but only because Socrates is compelled to 
defend his radical conception for gender equality from direct criticism. The Republic includes 
children in its universal sharing of property, and connects this to an argument that women are 
expected to engage their citizenship just as men do, as opposed to managing a defined domestic 
sphere of some kind.278 More’s Utopia is more specific in defining what women can do, and 
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more explicitly attempts to define what early modern gender could mean even in a society that 
seems to have achieved an almost egalitarian balance. In More’s commonwealth, women 
participate in labor just like men. They can be priests (although they rarely are), farmers, 
craftswomen, etc. but they are ultimately subservient to their husbands just as children are 
subservient to their parents and men are to their elders. In an important addition that suggests the 
importance of sight for embodied gender in the early modern period, More also allows for 
affianced men and women to observe the naked body of a potential spouse in order to decide on 
mutual attraction and compatibility. The New Atlantis finds this a bit too much and may even 
obliquely deride More for his suggestion, but Bacon’s commonwealth still allows for friends of 
the spouse to inspect and report on the naked body. The journal format of The New Atlantis, 
however, leaves actual experience with women outside the scope of the narrator’s quarantine.  In 
a similar way, Donne’s Hell holds the remarkable status of not including a single woman among 
the insiders of the conclave. Highlighting this absence and complicating what might seem to be a 
clear gender split, Ignatius pauses to remark explicitly on the status of ladies in the sections I 
explored in the section above. In indeterminate misogynist terms, Ignatius suggests that women 
are most susceptible to Satan’s charms, but then fails to include a single woman in Satan’s 
dystopian capital. These responses to women may seem to range widely, but they all take on 
some standard assumptions. 
Each of these utopian represents women as a gendered category that is either absent from 
the social structure, as in Donne, or that can be altered through the communal will to become 
functionally identical with men with slightly limited capacities. Socrates says very clearly that 
women will do exactly what men do in the kallipolis, including going to war and practicing 
naked physical fitness in the gymnasium, to the chagrin of some of his listeners. In Utopia, 
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women have the ability to participate in society in the same positions as men, but without the 
ability to excel to the same extent in morality or physical strength.  Yet unlike other institutions 
in Utopia that have a history in the ancient founder’s laws, readers have no clue how the ancient 
Greek-influenced culture of General Utopus led him to enact an equality of the sexes to any 
degree. More’s narrator seems to take as self-evident that freedom to pursue a talent and 
communal efficiency simply give rise to the equal labor of both sexes.279 Even more than the 
labor of cutting away the peninsula into an island, More’s text suggests that the switch to the 
employment of women can happen rapidly with focused and communal effort. Bacon’s text 
spends even less time describing the general status of women. Besides the mention of Adam and 
Eve pools where friends observe the naked body of a potential spouse, only one brief line that 
suggests women are employed in the various scientific enterprises on the island. For the 
Baconian utopia, women are the raw material of visual imagery, to be viewed by men and in 
return to view men for the purposes of childbearing. 
The cumulative effect of each of these treatments suggests women are the unprocessed 
sources of human material to be manipulated and shaped by utopian plans. Although not simply 
vessels for the production of children in any of these works, women’s bodies and behaviors 
become the most radically altered even by the extreme standards of the texts involved. As my 
earlier analysis suggests, the commonwealths achieve this change without any suggestion of a 
single woman’s volition or opinion. In Frederic Jameson’s analysis of the utopian genre’s early 
modern origins that I outlined at the beginning of the chapter, I see a repetition of the theoretical 
manipulation of embodied females in the utopian texts. Trying to outline the pleasures of abstract 
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construction, he mentions Cavendish’s utopia, specifically in conjunction with an infantilized 
“pleasure” and “play.”  Although Jameson claims this concept of pleasure applies to other 
utopias, the specific citation of a woman’s work at this moment is revealing because one page 
previous he claims that the utopian genre escapes the “erotic economy” to focus on en economic 
one. Although he makes an equivalence of erotic power to economic power, he divides the 
two.280  The economic pleasure is mediated through some kind of femininity for Jameson, the 
raw material for a theoretical definition of the genre. His analysis reflects the earlier utopias, but 
also downplays the gendered complications of the texts. 
A utopian connection between raw material and femininity is complicated for several 
reasons. To begin, I have already argued that the Subjunctive Aesthetic blurs the distinction 
between material and non-material in order to construct a contingent narrative.  Secondly, men of 
all social standings also become raw material to be shaped by the utopian institutions in each of 
these texts.  Plato may claim that stereotypically masculine endeavors like wrestling and war fit 
the women of his new Republic better than stereotypically feminine traits. But even he blends 
gendered tropes by suggesting that men whose skills incline them in the direction of child rearing 
will help in the raising of children.  More argues even more clearly than Plato that masculinity 
changes under different institutions, as war and even violent activity becomes unacceptable to 
the Utopians.  The plasticity of gender roles, and the blending of stereotypically feminine or 
masculine pursuits and traits suggest the contingency involved in narratives of probability, even 
if More and Plato leave the specific explorations in a handful of sentences. Their minor asides 
seem to suggest a fluid notion of sexuality, or at least a blended range of possibilities beyond a 
dichotomy of sexes. I do not want to overstate the potential feminism of these texts—women 
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remain categorically inferior to men in them, even with their expanded range of probable social 
roles. Bacon and Donne, for example, generally pass over the presence of women. And when 
Donne actually discusses femininity, the narrative’s tone becomes jarring, devolving on tropes 
about female weakness and inability to be productive beyond childbearing.  Bacon and Donne’s 
texts may seem to depart from More and Plato, but they assume a comfortable category of 
femininity, and only clarify that women receive very little discussion in utopian texts because 
their pliability is aligned more comfortably with material embodiment. The Blazing World, 
playing up the Subjunctive Aesthetic, upends the earlier assumptions and renders a gendered 
multiplicity alongside the utopian mixture of theoretical and material. 
The Blazing World depicts and undermines the categorical manipulation of women by 
designs from its first pages by beginning with a man “extremely in love with a young Lady” who 
attempts to “execute his design” of either marrying or “obtaining” her.281 In opposition to 
Jameson’s division of the erotic and the economy, design and desire are not equivalent in the 
introduction to Cavendish’s narrative, but they blend into each other when the object of each is a 
Lady.282 The abductor’s plan almost comes to fruition when he steals the Lady and takes to sea. 
A cloud of contingent events, however, thwart his plot when a storm moves them off their 
expected course to the frozen north seas where all the men eventually freeze to death.  The 
narrator gives an “Alas,” to the sailors, focusing mainly on their lack of a sensible plot for 
sailing, “not knowing whither they went, nor what was to be done in so strange an adventure, and 
not being provided for so cold a voyage, were all frozen to death.”  The lady meanwhile survives 
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“by the light of her beauty, the heat of her youth, and the protection of the gods.”283 The 
abductor’s plan and the manipulation of a female body become untenable because navigation, 
like other forms of projection, relies on probability. In the course of these ranging encounters 
with probability, the Lady’s material body pushes back against masculine designs to alter the 
conditions of the plan. The lady’s ostensible objectified status even saves her from a cold death, 
allowing her to survive where the men all die.  As the narrative continues, readers discover that 
this environment is not just an extreme point of our own world, but rather the connection to 
another world that touches our own “Pole to Pole.” 
 This is the second utopian work in this chapter that mentions another world beyond earth.  
The first was Donne’s mention of the lunar Queen. But Plato’s Myth of Er and More’s 
suggestions that Utopia is in fact a “non-place,” also seem to suggest that a key component of 
utopian fictions involve positing a type of world-creation or parallel world. Donne’s offer of a 
lunar church, and Bacon’s Bensalemite mines and towers that reach high into the sky and deep 
into the earth suggest similar possibilities. The narrator of The Blazing World claims that the 
parallel world her protagonist enters is only one of many, all of which are invisible because the 
light of our sun blinds us to the presence of these worlds. In my terms, the “Lady” protagonists’s 
entry into one of these other worlds comes because she is forced to engage the plans of her 
would-be abductor. The other world she enters eschews the narrative intentions of the potential 
rapist, exploring a counter-possibility that is parallel but mutually constituative. Cavendish’s 
introduction suggests that by believing that only the man has a narrative design ignores an entire 
other probable world implied by the necessity of this design, specifically the Lady’s own 
intentions. By making a plan the entrepot into a new world, Cavendish makes the continuum of 
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utopia and plan apparent. She also reveals the gendered assumptions inherent in a utopian 
separation regarding the author’s intention.   
The protagonist exploits the probability of the Subjunctive Aesthetic to confront 
masculine intention, rendering her as a character capable of resisting the stereotypical 
movements of gendered categories. Both gender and authorship conflate in this protagonist’s 
rapid crossing of worlds. The other texts in this chapter make some claim of a shared reality with 
our own, but the unnamed “Lady” protagonist’s experience in crossing over to the new world 
suggests that these other worlds of utopian fictions are fabrications by multiple authors, readers, 
and characters, not just the vision of an male author. In the new world with unfamiliar materials, 
the Lady quickly meets unfamiliar beings. First she encounters “bears…upright like men,” but 
then comes across multiple races of upright beings, including fox-men, bird-men, and “grass-
green” men.284  They bring her, without her understanding or consent, to the Blazing World’s 
Emperor who, like the man with designs upon her in her own world, marries her without 
consulting her wishes (he makes a show of worshipping her first). The moment offers a gendered 
connection uniting both worlds in a parallel but distinct fashion. In the Blazing World, abduction 
seems slightly more acceptable not because the spouse is the Emperor of a world, but because in 
this parallel world the “Lady” is able to engage in open design of her own. The wedding and her 
relationship to the Emperor receive no description. Indeed, the only significant thing about the 
marriage at this point is that the Emperor “gave her an absolute power to rule and govern all that 
world as she pleased.” 285 After a view of the new Empress’s extensively described 
“accoutrement” we move to her curious investigation into the ordering of the new world, as she 
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reorganizes it to fit her desires. The Lady has her own plans in the blazing world, instead of 
being forced to deal with the designs of men. 
The reversal of the protagonist’s social power from the beginning of the narrative to her 
encounter with the Emperor is quick and remarkable, made even more remarkable by the 
possibility that the new Empress is the only public woman in this parallel world. The word 
“man” or “men” describes each of the beings in this strange world of animal castes, even 
including worm-men, and readers only find out later in a conversation about prayer that women 
stay in the home to pray.286 Cavendish’s publically homosocial Blazing World suggests that the 
Lady’s unaccountability within the strange world’s social order allows her a unique position that 
compels the inhabitants of the Blazing World to worship her as a deity and invest her with 
extreme amounts of power. The Lady encounters the plans of men in both her world and the 
Blazing World, and although the plans would control her behavior the utopian frame also gives 
her a unique ability to reverse her position. She survives abduction because the male plans failed 
to account for contingency. In this new world, instead of mere survival, the Lady takes charge 
and sets out uncovering the Blazing World’s underlying structure and re-ordering it according to 
scientific principles.  She becomes a kind of avatar of the Subjunctive Aesthetic as soon as she 
ascends the throne. 
 The New Empress has big plans, and the first thing she does is survey the epistemologies 
of her world: 
Of these several sorts of men, each followed such a profession as was most proper for the 
nature of their species, which the Empress encouraged them in, especially those that had applies 
themselves to the study of several arts and sciences; for they were as ingenious and witty in the 
invention of profitable and useful arts, as we are in our world, nay more; and to that end she 
erected schools, and founded several societies.  The bear-men were to be her experimental 
philosophers, the bird-men her astronomers, the fly-, worm-, and fish-men her natural 
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philosophers, the ape-men her chemists, the satyrs her Galenic physicians, the fox-men her 
politicians, the spider- and lice-men her mathematicians, the jackdaw-,magpie- and parrot-men 
her orators and logicians, the giant her architects, etc.287 
 
This description transforms the Empress into a surveyor of many different sorts of “men.” 
It also bookends specialized fields of knowledge with architecture and the language of 
architecture. Before the description, “the empress erected schools, and founded several 
societies,” and then the list of her animal scholars ends with the giant “architects.” This might 
suggest that by the time Cavendish writes The Blazing World, the connections of institutional 
knowledge-based statecraft to architectural mastery seem obvious. Again, however, I would 
suggest we resist this teleological urge. In the third chapter I suggested a similar connection of 
knowledge systems to architecture in my comparison of John Dee with Bacon. But there I argued 
the connection is adversarial. Like Dee’s outline of knowledge in his preface to Euclid or 
Bacon’s survey of epistemology in Novum Organum, the fields that Cavendish lists in this 
catalogue associate architecture with disciplines utilizing spatial and mathematical projection, 
such as astronomy. But Cavendish also associates architecture and projection-based disciplines 
with natural sciences such as those described by Bacon, for example experimental philosophy.288  
If we look at the Empress’s survey and retooling of the Blazing World’s scholarly 
disciplines out of context, we might be tempted to conclude that the instrumental use of the 
Subjunctive Aesthetic necessarily leads to a deified monarch who uses plans of systems to 
reinforce state power and vice-versa—a very modern world, even if a woman pulls the strings. 
Indeed, the Lady argues with representatives from each scholarly species in order to fix fields of 
knowledge while shoring up the stability of her political order. Also suggesting a prototype of 
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the military-industrial complex, the Empress eventually goes on to use her knowledge of these 
disciplines to plan and execute the invasion of yet another world in the second part of The 
Blazing World.289 This invasion even involves submarines and a strangely modern type of bomb.  
But the most convincing suggestion that the Blazing World predicts a modern regime of 
carefully planned knowledge is the extensive discussion of authority in the creation or invasion 
of new worlds. In the course of her scholarly interrogations, the Empress meets spirits who 
inform her that infinite worlds exist. She even meets Margaret Cavendish during a spiritual 
projection into another world. Furthermore, the Empress even attempts to secure the Duchess 
Cavendish a world of her own.  
In isolation these details support Jameson’s assessment of the utopian genre as the 
workshop for the social imaginary that feeds into the modern state, and the continued domination 
of women. In particular, Cavendish’s suggestion that architecture forms a model for organizing 
knowledge for the state feeds into terms like “superstructure” and “infrastructure.”290 The text 
also gives credence to McKeon’s idea that utopian writings lead to the novel by looking ahead to 
tropes we find familiar. During the course of The Blazing World, Margaret Cavendish appears as 
a character. The insertion of the author as a character and an emphasis on an author-function 
seems particularly novelistic. In a discourse on the pleasure of authoring a world, and what 
seems to be a blatant display of weak model theory, the Duchess character/author even goes 
through several patterns for an imaginary world, beginning with Pythagoras, going through 
Plato, continuing to Hobbes and others, finding each of these authorities deficient.291  
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I acknowledge this is one potential reading of the text, but I emphasize it as a potential 
one. I also see parallel narratives that interact with and occasionally differ from this teleology. 
The outline Cavendish presents here has several obstacles to marking The Blazing World as the 
inauguration of a fixed world of human behavior, of science, or even probability. To begin, the 
dialogue between the Empress and her scholar-species is a dialogue. Although sometimes she 
agrees with the assessments of her advisors, she also finds them confusing, unhelpful, or 
incomprehensible. Occasionally, as with her “Galenic” fish-men or the “worm-men” her 
interrogation leaves open questions, without deciding questions of natural philosophy in any 
particular direction, demanding more interpretation along the lines of Bacon’s utopia.292 She has 
as much information to offer them as they do to her. Second, the inclusion of architects and 
orators alongside each other in the rolls of scholars also forestalls the suggestion of complete 
control. The Empress interrogates each of her castes, but she never has a conversation with her 
architects. In this absence, readers have the suggestion of a connection to the second-to-last 
group, the orators and logicians, who come last in the Empress’s interrogation. But when the 
Empress finally questions them she mocks their syllogisms. Does her mockery extend to the 
architects?  Presumably not, since their caste is the one that will later build the submarines that 
allow her invasion of another world. Yet the connection of the architecture in oratory in her list, 
and the Empress’s emphasis of their duties as “art,” suggests that Cavendish has a Vitrivuian 
idea of an architect—a broad-minded builder focused on the practical application of theoretical 
abilities. Architecture does not transform the knowledge outlined here into tools for the state, but 
connects disparate theoretical concerns into practice without foreclosing any particular use. 
Architecture, for Cavendish, does not fix. It blends. 
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Ultimately, the author as a character actually poses the biggest challenge to a teleological 
reading that would define Cavendish’s utopia as a blueprint for a modern text. Authority, for 
Cavendish, becomes multiply occupied, both material and imaginative. This is most acute during 
a long sequence describing spirits that illustrates the connection of gender, authority, and 
materiality in the field of planning. As I mentioned above, the spirits consulted in The Blazing 
World help the Empress in her quest to find out about her old world. The Empress uses the term 
“immaterial spirits” to describe these beings, who also have their immateriality confirmed by the 
fly-men who summon them. This immateriality is hazy and doubtful, however, as the Empress’s 
advisors note that the immaterial beings can use matter for clothing. After this initial tension that 
blends material and non-material comes an even bigger difficulty for defining materiality in the 
following parenthetical, “After the spirits had presented themselves to the Empress, (in what 
shapes or forms I cannot exactly tell).”293 Even when wearing their material clothes and 
conversing with the Empress, the spirits do not have a defined shape. According to the spirits’ 
extensive conference with the Empress, spirits believe that materials can act upon them as they 
can act upon material. “Natural material bodies give spirits motion,” they say.294 The Empress 
remains skeptical. Here, The Blazing World is positioned in the dispute between the theoretical 
and material of the strange spirits. The spirits consistently work to achieve the aims of the 
Empress once she makes contact with them. Like plans, although they cannot act on materials 
and are not materials themselves, somehow they have an effect on materials. But most 
importantly in undoing authority in utopia, these spirits become the conduit through which the 
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Empress contacts the author Margaret Cavendish, making her a spiritual “scribe” for a proposed 
“Cabbala” that will explain the Empress’s survey of knowledge. 
As this spiritual contact suggests, the appearance of the spirits does more than just blend 
material and theoretical. As they are described, the parenthetical “(in what shapes or forms I 
cannot exactly tell)” also interjects with the voice of the narrator who has been absent from the 
text until this point. The narrator and author are as confused here as they are in other utopian 
texts—unable to define forms “exactly,” just as the spirit’s forms cannot be defined. This, 
“exactly,” construes materiality as provisionally defined, unable to quite fit in a single shape or 
form. At the same time, the parenthetical introduction of the author inaugurates a blending of 
text and authority that reduces the amount of control exerted by designs or plans.  Up to this 
point, The Blazing World seems to emphasize a masterful unitary authority in the creation of a 
social plan through the Empress’s sprawling survey of knowledge. But the parenthesis surround 
another voice that disagrees with the Empress, opening a new world in the text itself. One might 
simply wish to claim this voice is the same authority, as the spirits suggest that the creation of 
the world is the ultimate form of control. But the author hinted by this parenthetical aside is 
actually summoned into the narrative of The Blazing World as a scribe at the behest of the 
Empress. This allows for a shared authority between text and author, as designs begin to generate 
their own counsel and modify the narrative of The Blazing World. Once in the world, 
Cavendish’s avatar advises the Empress against a plan to concoct a Cabbala to unravel the 
mysteries of the universe.  Thus, the designs of the state that Cavendish authors become 
modified from within the narrative by counter-probabilities. In turn, the Empress will exert 
influence on Cavendish’s world.   
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The main way the Empress influences the Duchess is through the push to design her own 
world. All the other utopias surveyed have attempted to connect a self-conscious fantasy to the 
real world via the insertion of the author or characters that seem familiar. Cavendish dramatizes 
this by actually visiting the world she creates as a character. The design of her world does not 
simply proceed from her mind though, as the spirits claim. The author is summoned by the text 
itself.  In fact, the character of Cavendish laments her inability to achieve her own designs. As 
she attempts to create her own world she works through the designs of other philosophers and 
writers, dismissing “Pythagoras” in particular because “She was so puzzled with numbers, how 
to order and compose the several parts, that she having no skill in arithmetic was forced also to 
desist from the making of the world.”295 She then dismisses Plato’s designs for focusing too 
much on the motion of thought. She is more sympathetic to other systems. Her other worlds 
include literary examples, Hobbesian philosophy, and even other utopias, in a reveal that evokes 
the genre-overlaps of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. Although she does not embrace any of these 
other probable worlds, she includes them together, emphasizing the validity and connection of 
each.  
The Duchess eventually comes to design her own world, the world that presumably 
becomes published as The Blazing World. Cavendish emphasizes the Subjunctive Aesthetic in 
her description.  “When the Duchess saw that no patterns would do her any good in the framing 
of her world; she resolved to make a world of her own invention, and this world was composed 
of sensitive and rational self-moving matter.” The world is so perfect it “cannot possibly be 
expressed by words, nor the delight and pleasure which the Duchess took in making this world of 
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her own.”296  The substitution of “invention” for “pattern” in describing the worlds of Plato and 
Pythagores evokes the language of architecture, and also connects this type of planning to 
utopian fluidity. The emphasis of “self-moving matter” emphasizes the world’s moving-picture 
quality, locating narrative in what would otherwise be a frozen image of a world.  This image 
cannot be expressed by words, and yet in a seeming paradox Cavendish does exactly that with 
the text of The Blazing World. The paradox relates back to the earlier parenthetical aside of 
“what shapes I cannot exactly tell.”  The narrative alone does not express the Duchess’s world, 
but the narrative in conjunction with images gives a probable outline of the one perfect universe.  
Furthermore, the aesthetic pleasure of this ordering is emphasized as well. Far from Jameson’s 
assertion that this ordering is distant from an erotic economy, the genitive that ends this 
paragraph, “in making the world of her own,” seems to suggest the providential power of God 
that connects to erotic generation, similar to the images from Milton in the second chapter. 
The Duchess’s “making,” differs from heteronormative models of generativity. To begin, 
she creates her world alone, explicitly rejecting male models such as Plato or Pythagoras. 
Emphasizing this, the act is called “making” and not “creating” or something more explicitly 
sexualized. But the fantasy is not quite parthenogenic either.  Before this moment, when the 
Empress initially summons the presumably authorial Duchess of Newcastle, the gender dynamics 
of creating worlds become difficult to reduce to standard tropes.  As Margaret Cavendish comes 
to the Blazing World as the Empress’s choice to write down the Cabbala, the Empress claims, 
“This lady then…will I choose for my scribe, neither will the Emperor have reason to be jealous, 
she being one of my own sex.”  The spirits she engages to obtain Cavendish respond, “In 
truth…husbands have reason to be jealous of platonic lovers, for they are very dangerous, as 
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being not only very intimate and close, but subtle and insinuating.”297  Upon the arrival of 
Cavendish’s spirit, “the Empress embraced and saluted her with a spiritual kiss.”298 Soon they 
are “platonic lovers, although they were both females.”299  This platonic sharing eventually ties 
into their imaginary worlds, as they are able to completely share their creations with each other. 
Instead of Jameson’s model of a non-erotic pleasure to Utopia, Cavendish suggests that utopia 
does not escape eroticism, but queers the movements of pleasure. 
The moments where the Lady and Cavendish’s author share minds and bodies in a 
probabilistic setting defines the multiplicity of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. The pleasure of their 
sharing renders utopia building as a distinct exercise, both literary and practical, that allows for a 
multiply situated authority. Cavendish makes utopia a project of epistemology, but an 
epistemology that interacts with and even incorporates disparate narratives of knowing. The 
Blazing World is a single world that contains many worlds, a utopia that defines the probalistic 
connections among utopias. These utopias happen in the same anachronistic time-frame, 
accessible from within and between each other in both body and mind, exemplifying the ranging 
image-narratives of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
 
Looking Back and Looking Forward in the Subjunctive Aesthetic 
Early modern utopias seem to create a genre that looks toward the future.  As we have 
seen, this forward looking is complicated by the simultaneous sideways push into distant lands, 
policy, supernatural worlds, or self-consciously geometric abstraction. Cavendish most clearly 
illustrates that utopias do not define a future, whether through geometry or minutely controlled 
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architectonics. Instead, utopias move through multiple coexisting probable organizations that 
have elements that interact and overlap. We can see a similar movement in Donne’s Ignatius, as 
well. Bacon’s The New Atlantis bridges the gap between an overarching social program as he 
outlined in Novum Organum and the operations of an entertaining narrative. Both Bacon’s plans 
for a new science and his utopian intervention utilize shapes and narrative in order to illustrate 
their institutional and policy abstractions. The real difference between utopia and Plato’s earlier 
piece lies in their narrativity. Plato’s narrative is defined by an isolated world, whereas in More, 
Bacon, Donne, and Cavendish, a world becomes constructed as readers move through it. These 
new worlds are not defined as belonging to the future or the past, or even at a distant location in 
another part of the world. They are defined as mutually intelligible probable courses for the 
social environment they emerge from and critique. 
Still, the sensation that utopias predict aspects of our current institutions persists. 
Although this may be the inevitable nature of narrative itself, I would suggest that we remember 
the operations of probability to resist seeing a direct relationship between these subjunctive 
narratives and our current world. As we look back to the past, we often forget that people in the 
past are looking back at us. They may see aspects of our situation, but there are also parts they 
would fail to recognize due to a rejection of the unlikely. Likewise, the way we make sense of 
behavior in the past relies heavily on what we expect to find, and we will continually revise this 
understanding as we sift through evidence and focus on different specifics. In both temporal 
directions, and whatever our vantage point in time, particularly at moments when planning 
happens, probability becomes the lens through which we interpret stories and the unfolding of 
history. Utopias are the genre looking most clearly to the future according to many critics and 
readers, but they do not do so comprehensively or in a way that forecloses other possibilities. As 
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a form of entertainment made from plans, they move self-consciously through multiple 
coexisting narratives of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 220 
Chapter 5 
"Nothing Is But What Is Not”: Shakespeare’s Script and the Contingency of the Stage in Three 
Historical Tragedies 
 
 In the four previous chapters I outlined the operations of an aesthetic grounded in non-
linear, probabilistic, and spatial thinking that combines aspects of both image and narrative.  For 
the most part, each of these texts and images I discussed, as well as the genres that they 
represent, stayed on a page (or a canvas).  Whether painting, woodcut, dystopian tale, or epic 
poem, the element of embodied human performance and material hovered in the background, 
obscured by the imaginative activity of reading or viewing these texts.  Even with the buildings 
produced by plan that I analyze, the Subjunctive Aesthetic remained static. Accessing potential 
in materiality is difficult. The buildings plotted by the plans, whether they stand or not, are 
museums and ruins, requiring a viewer’s imagination to reconstruct the narrative of its planning, 
hiding the labor and motion that appears in design.  In some ways, this invisible haunting makes 
sense, as the potential of the Subjunctive Aesthetic haunts the dead remains of a once-occupied 
building. However, as I have suggested since Spenser’s narrator entered Alma’s house, the 
Aesthetic is not just imaginative or ghostly—it is material. In this chapter, I turn to the 
Shakespearean theater, where matter returns with a vengeance in order to illustrate that bodies 
never left the considerations of plotting. A play’s narrative relies on inhabiting the physical space 
of the stage that doubles as imaginative space for the play, paralleling the spatial mediation of 
the Subjunctive Aesthetic.  In at least one way, the requirement that the audience imagine a fixed 
space for the activity of the theater is the inverse of the plans in the first chapter. Viewers must 
construct an imaginary place from the material narrative unfolding before their eyes in real time. 
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At the same time, the theater adds a broader form of projective narrative to the scope of the 
dissertation. Although perhaps more clear in their exploration of probability in space, 
architectural images rarely appeared in the lives of most people.  Works like Utopia and 
Paradise Lost also remained out of the ken of many.  Even an illiterate individual, however, 
could go watch a performance of Macbeth, King Lear, or King John and deal with the complex 
chronology of planning, register the subjunctive potential of projection, and feel the emotions 
contained by the narrative.   
 This chapter focuses on the historical tragedies of King Lear, Macbeth, and King John, 
works that deal with how aristocrats and royalty construct and destroy political regimes in 
historical time.  Although each play seems concerned with lofty matters of state, however, the 
speech, the words, the space, and the special effects of the theater all serve to show the ways in 
which the Subjunctive Aesthetic may have infiltrated the imaginations of people who would 
never have participated in stately deliberations or architectural planning. In the performance of 
these plays, I find a wider self-consciousness about the promises and dangers of enumerated 
planning in early modern England, as audiences access complex negotiations of probability. 
Specifically, this chapter argues that the three historical tragedies perform a probability that 
haunts fixed representations of prophecy, national borders, and history with a range of contingent 
outcomes. I also analyze the way these three plays derive an impetus from navigating probability 
by looking backwards in history. Ultimately, I connect this backward-looking navigation of 
plotting to current critical approaches to theater, suggesting that multiplicity should be an 
integral method for approaching performance. 
Developing the promise on the word Aesthetic to indicate a multi-media artistic presence, 
this chapter uncovers the same imagistic representational strategies on stage that I also found in 
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text, draught, and painting.  In order to make this argument for an audience’s imaginative 
response, I reconstruct a multiplicitous audience in a way that may occasionally run counter to 
historical notions of what an early modern audience would be aware of, but that nonetheless 
emerges from script of the plays. Anachronism, as I have shown repeatedly, is a key feature of 
the Subjunctive Aesthetic. By focusing on the performance of these plays, I do not just bring the 
Subjunctive Aesthetic back to material human bodies on a stage or into a new medium; I also 
hope to outline the emotional resonances of the seeming abstractions of a plan. In these works, 
projective considerations are moving. They cause joy and bring pain. Although the trickery of 
The Alchemist or Petrucchio’s plans in The Taming of the Shrew could also work well for this 
chapter, I have narrowed my focus to tragedies to closely explore the emotional impact that 
planning has in a sense of lost possibilities. In my other chapters, multiplicity seemed to add to 
perception, making positive readings where there only seemed restrictive interpretation. In 
contrast, the acute emotional power of these plays suggests that a sense of lost possibilities is 
only made possible by a sharp awareness of contingency—the audience knows, for example, that 
Lear could have done things differently. This sense of loss, both of identity and life, contributes 
to queer readings of the tragedies, connecting to the loss implied by normative and linear 
models.300  As this suggest, in addition to the tragic component, I also chose history to continue 
exploring the Aesthetic’s strange relationship with linear time.  
In the first section of the chapter, I compare the movement of prophecy and planning in 
Macbeth, suggesting that rational engagement with a supernatural knowledge of the future skews 
that future into equivocation and multiplicity. This argument is a continuation and embodiment 
of the notions of Providence outlined in chapters one and two. Then I survey the way that flat 
                                                 
300 For an influential argument and an initiator of this recent trend see Edelman, Lee. No Future 
(Raleigh: Duke University Press, 2004). 
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spatial enumeration of a divided kingdom in King Lear threatens to divide the entire kingdom 
into a nothingness of fixed possibility. Lear’s planned dissection and arresting of his kingdom, I 
argue, creates an institutional force that moves outside seemingly normative lines of intention, 
working against the very borders that division would seem to create. I also tie this process to the 
making and unmaking of certain boundaries of subjectivity. In the third part of the chapter, I turn 
to the ways King John’s potential projections transform history by rendering its constant 
promises—even tragic promises—unfulfilled by the narrative of history. As in Macbeth, King 
John’s plans defines an intention that moves in a range, frustrating avowed goals even as 
planning makes them achievable. I conclude by tying the plays’ historical navigation of 
probability to my own practice as a literary critic who looks backward in history. 
 
Prophecy and Tomorrows 
“Present fears/ are less than horrible imaginings./  My thought, whose murder yet is but 
fantastical,/ shakes so my single state of man that function is smothered in surmise,/ and nothing 
is but what is not” (Macbeth, 1.3.136-41)301 
 
As the planned moment for undertaking his murderous “imaginings” on King Duncan 
draws closer, Macbeth agonizes over the explosive power of possibilities.  He feels his “single 
state” shaking, threatening to break his identity apart, and finally ends this monologue in a 
paradox that connects existence to nonexistence via imagination. Yet the “surmise” he speaks of 
is not a nightmare. His thoughts are established courses of action already discussed with his wife.  
He wavers here, but eventually the appeal of power becomes too much and, when the 
opportunity presents itself, Macbeth murders Duncan, frames the king’s retainers, and seizes the 
                                                 
301 The quotations from all three plays, including both Folio and Quarto versions of Lear, come 
from the Norton edition. Shakespeare, William. The Norton Shakespeare Eds. Greenblatt, 
Stephen, Walter Cohen, Jean Howard, Katharine Eisaman Maus, (New York: Norton, 2005). 
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throne.  For a whole act before the coup, however, and for nearly the entirety of the rest of the 
narrative, the play’s action amounts to a consideration of how to achieve rulership. The 
tangibility of imagined courses of action is one of the defining features of Macbeth, bolstered by 
the play’s supernatural emphasis on ghosts and prophecy. But this palpability of probability often 
passes unremarked in critical discussions of the play.302 Gil Harris in Untimely Matter in the Age 
of Shakespeare, however, provides a reading that touches on probability by focusing on time. 
According the Harris, the stink of stage squibs used to make thunder suggests the explosive 
intrusion of the past into the present, offering a temporality that does not move in a linear way 
through past, present, and future, a movement Harris and other critics have criticized as 
“heteronormative.” In particular, Harris’s last thought is tantalizing.  He claims Macbeth’s final 
moments reveal “another temporality…in it, two seemingly different and even opposing 
moments are conjoined.”303  
If linear time has been associated with heteronormativity, as critics like Harris and Carla 
Freccero claim, then projection in Macbeth adds an unnatural and queer mode of narrative to the 
temporal movement of the play.  It transforms even a certain future into a single possibility 
overlapping many others.  In this dissertation, I have repeatedly demonstrated this idea when 
deliberations occur in early modern writing. Running alongside this notion of multiplicity, the 
play also suggests that certain types of magic, alchemy, or knowledge can theoretically make the 
future knowable. Repeated confirmation of these prophecies would seem to corroborate that 
there is a single future. Supporting this notion is the fact that prophecy is not a literary conceit 
                                                 
302 The connection of tragedy and certain prophecy is as ancient as Oedipus. For one take see 
Calderwood, James. If It Were Done: Macbeth and Tragic Action (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1986). There are hundreds of other articles in this vein, but most don’t treat 
probability as a factor. For one analysis that works against this trend, see Reynolds, Bryan. 
Transversal Enterprises (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). 
303 Harris. Untimely Matter, 139. 
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nor is it strictly demonic and evil. In chapter three, as John Dee predicted the future for the 
English state as the official state prophet to Queen Elizabeth, I also analyzed a Providential and 
unitary future. Alchemists like Dee who saw the future in their scrying glasses believed in this 
providential chronology, a future that can be obscured by the hand of God or demon, but unified 
nonetheless.  In Queer / Early / Modern Carla Freccero argues that this understanding of a linear 
unified history is heteronormative and limiting—it not only denies the creative potential of 
anachronism when we interpret the past, but also denies the ghostly presence of the past in the 
present moment.  Harris finds Freccero’s chronology in Macbeth, locating England’s Catholic 
past inscribed into and exploding out of the squibs of the theater. He associates this intermingling 
of categories of time first with the equivocation of crytpo-Catholic plotting against James from 
within the state.  But he also associates the doubling with differing chronologies: the ritual time 
of a Catholic past and the empty homogenous time of the Protestant now.304  Harris notes this 
absence of ritual time is distilled in the line “nothing is but what is not.”  I agree. I also argue that 
probability is more helpful in understanding this moment and the play as a whole than time. In 
order to make this argument, I must contrast prophecy with probabilistic calculations like 
planning. 
King James’s Daemonologie—a work critically associated with Macbeth that confronts 
witchcraft—uses a version of Providence to define the prophetic power of witches.305 One of the 
                                                 
304 Ibid., 139. 
305 The field of witchcraft in early modern England, even confining myself to Macbeth, is too 
massive to summarize here. For the direct connection of King James to the play, an authoritative 
example is Paul, Henry. The Royal Play of Macbeth (New York: Macmillan, 1950). Sharon 
Jaesch’s article “Political Prophecy and Macbeth’s ‘Sweet Bodements’” gives a helpful overview 
as well, arguing that that prophecy is often political, using ancient tropes in new situations to 
represent new hopes and fears, relating this to the witchcraft James feared so much. She also 
captures the multiplicity of prophetic interpretation. Shakespeare Quarterly. Vol. 34, No. 3 
(Autumn, 1983), 290-7.  
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first problems the dialogue associates with witchcraft is the ability of devils in “foretelling of 
things to come,” which the speaker claims is impossible because the Bible mandates the future is 
only available to demons “either as being worldlie wise, and taught by an continuall 
experience…judges by likelie-hood of thinges to come, according to the like that hath passed 
before, and the naturall causes, in respect of the vicissitude of all thinges worldly: Or else by 
Gods employing of him in a turne, and so foreseene thereof.”306 For King James there is only one 
future, even if the future accessed is via supernaturally demonic or holy means.  James’s seeming 
clarification of how demons know the future also contains an ambiguous choice that resonates 
with Macbeth—even devils can use the certain terms of prophecy if God employs them against 
their will in his own “turne.” Whether god or demon, supernatural prophecy follows the same 
timeline as “natural” cause and effect. 
A good/evil ambivalence in prediction is unproblematic for James as both prophecy and 
devil’s lies are meant to pull willful sinners into damnation through Providence.307  One reading 
of the play might also claim that the witches’ prophecies similarly lure Macbeth to his tragic 
doom. Bryan Reynolds in what he calls in Transversal Enterprises suggests a different route, 
finding “potentialities in instabilities” in Macbeth, as the play essentially puts James’ position 
under scrutiny.308  Indeed, the play contains a series of predictions and prolepsis that are fulfilled 
over and over. In presenting these, the play seeks to define what happens when prophecy 
accurately predicts a new King of Scotland without providing the specific means that this 
teleology will come to pass. One of the first results of this prophetic knowledge given to 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
306 James I.  Daemonologie (Edinburgh: Robert Walde-Grave Printer to the King’s Majestie, 
1597), 5 
307 James uses the word “tragedy” in this section to describe the results of prediction. 
308 Reynolds, Bryan.  Transversal Enterprises, 19. 
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Macbeth is a suspension of linear time in order to make a plan incorporating this prophecy.  
After the witches make their ambivalent prophecy and disappear, Macbeth laments a parallel 
possible present with a desire, “Would they had stayed” (1.3.80). By uttering the line he enters a 
mental space that splits time into multiple possible times.  After this entry into a probable world, 
Macbeth continues to encounter the prophecy he received from the witches with provisional 
language. “Your children shall be kings,” he predicts to Banquo (1.3.80, 84).  In terms of action, 
when events verify the witches’ prophecies, Macbeth prevaricates instead of leaping into 
damnation, and slowing his movement toward what he perceives as an inevitable goal.  While 
“smothered in surmise” Macbeth waffles, but more importantly he begins moving in a form of 
imaginary narrative that is not reliably linear (1.3.136-41). 
As he returns home the prophecy precedes Macbeth to his castle in the form of a letter 
even before he tells Lady Macbeth how he will deal with the prediction.  Based on his letter and 
this information, his wife to form her own calculations about the probability of Macbeth being 
“crowned withal” (I.5.27).309 This seems to signal an arrival of a certain future, but when 
Macbeth arrives she must exhort him to act because he remains non-committal.  In fact, the next 
scene has him continue to contemplate his options in a monologue beginning, “If it were done 
when tis done, then twere well it were done quickly” (1.7.1). Again, the subjunctive appears. 
With the initial nudge of this supposition, the consideration begins to unpack itself, “We but 
teach / Bloody instructions which, being taught, return / To plague the inventor,” Macbeth says 
(1.7.8-9).  The verbs here are tortured by being piled on top of each other and in shifting tenses, 
and the mental space is uncertain.  Macbeth seems to be speaking generally, but he uses a 
                                                 
309 For the early modern distinctions between early modern prophecy and prediction see 
Kosselleck, Reinhart. Futures Past Trans. Keith Tribe, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985). 
King James does not comment on the subject. But John Dee in chapter three seems to conflate 
the two. 
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mixture of present tense (“teach”) past tense (“being taught), infinitive (“to plague”), and the 
strange word “return.”  Return implies a repetition, a connection of past to present and future, but 
in this case it’s about the “invention.”  The words summon the ghost of anachronistic multiplicity 
that vibrates Macbeth throughout categories of time and even nudges him out of time.  Similarly, 
Lady Macbeth’s later line, “Th’attempt and not the deed / Confounds us,” not only refers to 
attempted murder leading to capture, but to the newly coined “attempt” actually acting on its 
own volition (2.2.10-11). Conjectures seem to trap the characters in a way that reflects reflect the 
damnation James mentioned in Daemonologie, suggesting a similarity between prophecy and 
projection. 
The similarity of a unitary future and probable calculation splits, as Macbeth’s 
deliberations multiply probability. The most vivid moment of being overwhelmed by his own 
plans comes when Macbeth delivers his monologue immediately prior to murdering Duncan.  “I 
have thee not, and yet I see thee still,” he says to his dagger.  “Are thou but a dagger of the mind, 
a false creation / Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain,” he asks it (2.1.35-39).  The 
apostrophe anthropomorphizes the object, but the lines also comment on the otherworldly 
compulsion brought on by seeing a plot so close to its performance.  The certain future is no 
longer certain, but begins to undermine the reliability of the present moment for Macbeth.  
Taking full advantage of the monologue, this scene dramatizes the suspension of time that 
happens when a character steps out of the play’s action to consider his options.  He stands on 
stage alone with passing time, while the play’s action does not pass in real time around him.  
Continuing deeper into the monologue, Macbeth describes his own actions with the phrase, 
“towards his design moves like a ghost,” comparing his own imagined actions to Tarquin’s rape 
of Lucrece (2.1.55-6). This moment is the nightmarish inverse of Carla Freccero’s ghosts.  She 
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claims that the “past is in the present in the form of haunting,” that is, the ghost of the past haunts 
the present moment.310  But Macbeth does not just connect past and present, he is moving 
through a projection in the present moment by enumerating the steps toward a possible future.  
The language is supernatural, but the movement is non-linear—it’s ghostly.  In the consideration 
of the monologue, Macbeth stands alone on the stage.  The dagger he holds moves toward a 
design, but a design itself is a movement toward an aim, a plan.  The movement proceeds to 
endless movement—not circular repetition, but a surging motion within ranging options. 
The speech to the dagger also proleptically scripts the subsequent scene with Banquo’s 
ghost. The ghost scene provides another moment where Macbeth seems to lose control when a 
plan is put into practice, in this case his plan to murder his former friend (III.4).  As with the 
dagger, the ghost scene is dramatically material and non-material.  Here directors must choose 
whether to have Banquo’s actor present in the scene, have nothing present, or some combination 
of both.  But the demand for this decision is exactly what I am emphasizing.  A ghostly Banquo, 
like a ghostly dagger, confirms the multiple possible choices that accompany any moment of 
linear time.  With either staging decision Banquo’s ghost simultaneously demonstrates the 
successful prediction of Macbeth’s murderous design while also returning to plague him to 
uncontrollable fits with possibilities. Even a unitary prophetic future contains myriad movements 
toward its fulfillment when human agency is applied to it in the form of a plan.  Harris might 
claim that time doubles in this moment, splitting into endlessly connected transitions between 
temporal categories.  I agree.  But chronology also doubles in the sense that projection allows 
time to occupy parallel or intersecting linear movements.  Although the witches have predicted 
what happens to Macbeth and Banquo, they do so in a way requiring the knowledge of multiple 
                                                 
310 Freccero, Carla.  Queer / Early / Modern (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 80. 
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interpretations, a self-consciousness of multiple specific paths.  This self-consciousness is 
heightened by the fact that plans almost always fail only achieve a stated goal.  They surpass the 
bounds of intention. For example, when Macbeth murders Duncan, he does not see the dagger 
killing the king’s retainers as well.  When Macbeth plans to kill Banquo as well as Banquo’s son 
Fleance, he fails to account for the son’s escape. 
By the end of the play Macbeth can no longer operate without constant reference to 
prophecies.  Furthermore, his tyrannical paranoia becomes kingdom-wide.  All his subjects live 
in fear of arbitrary and contingent violence, making probability an emotional presence in their 
lives.  Lady Macbeth enacts the split of linear time into probability that Macbeth earlier feared.  
In her doctor’s words, “thick-coming fancies…keep her from rest” (5.3).  Like Macbeth, she now 
lives in a dream world with competing probable narratives, wherein she could wash out the 
guilty spot that she remains unable to remove. Within this dream she remains arrested inside 
projections, considering the developments of her plans.  “One, two—why then tis time to 
do’t…what need we fear when none can call our power to account?  Yet who would have 
thought the old man to have had so much blood in him” (5.1-31-4).  This narrative reaches into 
the past but also into a competing present and future.  How will they hold on to their power?  
Who could have predicted the King would have so much blood?  The Doctor calls the report of 
these deeds “unnatural.”  They are unnatural in a horrified sense at the violence, but they also 
work against a naturalized motion of Providence as multiple simultaneous probabilities coexist.  
Guilt and removal of guilt, the murder of the king, the consolidation of power—each design is 
probable and has enumerated steps to demonstrate its achievement. 
 When Lady Macbeth dies, Macbeth registers the probable narratives he is caught up in 
and decries the tragedy of enumerating the steps that lead to his certain future.  “She should have 
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died hereafter,” he says, in a flat counterfactual with little potential power, where “there would 
have been time for such a word.”  His next words, though, “Tomorrow and tomorrow and 
tomorrow” suggest the prophecy that began the play, and multiply the divergence of a unitary 
tomorrow into probable tomorrows. Macbeth emphasizes that he is not just moving through 
linear time, even while he appears to do so, he then considers “the last syllable of recorded time,” 
before turning back to “all our yesterdays” that “have lighted fools the dusty way to death” 
(5.516-23).  The way to death seems to offer a unitary progression, but the “yesterdays” that 
pave the way to death suggest the same anachronistic multiplicity that Macbeth’s plans offer in 
fulfilling his prophecy.  When Birnam Wood moves and Macbeth battles the man not of woman 
borne, he fulfills the prediction offered at the beginning of the play, not to mention other 
prophecies uttered along the way.  But he also brings to fruition the plans of his enemies, 
Macduff and Malcom, while frustrating his own designs. 
 The play ends not with a unified Scotland or a celebration of the overthrow of a tyrant, 
but another plan.  Malcolm will be enthroned at Scone, he will make his thanes into earls, and set 
the kingdom aright in “measure, time, and place” (5.11.39).  But even here a background 
prophecy accompanies these plans.  Fleance will eventually become father to the kings that lead 
to James.  Some of Malcolm’s plans may be fulfilled, but the probability for tragedy remains.  
Yet a more generous way of reading this final moment of projection is that the multiple probable 
outcomes of these plans accompanied even Macbeth’s tragic arc.  Each step in his supernatural 
narrative offered a consideration for another possible action, an unnatural projective narrative 
that spun off into intermingling possibilities.  This is not to say that there are infinite possibilities 
when early modern audiences watched Macbeth engage narratives of planning, but it does 
suggest that the enumeration of specific steps along a linear progression opens up certain chances 
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for events to proceed in other ways.  In fact, the foregrounded awareness of these possibilities 
contributes to the emotional resonance of the play’s many tragic moments.  The unfulfilled 
possibilities of plans define the sense of loss contained in a play that does exactly what it 
predicted it would do in the first scene—see Macbeth king and lose that kingship.  Like the royal 
ghosts in the dynastic portraits of chapter one, a natural Providence is accompanied by unnatural 
probability. 
 
Lear’s Kingdoms and Creatures of the Deep 
 Macbeth’s concerns with the aims of rulership resonate with King Lear. The first words 
Lear speaks in the play summon the lords who want Cordelia’s hand in marriage, establishing the 
King as a figure of command.  But his next words suggest that this command is only one level of 
his mastery.  “We shall express our darker purpose. / Give me our map there.  Know that we 
have divided in three our kingdom, and ‘tis our fast intent to shake all cares and business from 
our age” (1.1.33-5).  The lines mingle purpose, commands, intent, a map, and a kingdom.  But 
why is this purpose darker than open command?  Is the purpose hidden?  If so, how can it be 
revealed and what does it mean when it appears in the light?  The play diverges from Macbeth by 
rendering the future almost immediately unpredictable, since Lear’s division of the kingdom is 
ignored as he changes his mind, much like the altered images of Henry VIII’s succession in 
chapter one.  But in many ways the concerns of both plays are the same.  Both plays explore how 
a ruler enumerates the possibilities of governance and use this information to preserve or 
improve the polity.  But where Macbeth tarried with parallel streams of prophetic time, Lear 
struggles with probability and space. 
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The intersection of narrative with avowed purpose and physical space was defined by 
architecture in the first chapter and influenced the arrangements of space in the utopias of 
chapter four.  As I suggested in the varying frontispiece islands of More’s Utopia, certain types 
of mapping and navigation feed into the Subjunctive Aesthetic because they attempt to craft 
narratives of probability.  If Macbeth suggests that even accomplished plans can never shake off 
their connection to unaccomplished parallel possibilities, then King Lear outlines the inverse.  
The spatialization and enumeration of Lear’s kingdom is defined by characters’ failure to bring 
about their aims or even to meaningfully approach them.  Whereas Macbeth overwhelmed 
characters by connecting possibilities, King Lear’s attempt to reveal and diagram desires, 
purposes, and aims fizzles the movement toward those desires, compartmentalizing possibilities 
and arresting them, thereby dissolving institutions and identities.  In a similar reading, Valerie 
Traub recently explored the overlap of mapping and bodily representations in King Lear, 
claiming that the discourses construct “a spatialized idiom that rendered newly thinkable a 
representative conceptual model, a stable secular standard, against which commonalities and 
differences could be measured…anatomy and cartography developed, both separately and in 
tandem, common spatial techniques of abstraction, rationalization, and comparative 
classification.”311   
One of the critics to pick up on the importance of the map in the first scene of the play, 
Traub is also seeking to discover a “style of reasoning” behind the organizing discourses she 
seeks to complicate, and uncover the “prehistory” of a modern epistemology that creates a 
generally representative abstraction based on specific material things.312  Like many of the 
                                                 
311 Traub, Valerie. “The Nature of Norms in Early Modern England.”  South Central Review.  
Vol. 26, Numbers 1&2 (Winter and Spring 2009), 60. 
312 Ibid., 45. 
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critical models mentioned throughout the dissertation, most especially in my third chapter on 
scientific projects, I would characterize her reading as part of a broader movement to define 
intellectual or ideological movements in the past based on discourses a way that resists the 
teleologies of Science, modernity, progress, or any other self-consciously current institutions.  A 
Subjunctive reading of King Lear also attempts to approach the inaccessible ideological 
constructions of a different place and time.  Like Traub, and as we have seen in the previous 
chapters, the Aesthetic works back from discourses defined by early moderns.  Unlike Traub, 
however, I argue that the play’s focus is not on what the overlap of anatomy and cartography 
reveal about a burgeoning focus on divisible classification.  Rather, the play bemoans this 
inexorable task as an inevitable failure because probability both defines and undermines divisible 
categories through spatial abstraction. Multiplicity unmakes classification. 
The first suggestion of this failure is the king’s incorrectly divided map.  Lear must have 
spent considerable time before the play in thinking through his “darker purpose,” and he 
presumably thought very carefully about the divisions of his kingdom.  And yet, when he 
encounters the unexpected lack of praise from Cordelia, all of that careful enumeration and 
division of possibility and space seemingly becomes a fantasy to be ignored.  His spatial 
representation of possibility could not account for this unforeseen decision.  But before exploring 
the failure of the map and its implications for the play, I would like to take a moment to explain 
its presentation, its evocation, and its meaning, specifically for political control.  Turning back to 
an image like the Castle of Limerick from Chapter One (Figure 1), a viewer can see that 
groundplots incorporate elements of maps.313   
                                                 
313 A 1611 image of the fort at Limerick made by the royal surveyer Josias Bodley, brother of the 
founder of the Bodleian Library. British Library, Cotton Augustus I.ii.33. 
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Fig 7. 
Compare this to a map from the same period such as Fig 8 below314:
 
                                                 
314 A map of Ulster made for Queen Elizabeth in the second half of the 16th century. British 
Library, Cotton Augustus I.ii.19. 
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 Fig. 8 
As Henry Turner notes in his survey of plotting techniques, the lines, the labeling, and the use of 
scale in the images resemble each other because the instruments and mathematics for designing 
and mapping run together.315 The difference between the two images initially appears to lie 
entirely in the level of focus on buildings. As Turner argues, map-making and planning are often 
a part of the same trend, a movement to self-consciously construct a provisional layout for 
property lines or the lines of the seashore with what early moderns perceived as the clean 
principles of geometry. Turner notes that this process is often difficult, requiring geometrical 
abstraction to represent very specific material.316 Similarly, Traub’s argument implies that the 
growing discourse of cartography attempted to distill a representative abstraction of what are 
often maddeningly blurred lines. A carefully maintained hedge or a fence, for example, can mark 
a property line.  This seems stable, even if we know that fences collapse and hedges grow. But 
some lines on maps are more difficult. With the shift of a tide and the roll of a wave, the borders 
of England change. In the terms of a map—the border between Limerick and the surrounding 
counties can be clean, but the border between the land and sea is a bit murkier, indicated on both 
plan and map by shaded colors. 
Although Traub’s observation of multiplicity has clear similarities to the probable 
narratives of the Subjunctive Aesthetic, I do not claim that mapping is an instance of this 
narrative-image form.  Generally, I would agree with Traub that mapping requires dissection, 
classification, and arresting of material. These abstractions are meaningfully different from the 
projective narratives of the Subjunctive Aesthetic for many reasons, but the main one is that the 
                                                 
315 Turner. The English Renaissance Stage, 20-25. 
316 For a similar argument about the role of potentially reductive abstraction in poetry, see 
Werlin, Julianne. “Marvell and the Strategic Imagination: Fortification in Upon Appleton 
House.” The Review of English Studies. (May 2012). 
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maps that Traub explores focus more on image and space outside of time in a way that unifies 
multifarious probability. The ideal map of England does not move with the tides, instead taking 
many of their possible extents into account in order to collapse the seashore into a unitary non-
narrative image.  Traub makes the case that for maps; a representative probability comes to 
dominate the many contingent arrangements of material bodies or nation-states. Gloucester’s 
false encounter on the cliffs of Dover vividly suggests the imaginative construction of borders 
and its importance for Lear, emphasizing the non-visual ideological and linguistic stratums 
involved in building the borders of a nation.  But Gloucester only wants this representative 
idealization of the border so that he can jump of it.  In a way, his border, like Lear’s map, is a 
tool for navigating—a place where his course can be charted, his designs achieved. 
Thus, I would agree that Gloucester’s representative idealization of the famous Dover 
cliffs resembles what we might now call a norm. But I also argue this only forms part of the 
spatial narratives of King Lear.  Granting Traub’s critique that critics of Lear often attempt to 
universalize an archetype or image from the play, I still argue that the play works very hard to 
demonstrate the failure of an attempt to diagram any ideal form and registering possibility gives 
us an important marker of this movement.  In the words of one critic, "Shakespeare wilfully 
ignored gratification of our appetite for justice in favour of other, darker possibilities.” 317  In this 
attempt, Shakespeare is not unique, as demonstrated in other plans from the era, but there is a 
strange spin on spatial planning because “there is a kind of mad pliancy about geographical 
reference in King Lear.”318 Characters named after places establish this overlapping movement 
of places to other places as when France and Burgundy come to England (France comes twice to 
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different locations).  But in addition, Gloucester’s encounter on the cliffs of Dover and the speed 
with which Lear and other characters move between spaces also suggests how easily space 
comes to meet the demands of time in the play.  This pliancy of place allows the play to play 
with aims and movements beyond temporally linear ones.  Lear does not just set out to define 
space with his maps or anatomize the countryside; he manipulates already-extant maps with a 
purpose in mind.  He seeks to define his comfortable authority and maintain the succession of his 
chosen dynasty, much like the images of Henry VIII in chapter one.  The play’s manipulation of 
space thus has an emphasis on a forward-thinking time, as well as a foundation in contingency.   
All this sets up the map in scene one as not just as an idealization of matter into a 
representative form, but a real failure of the idealization to bring about a workable way to sift 
through potential alternative divisions of the land.  As he commands his children to speak of who 
“doth love us most,” Lear has them speak in a decided order—eldest first (I.1.49-52).  But the 
whole time, the youngest Cordelia’s asides to the audience undermine Lear’s “darker purpose.”  
Her few asides to the audience reveal the extent to which Lear’s expectations depend on 
understanding divergent probabilities. The asides do not establish Cordelia as a trustworthy 
daughter or figure of honesty.319 As Harry Berger outlines, Cordelia “did have a share” in the 
ambivalent treatment of Lear that leads to her husband’s later ascendency in England.320 Her 
answer to Lear may be honest, but her asides suggest that she is deliberating—sifting through 
possibilities for how she will answer her father. She is plotting. “Love and be silent,” is her first 
decision, which she soon modifies (I.1.59-61). Cordelia becomes a powerful woman with 
calculated and mediated desires. Cordelia, like Macbeth or her father, works through her darker 
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purposes as she struggles to plan how she will answer Lear.  Her eventual answer that she loves 
him as much as she should until she marries fulfills Lear’s demands, and may even do so in a 
way that early modern audiences would have found honest and pious.  Still, her words fail to 
answer him to the extent or in the way that Lear expected.  Her answer looks ahead to a husband 
she does not have and suggests the impending division of her love in the same way her father’s 
map looks ahead to the division of his kingdom. 
Why does the map suit Lear, then, while Cordelia’s answer to the extent of her love 
enrages him?  Not because Lear is senile, nor is it because the answer is completely unthinkable.  
The overtones of a powerfully patriarchal father-daughter interaction color the extent and 
expression of his anger, but Lear reacts poorly even when strangers question his authority.  
Goneril’s answer to his question of love helps explain the stakes for Lear’s rulership.  She tells 
him that she loves him “Dearer than eyesight, space, and liberty” (I.1.54).  And Regan cites 
Goneril in a repetitive answer.  Eyesight, space, and liberty would seem to predict a regime for 
control, a panoptic vision of kingship.  Cordelia’s response, meanwhile, suggests alternative 
arrangements for the political and familial order, even from within the dutiful options of a 
hegemonic ideal  “Haply when I shall wed / That lord…shall carry half my love with him…I 
shall never marry like my sisters” (I.1.98-101).  Her plan for the future divides her love in half, 
but it also provides a counter-plan that Lear has no real response to other than his suggestion that 
her idea is “untender.”  How much he has to complain about is difficult to imagine.  He is, after 
all, asking suitors to marry Cordelia so that he can retire from cares and pursue a potentially 
ridiculous Arcadian retirement.  Although traditionally seen as an innocent who dies because she 
loves her father too much to lie to him, Cordelia’s deliberation in the very first scene suggests 
that Lear’s real problem is that she also reveals her darker purposes.  She diagrams or performs 
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her intentions in a way that multiplies the contingency of the map on the stage through multiple 
players 
Even the appearance of the map on the stage is highly contingent, performing the 
contingency of probability. The quarto and the folio versions of Lear give a different spin upon 
introducing the prop.  “The map there,” in the quarto, or “Give me the map there,” in the folio 
ersion, not only suggests different emotive responses to the map, as Traub claims, they also offer 
competing types of maps.321  “The map there,” could point to a wall-sized atlas dividing up the 
English countryside—an image known among both galleries and groundlings.322 “Give me the 
map there,” offers an image more miniature, a text Lear can put in his hands or perhaps on a 
table.  Both types of map appeared in the Renaissance, but the map actually used in the scene 
influences how we read Lear’s darker purpose and the probable politics of the play. Although I 
find it difficult to believe that even a huge version of the map would be completely accurate in 
terms of cartography given the monetary constraints of the theater and the cost of an extensive 
map, I also doubt the company would have ignored the burgeoning awareness of reliable maps in 
the era. 323   Whether or not a map appeared on stage, then, we can surmise that an audience 
would have had a specific awareness of the possible divisions of the kingdom of England based 
on the way that Lear divides his kingdom.  
But thinking through which map appears also more also helps us understand how maps 
would register with an audience who could not afford the expensive folio versions of Saxton or 
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Representing the English Renaissance Ed. Stephen Greenblatt, (Berkeley: University of 
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Seckford’s new maps of England.324 In early modern England more generally, but also for Lear’s 
case in particular, the larger map means more effort put into its creation.  As we saw in the Great 
Yarmouth image, a township or the crown often commissioned a larger spatial representation 
that would dwarf what could be published on the printing press.  Smaller maps might appear 
onboard ships, in letters, or in private collections, but the larger maps offered a greater level of 
detail and the opportunity for political digression.  Maps have space for coats of arms, the 
Crown’s seal, or various activities taking place in the countryside. This does not mean a larger 
map necessarily equates to an increased amount of political narratives, but the larger maps often 
give more detail to their myriad points of view and intermingling possible narratives. On the 
stage, a larger map offers physical space to place Lear’s coat of arms placed on the countryside 
or perhaps in the space framing the map—a common technique at the time.  A larger map also 
provides the opportunity to divide the smaller allocations between Cornwall and Albany by 
labeling these subdivisions with crests as well. The larger map allows the audience to actually 
see the divisions being made, to see the shifting possibilities of rulership.  At the same time, the 
extensive size of such a map would suggest the level that Lear has thought through his division.  
A giant map suggests that Lear’s purpose has been projected on a massive scale—he must have 
felt he had a fix on his daughter’s motivations and a confidence in their willingness to make a 
public profession.  A smaller or unseen map suggests that Lear has put far less effort into 
imagining the potential divisions of his kingdom, even if he did have certain expectations. 
 With no decided evidence as to the map used in Lear based on the competing scripts of 
the folio and quarto, I suggest extending the pattern established in my reading of Macbeth. The 
two scripts’ simultaneous options for both only clarifies the probability of performance. Both 
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maps seem equally likely depending on the self-conscious purposes of a theater company, 
audience, or reader.  Both also make clear that probability became represented through in spatial 
terms—any division that happens in this map could happen in another dispensation. A massive 
map seems to make a mockery of Lear’s purpose by suggesting its ridiculousness or pushing it 
toward a mad fantasy of a senile old man. This aligns with a traditional reading of Lear arguing 
that dividing the kingdom, dividing the patriarchal inheritance of primogeniture, or dividing 
subjectivity, destroys all institutions made by breaking them into nothingness. Yet this reading 
ignores the fact of Lear’s plans, whether he is mad or not. Any political division of the kingdom, 
even a unitary non-division where Lear remains king until he dies, would still follow the darker 
purposes of the king. Introducing this redrawing, however implies the importance of planning in 
a wider sense. Even a whole or undivided map contains the potential for numerous redistrictings, 
redivisions, or reimaginings of the political landscape. Even if the audience couldn’t see the map 
on stage, even if Lear’s map is a tiny hand-map that the audience was meant to imagine and not 
see, the “the visual character of the generic nation map—the iconography of the map’s surface” 
remains a central focus of the characters’ dialogue when they use the map.325  As much as an 
architectural plot, then, Lear’s image depends on spatializing probability to define narrative. 
Only here Lear attempts to make the image serve his political narrative. 
The visual and spatial divisions of a politically motivated map can undo the political 
order, as they might seem to in King Lear, but the king’s multiple contingent plans also 
constitute the kingdom.  Traub suggests the play occurs in the prehistory of the discourses of 
anatomy and cartography—before an always-already of the catalogued body.  But Lear also 
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plays before the Foucauldian moment of institutional planning defining the patterns of life and 
before de Certeau’s counter-reading of tactical response to institutional strategy.  Lear’s map 
demonstrates the failure of plans, but it also gives a peak behind the curtain and suggests that 
plans use space to constitute the field of social activity.  My temptation with Lear is to read the 
king’s enumeration of possible divisions of property and power as reductive.  Like Traub, I think 
criticism sees a play that disjoints bodies and participates in the idealization of certain white, 
male, property-holding subjects as figures that will eventually become norms.  But because I see 
the play in terms of probabilities, I see the constant and meaningful presence of non-hegemonic 
forms of the political order as well. In the end, I think the quarto version of the play is the one 
that emphasizes these probabilities, offering a huge map and showing the audience that property 
may always be divided with a different probable narrative in mind. But this version does not 
dismiss the folio’s smaller, still contingent political rethinking.  
The quarto’s multiplicitous vision of planning comes through not just in the doubled 
scene with Lear’s maps, but also in the lines, found only in the quarto, when Albany hurls 
extensive invective at Goneril.  One choice sentence of a consideration: “If that the heavens do 
not their visible spirits send quickly down to tame these vile offences, It will come, Humanity 
must perforce prey on itself, like monsters of the deep” (4.2.45-50).  The cause and effect of this 
counterfactual is as strange as Macbeth’s ghostly dagger, but one key point is that the mini-
narrative described here relies on “visible spirits” to prevent the vile offences from spurring self-
destructive behavior like the kind in the unseen depths of the ocean.  Albany does use the word 
“will” instead of something more conditional, like “shall,” but the murky depths of his 
comparison transposes a sense of doubt to his words.  According to Albany, the visual field 
promises to expose Goneril’s darker purposes, but at the same time he tells her, “Howe’er thou 
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art a fiend, a woman’s shape doth shield thee” (4.2.65-6).  As Albany defines Goneril’s behavior 
as unwomanly and monstrous he simultaneously catalogues her as womanly in a misogynist 
vein, and her intentions remain hidden by a surface appearance.  Like the map, visual definition 
alone cannot confirm a unitary narrative of her identity.  Sight promises to expose the darker 
purposes and the depths, but at the same time visual presentation dissimulates her plots. Albany’s 
suggestion also uses space and the visual to queer what the “shape of a woman” means.   
The disconnect between sight and ontology becomes complicated by the fact that 
Goneril’s monstrousness relies on seeing not her actions or even her shape, but her intentions.  
Albany is not horrified at her acts or shape as much as he is by her desires as they come through 
in her machinations, in his words her “disposition,” the “nature which contemns its origin” and 
“cannot be bordered certain in itself” (4.2.31).  Disposition is an apt word for the denatured 
nature Albany sees when a woman uses her femininity to work beyond a certain essentialized 
vision of what femininity is.  The word signals a place and an identity, and in this case, also 
emphasizes a strange moving relationship to space.  “Disposition” does not mean what Goneril is 
in an essentialized way or where she stands so much as it is a dis-position, a deviation from an 
established place.  In the way Albany utters it, the term suggests a possible relationship to where 
Goneril stands that also suggests the possible places she might go in the field of imaginable 
possible desires.  Her disposition threatens to break the “borders” of her identity because it helps 
establish her identity via projection.  A map’s edges are necessarily defined by the intentions of 
the map-maker and the map-reader.  Goneril’s plans define who she is, but also who she might 
possibly become. 
The script of the play encodes this enumeration of distinct possibilities and connects them 
to more modern notions of subjectivity that I will take up in my final section. Albany utters the 
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last lines in the quarto while Edgar speaks them in the folio.  The words are the same, the 
trajectory of the tragedy similar, but the distinct path each version takes is meaningfully 
different.  The words themselves speak of intention, in the Subjunctive, defining the proper 
course of action.  “The weight of this sad time we must obey,” says Albany/Edgar, “speak what 
we feel not what we ought to say.”  The indicative of “speak what we feel” seems to promise the 
possibility of connection between intention and performance, of a link between surface and 
identity.  Unlike many other Shakespeare lines, these lines don’t break the connection by 
suggesting that lying or error are the spill twixt cup and lip of inner and outer identities.  Instead, 
like the map of the first scene and like Goneril’s monstrous identity, Edgar’s lines are bordered 
by a “must” and an “ought.”  Identity, both public and private, becomes mediated through 
subjunctive verbs that demand action or signal likelihood.  In this sentence, the self-conscious 
intention of the Subjunctive Aesthetic surrounds and buffers the potential for both performed 
identity and something akin to inward subjectivity.  This problematic boundary suggests the 
queering potential of projective mediation for subjectivity, but also suggests that projected 
narratives define an inner-outer subjectivity that Descartes might recognize.  Like the proscribed 
map’s definition of the country, the boundaries of “must” and “ought” define the enumerated 
steps to making a person.  Yet this person defined by a range of probable narratives remains open 
to different “musts” and “oughts.”  These Subjunctive demands do not just look to the future. 
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King John: The History That Might Never Have Been 
The first Shakespearean movie adaptation to project on the big screen was, to my 
constant surprise, The Life and Death of King John in 1899.326  But this fact may not shock those 
who are familiar with this underrated play, as King John has repeatedly lent itself to various 
forms of projection in its strange performance history, the most famous being the insertion of an 
ostentatious signing of the Magna Carta during Victorian era productions.327  Strangely squaring 
with the play, this retrospective constitutional-monarchical-republican deployment into a feudal 
world would operate as a magnificent set-piece, but only re-emphasize what Walter Cohen notes 
in his introduction to the Norton edition of the play as the failure to deliver the narrative 
“coherence” that the play “promises.”328  In this final section, I analyze what it means for a play 
to promise something in the field of the historical past.  The other two readings of Shakespeare 
plays in this chapter have explored the projective probable narratives of the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic in a play that looks forward with prophecy, and one that explores the spatial 
representation of probability via maps and space.  I turn now to King John to see how projection 
plays out in the terms of history, a movement that has remained submerged in my discussion of 
the two other historical tragedies but that was vital to the argument of chapter two.  As Freccero 
reminds us, the past is always haunting the present.  But this haunting becomes especially 
strange when planning becomes involved.  King John does not emphasize space or the future to 
the extent that the other plays I have discussed do, but it does spend an extreme amount of time 
focused on defining the exact steps of plots.  These plots—generally undefined and often 
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unrepresented or unspoken—nonetheless promise a unitary history that the play’s action can 
never fulfill.  The element of contingency built into their plans keeps spilling over the channels 
carved by historical perspective, channels that the characters in the play would seem to be 
following.  In doing so, the play opens the space for frustration of desire in the pauses between 
the steps of plans. 
Contingency is grafted into the play’s title, The Life and Death of King John.  Although 
not a strange name for the time, the combination of Life and Death is conspicuous in 
Shakespeare’s corpus of plays with titles that emphasize the Life of Henry V, or the Tragedy of 
King Richard II.  King John’s title, in contrast, promises both the life and death of a monarch, a 
promise it never delivers, a dual promise that the action of the play eventually undermines as 
impossible to fulfill.  John dies offstage in the final act, at the hands of a character that the 
audience never sees.  The machinations, motivations, and intentions behind the assassination 
remain mysterious, but they also throw into relief the drama and dangers set up by the rest of the 
play.  Shakespearean audiences as well as modern audiences watching the play have their 
temporal perspectives open to a reimagining of the past. Neither audience can quite reject the 
narrative of this re-imagined past because they both live at the end of its teleology. But because 
characters cannot know the future, a sympathetic viewer must necessarily also remain open to 
multiple possible pasts as these characters feel out the differing probabalities.  In the words of 
Kathryn Schwarz, the “counterfactual” is the integral to King John.  The play’s “representational 
strategy…is a theory of mimetic rupture through which the past must produce the future, and the 
future produce the past, across an alienated moment of non-presence.”329  I associate this “theory 
of mimetic rupture” with the plans of the play and the way they interact with the retro-
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perspective of history.  The play’s various plots that move through the Subjunctive Aesthetic, in 
addition to the counterfactual “ifs” that Schwarz outlines, are the key moments that expose this 
rupture.  Within some of these gaps lie momentous historical events, but these events never 
follow the narrative of the moment, even if plans eventually come to define the conditions for 
history.  In many moments throughout the play, actions seem to appear from an equally likely 
and unlikely other word that resembles the one of the play.  In King John, the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic demonstrates the power of self-conscious intention for defining history.  But in the 
characters’ attempts to define probability, the aesthetic also suggests radical other modes of 
interacting with linear time wherein policy decisions expose the lack of agency that comes with 
backwards projection.  Like Spenser’s book of history from the Faerie Queene in chapter one, 
the play’s deliberations also suggest that history can be as contingent as freshly made plan. 
Similar to King Lear, King John begins with an embassy between nations and members 
of the same family.  Dynastic war spurred by the emotional demands of old family rivalries and 
the promises of political power forms the premise of the first scenes.  This premise defines the 
bulk of the plays action, and impact each subsequent negotiation, battle, and plot that unfolds in 
the rest of the play.  But these familial and dynastic struggles can distract from the aside that 
arguably leads to John’s death. The decision to fund the war by the “charge” of “our abbeys and 
priories” presumably disgruntles the monk who murders his king in the final act (1.1.48-9).  Both 
decision and result seem arbitrary and beside the point, forming a single facilitating step for the 
rest of the play’s action.  The decision is only one toward John’s larger intention.  But the 
decision and its result also point to the almost overpowering role that minute possibility plays in 
the specifics of government planning.  In the early modern period, contingency begins to figure 
prominently in all levels of governmental discussion, from the theoretical, to the popular, to the 
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official writings of advisors like Lord Burghley.330 As I outlined in the first chapter, Machiavelli 
is a writer whose discourse and methods appears prominently in each of these levels, and he is 
also obsessed with utilizing historical narrative as precedent for his ideas.  As such his work 
provides a helpful point of comparison and suggests that the concerns of the play also figure in 
broader discourses featuring history and government. In The Prince, I would align the arbitrary 
and accidental contingency of John’s minor funding decision with Machiavelli’s definition and 
exploration of the role of fortuna or fortune. Fortuna as a figure of contingency encompasses a 
broader category than a notion of the counterfactual, but also interacts in a similar way with the 
future and past.  Machiavelli’s theory of real politick incorporates fortuna and claims to focus on 
practical matters, while still largely moving through theoretical abstraction at the way Caesar 
Borgia, for example, might have held on to power.  Like an architectural plan, then, 
Machiavelli’s handbook straddles the line between imaginative and mimetic, forming imaginary 
lines out of intermingling probabilities.  Machiavelli, however, generally restricts himself to 
prior example, even when dealing with the present or future of state policy. 
As Victoria Kahn outlines in Machiavellian Rhetoric, Machiavelli’s writings in both The 
Prince and The Discourses are concerned with dialectical reasoning.331 He uses this dialectic to 
predict and influence the future. This puts Machiavelli at odds with some contemporary political 
philosophers like Guiccardini, for whom the projection of “if-then” statements is unreliable for 
decision-making.332 But English writers often use Machiavelli by name, and even when they 
don’t, often incorporate his notion that the future can and should be predicted based on previous 
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events. Thus, Schwarz’s suggestion that the counterfactual “if,” is a key concept for the play also 
suggests the importance of Machiavelli in understanding the style King John.  The play’s 
engagement with Machiavelli is significant because King John puts the Florentine’s methods of 
concrete planning based on historical precedent into practice, but the titular character still loses 
control.  For Machiavelli control is occasionally fleeting as well, but unlike his “fortuna,” which 
can overcome abstract “embankments” of “reason,” King John becomes swept away as a side-
effect of the minute decisions involved in his own plans.333  In short, unlike Machiavelli’s 
considerations played out in government discourses that see fortuna as the threat, King John 
creates a monster through the operations of his reason.334 
 King John contains a Machiavellian prince as the titular character, and it also contains a 
dialogue that exposes the intentionality and probability thought inherent in Machiavelli’s dispute 
between fortuna and reason. In Act III, Hubert listens to a speech by King John in subjunctive 
“if-then” statements, conjuring up an imaginary “churchyard” with a “spirit” and a mention of 
his “purposes,” that is intended to convey a command to kill John’s presumptive heir, Arthur 
(III.3.52-55). Although John mentions “Death” and “a grave,” as a part of this oblique command 
for murder, the words are disconnected from any particular sentence and interspersed with 
Hubert’s obsequious assent. Like Macbeth, a ghostly presence defines the enacting of a specific 
series of commands.  Unlike Macbeth, however, the complex series of orders remains unspoken. 
John’s final command is “I’ll not say what I intend for thee.  Remember”  (III.3.66-8). The 
exchange highlights two implications for the Subjunctive Aesthetic.  First, projection remains 
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mostly unspoken but agreed-upon, the words of John’s command self-consciously conceal a 
purpose that relies on very specific enumerated steps. Second, the final word “remember,” 
suggests that history and memory defines the plot against the young prince’s life.  As in 
Machiavelli, the expedient path is defined by backwards thinking, not looking ahead.  In this 
field of discourse, any potential narrative relies on an audience’s understanding of the likely 
path.  In this case, Hubert must undertake what he understands to be John’s will, again opening 
up the space for constant failure of intentionality as in King Lear. 
An exchange where a monarch’s orders and intentions become open to wide-
interpretation may seem highly dramatized.  But this exchange from King John also recalls a 
similar series of textual and oral exchanges from a few years before the first performance of the 
play.  At the culmination of these discussions, Queen Elizabeth finally signed a warrant to 
execute Queen Mary of Scotland long after various Privy Counselors and members of Parliament 
had argued that they understood it to be her will.335  But this decision was only arrived at after 
years of discussion among council, in Parliament, and even debated in the nascent printed 
publications of the day.  Elizabeth’s plans were never certain even to her closest confidants, but 
everyone agreed she certainly had some sort of design, and they based their conclusions and 
suggestions on historical precedent.  Many of the publications addressing how Elizabeth should 
treat Mary claimed to uncover the hidden machinations of counselors.  As in Elizabeth’s poem 
and King Lear, the authors of these plans argue that other political agents engage plots while the 
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monarch leaves intentions visible and honest.  In short, they contrast plotting with counseling 
and leadership.  They also turn repeatedly to historical precedent to make their policy outlines.   
The execution of Mary is a unique moment in the Elizabethan regime where public 
discourse can criticize the monarch with few serious repercussions.  A public audience that 
would usually have no input with the queen was able to speculate on the affairs of state.  And 
although most of these criticisms were written, leaving out direct access by a huge chunk of the 
theater’s potential audience, the various plots against the Queen’s life were surely widely 
discussed.  The discussion may have made Elizabeth and her counselors uncomfortable, but they 
had little choice as they speculated.  By manufacturing and representing public policy, plans 
open themselves up to competing plots and counter-plots.  Works like The Treatise of Treasons 
claimed that working against the defined intentions of the monarch are treasonous, even as The 
Treatise sought to alter the policy of the Elizabethan regime. Catholic and Protestant each 
believed they grasped Elizabeth’s true intention, and sought to define a device to enact this will. 
Some of the narratives of conspiracy and secret decision-making found in works like The 
Treatise of Treasons often seem outlandish at first glance, but they also occasionally ring true 
and some of their claims find consensus among historians today.  In the narratives of government 
policy, both the defined plans and the assumed (and often secret) intentions and possibilities 
have equal weight.  In a movement that mirrors Machiavelli, Elizabeth, and King John, historians 
discussing events such as these today must turn to probability and intention.  They also suggest 
that this is a moment where the wider public understands plans and finds emotional investment 
in even more mundane affairs of the state. 
Part of the reason that public discourse proliferated around this event is because Elizabeth 
refused to make public pronouncements on the issue—except for a refusal to make 
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pronouncements.  In neither writing nor speech does she tell her advisors exactly what she wants.  
This decision might be calculated or it might indicate indecisiveness. But instead of reading this 
deliberation as uncertainty, I think it captures the range of probability of planning. Decisiveness 
blends into indecisiveness within the Subjunctive Aesthetic, because multiple possibilities all 
move to the foreground. Even if she does simply intend to kill Mary, she cloaks her intention as 
King John does with Hubert. Elizabeth must insist on the clarity of her own state policy, and 
only signs the order for Mary’s execution when Mary’s role in the Babington Plot against the 
regime becomes public knowledge.  As with the absent Queen Mary of chapter one, if there is a 
providential narrative for the Elizabethan regime, the narrative cannot be open to competing 
probable Marian dynasties.  The irony, of course, is that Mary’s execution is only necessary 
when the state acknowledges that the competing dynastic claim for another English monarch 
holds validity. 
This peak into Elizabethan policy suggests the real repercussion of understood orders, as 
her plan seems to bring about its design even without the explicit consent of the monarch. Also 
like Queen Mary’s execution, eventually King John’s implied order to Hubert will be written and 
specific.  Writing them down, however, does not contain their power in the play. John’s written 
orders of execution of increase the strange and unpredictable power of his plan. Arthur receives a 
note from Hubert telling the boy his eyes must be burned out—strangely in opposition to the 
“death” and “grave” of the earlier command (IV.1.38-9).  As in Macbeth the specific 
considerations initially bring arrested motion of thought.  “Must you,” asks Arthur. “I must,” 
answers Hubert tersely, “And will you,” Arthur interjects, “And I will,” says Hubert (IV.1.40-2).  
The dialogue’s repetition would seem to emphasize the pre-meditated nature of the blinding, but 
the consideration gives Arthur time to interject not just with one line but with several large 
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monologues that give the iron time to “cool.”  As the iron cools does, Hubert finally abandons 
his interpretation of the plan and agrees to give King John “false reports” the boy is “dead” 
(IV.2.127).  Simultaneously, in the interim between John’s writ and the false reports, the king 
grows to repent his command and seems to reverse it.  Yet the play’s backward projected 
narrative of execution morphs into a kind of Fortuna, seemingly completed by Arthur himself.  
Arthur dies accidentally jumping off a wall to try and escape but not before naively pleading 
with the ground not to harm him.  The pleading to the ground suggests a kind of inevitability, but 
a strange one involving a decision to take a chance and jump.  Thus, a chance accident comes to 
represent the will of the monarch to an untrusting nation, although there is no cause-effect 
relationship that directly links the two.  In retrospect, the narrative seems plausible because it is 
probable— John likely had specific steps for what should be done. Yet his plan opens up the 
space for undoing cause-and-effect connections between commands and actions, while 
paradoxically allowing for history’s buttressing of a linear chain of history. 
As I previously mentioned, John ostensibly dies because of a command that returns to 
plauge him from the play’s first scene.  The line, “Our abbeys and our priories shall pay / This 
expeditious charge,” seems to be the only motivation for the king’s offstage poisoning by a 
displaced monk (I.1.48-9).  But John appears to be dying of fever even before the poisoning, like 
Arthur a victim of what A. R. Braunmuller in “King John and Historiography” calls the 
backwards looking abstraction of “history. ”  This backwards abstraction uses the projected 
narratives of the era as an organizing principle.  This principle, however, is just as much a 
disorganizing principle.  A penumbra of possibilities accompanies every action undertaken with 
an eye toward fulfilling a plot.  Thus, the multiple probable narrative projections of King John 
render abstraction and contingency a key element of any historical description. Bruanmuller 
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locates this abstraction in Stow and Holinshed and their modified history focused on the 
glorification or critique of a particular regime.336  I add that this trend is even more important in 
overtly political writers like Sidney, Elizabeth, and Machiavelli. Both historians and more 
abstract political philosophers ground much of the work of contemporary historians of the early 
modern period, because they suggest what was probable.  I agree with Braunmuller that in some 
ways the action of the theater is in conflict with history in this play, but exactly how this conflict 
unfolds is contingent and relies on the reading of the represented intention of planning. The wide 
import of political planning in England suggest that they became a kind of public spectacle, and 
helps explain how a play like King John, where very little violence happens but much is 
threatened, would be performed in the theater.  This does not mean that all plays, or even all 
Shakespearean plays, emphasize self-conscious thinking about the future.  But Macbeth, King 
Lear, and King John do.  King John in particular exposes the force and dangers of history-based 
governmental projection by dramatizing the tragic effects of acting non-actors such as John’s 
unspoken intentions.337  Like Cohen’s reading of the play as a failure to achieve what it 
promises, some might argue that by failing to deliver, the play robs historical agents of their 
efficacy and emotional power.  As a side effect of this failure, an underlying critical assumption 
is that the play also renders itself oblique to the canon of some of Shakespeare’s most widely 
known plays—his historical tragedies. 
I challenge King John’s strangeness, not because I believe in a canon or think the play is 
entertaining, because all three plays show how emotional power becomes intensified in moments 
when this historical version of reconstructed planning comes to the fore.  Backwards looking 
                                                 
336 Bruanmuller, A.R. “King John and Historiography.” ELH. Vol. 55. No 2. (Summer 1988), 
332. 
337 King Johan, by John Bale, a possible source for the play, actually has abstractions acted as 
characters.  “Civil Order,” “England,” and “Treason” are all individual players. 
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historical agency becomes the narrative of potentially fulfilled desire for coherence.  But this 
desire for coherence also entails a sacrifice of agency when represented through the narrative of 
plans, revealing that even successful coherence is disconnected from itself. Thinking about the 
future means remembering the King’s commands.  John’s carefully mediated attempt to transmit 
a command via unspoken and ghostly means gains authority of its own, seemingly ignoring and 
then reconfirming John’s original intentions. In this case, John’s projected narratives incorporate 
careful description and calculated gaps for counter-possibilities.  These possibilities are thrilling 
or terrifying depending on one’s perspective.  But the real excitement comes from the awareness 
of both of these chances.  To put it in other terms, the play alters the relationship of reason and 
fortuna found in Machiavellian discourses by connecting them.  Actions guided by reason occur 
only by the interjection of random chance and improbable intervention incited by the earlier 
stages of planning.  Only in retrospective, by engaging in the Machiavellian mining of the past 
can reason tautologically define itself against the improbable actions of Fortuna.  Machiavelli’s 
attempt to apply historical lessons to current problems only re-emphasizes the provisional nature 
of historical narratives like those of King John.  Ascribing failure based on represented intention 
is only possible because that intention is represented.  Failure to deliver promises does not define 
King John any more than failure defines King Lear or Macbeth.  What makes critics 
uncomfortable is that the play exposes the abstractions in historical narratives, by opening space 
for audience reactions to perceived intentions.  History becomes contingent because historical 
actors incorporate contingency into their writings, imagery, speeches, and actions.   
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Abstraction, Aesthetic, Material Practice 
I would like to conclude this chapter with an investigation of what the performance of 
probable narratives in a historical milieu means for critical practice on theater and reading the 
past more generally.  Theatrical narrative appears to require us to make assumptions about the 
fixity of architecture, of the solid materiality of buildings.  When I say “us”, I do not just mean 
literary critics; I refer more broadly to historians or any Shakespearean audience. But what does 
the fixing of the past’s architecture look like? When stage designers look back at the early 
modern stage and build an imitation, they make reasonable guesses, reconstruct, and build 
narratives based on plans—both spatial and otherwise. Admitting this guesswork is not to say the 
contemporary moment can arbitrarily remake the past. There is a range of possibilities available 
to us based on material evidence and archival sources. This process is anachronistic in multiple 
categories of time. We do not seek to understand the theater of the past and leave it there.  We 
bring what we find back, and in doing so we remake material culture for the future. The most 
striking examples of this tendency to modify and use space through what we imagine to be the 
probable narratives of history are buildings like The Globe and the playhouse at Stratford, the 
Blackfriars playhouse in Virginia, or the promised reconstruction of the Blackfriars Theatre in 
London.338  These reconstructions are not limited to the original sites and I would be surprised if 
they remain limited to English-speaking nations.339  Several of these buildings are based on 
surviving plans and ruins, and as a result, even the most fastidious reconstruction involves 
contingency. Even with archaeological remains guiding reconstruction projects and floor plans to 
outline what some draughtsman planned in the 16th century, a builder could never precisely 
remake Shakespeare’s Globe. In the attempt to reconstruct the past, however, we moderns 
                                                 
338 http://www.guardian.co.uk/stage/2011/aug/04/globe-theatre-to-build-roof 
339 http://www.americanshakespearecenter.com/v.php?pg=70 
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reproduce the tendencies of Renaissance architects like Palladio in simultaneously understanding 
and misunderstanding the ruins of Rome while rebuilding its perceived glories.  As with these 
architects, we use likelihoods to define material space. We, perhaps, do not realize it or admit it. 
Yet the architects of the period may also have been unaware of the extent to which probability 
shaped their representations and material reality.  
In spite of the similarities between living planners and the dead, however, Renaissance 
reconstructions are different than ours. The ability to produce identical physical copies of objects 
such as buildings is a myth that we do not likely share with early modern planners. This myth of 
reproduction, as Edward Said, Benjamin, and others have argued, is flawed because each 
repetition, no matter how exact, becomes interpreted in a different perceptual and social context. 
But architectural plans add an element of probability that precedes the crafting of a building and 
weaves into the interpretation of that building. In this, the Subjunctive Aesthetic appears today, 
and I can illustrate how in a personally familiar, and yet deeply strange, example. In Nashville, 
TN, the “Athens of the South,” an exact copy of the Parthenon stands in a lovely park not far 
from Vanderbilt University.340 This copy is not made out of Grecian granite funded by Pericles, 
but stucco and concrete. The exhibit makes no claims for exact reproduction. In fact, for those 
who pay the entry fee, the plaques near the statue of Athena warn that this is a hypothetical 
copy—an imagined reconstruction. Attesting to this, bust usually unmentioned by visitors and 
tour guides, the building is only three fourths the size of the actual Parthenon. As plausible as the 
material may be, verisimilitude is not the point of this edifice. It is self-consciously performing 
the past in terms of what is probable. The Nashville Parthenon is a model as well as a real 
building. It is a plan that one experiences in the flesh, blurring the boundary between 
                                                 
340 This ostensible exact copy is actually 3/4ths the size of the “real” Parthenon and is a 
reproduction of a plaster edifice built for the Nashville centennial of 1897.  
 259 
representation and material reality. Like Lear’s simultaneous big map/small map/kingdom, the 
building calls up the Subjunctive Aesthetic. 
 But we moderns do not stop with physical reconstruction; as King John did in 
Shakespeare’s day, we attempt to re-perform past. At the Parthenon in Nashville, for example, 
huge pageants were held in years past to commemorate and cultivate a connection with ancient 
Greece.  To this day the local Shakespeare in the Park performs near and sometimes on the 
building itself. In a more reliable venue, at the Globe by the Thames audiences pay to see period 
costumes derived from research. Viewers hear words spoken based hours of accent lessons based 
on linguistic studies.  They watch a stage built with the investigation of theatre-craft.  Each 
performance defines a backwards-looking critical practice and this critical practice in turn 
transforms the landscape of the surrounding city and the unfolding of the city to come. As critics 
seek the spatial contours of the past, we often find ourselves anachronistically collapsing all time 
periods in space and seeking to define how things “actually” were, as if we could somehow make 
the past become the present.  In this method there is something of planning, as both designers 
and critics define materiality through abstraction, through that which is not there. We try to 
understand characters and staging by working out old plans and enacting them, much as King 
John does with English history. Many audiences find these performances entertaining and 
convincingly faithful to the past. But each time I watch a faithful Shakespearean adaptation, 
though I am impressed by the reconstruction, I am more moved by the sensation that so much of 
the past is lost or unlikely. I find exhilaration as theater companies try and plan ahead for their 
own maintenance while I watch them “remember,” in the words of King John, what the 
commands of the past were. So much is unspoken and unwritten but seemingly understood, 
derived from the puzzling out of what must logically or likely follow from remains and a script. 
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The early modern theater, I believe, pronounces a tendency to reconstruct buildings and 
performances in our contemporary moment not because of some special charm, but because 
many modern representations facilitate the movement between materiality and imagination. To 
illustrate this trend by a very general contrast with other eras of performance, theater audiences 
are content to leave the medieval past in ruins, while late 17th, 18th and even 19th century plays 
remain mostly unperformed. Yet our contemporary moment not only performs early modern 
plays, but also builds new buildings in which to enshrine them. This, I think, is partially due to 
the material-abstract mix of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. Architecture and the theater have an 
ancient history, but in early modern England the relationship becomes especially important, 
hinging on a shared enthusiasm and an overlapping Aesthetic. The Blackfriars was the first time 
the theater went indoors, and Inigo Jones made his name as a stage designer for masques as well 
as an architect. Early modern theatrical space calls to the present moment because the designs for 
these venues, like many of the plays performed at them, encode anachronism and probability 
through the image-narrative of the Subjunctive Aesthetic. The plays of the period find terror, 
pity, perhaps catharsis, in potential narratives—in nothing that is something. The reconstruction 
of buildings from plots means fleshing out and making real alternative probabilities, in contrast 
to what seems to be the fixed boundaries of the modern world that many perceive. In this 
fleshing out, the relationship between plan and action mirrors the relationship between script and 
performance.  Performance, even the performance of a script performed as faithfully as possible, 
moves in a range about the lines of a script.  Directors and actors must think through 
motivations, intentions, likely movements, and tones.   
A commonplace topic for a conclusion among scholars of the early modern period, 
involves defining the impact that understanding the past has on interpretations in the current 
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moment.  I am doing so right now. But I would suggest that early modern theatrical critics keep 
in mind the relationship of Providence and probability that came to the fore in Macbeth and King 
John. In Macbeth, prophecy seems firm in the background as thinkers and actors move through 
probable narratives. The tendency to treat a unitary future is persistent, and it is easy to forget 
how many performances are contained in a single script. By following the lines, we often end up 
exactly where we expected a version of Providence to lead us. Different critics might define 
providence as historical progress, decay, or a juridico-political-epistemological era, depending 
on how one defines a critical method. But whatever the methods used, critics rarely acknowledge 
the element that contingency plays in all of these definitions. The narratives of the Subjunctive 
Aesthetic are not based on progress or decay, or in an institutional apparatus as De Certeau and 
Foucault might imagine. Instead, the indistinct and yet detectable haze brought by the 
subjunctive defines the perception of a relatively commonplace form of narrative in both the past 
and the present. The Subjunctive Aesthetic is not about ignoring the divisions between script and 
performance, abstraction and empirical reality, or jumping the gulf between back then and right 
now. What this method offers is an acknowledgement that probability defines our practice and 
our narrative interoperations. This multiplicity is often mundane, neither utopian nor dystopian 
or tending in any one direction in particular, but probability nonetheless haunts the material and 
immaterial narratives of performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 262 
Post-Script: Thinking Ahead 
 
 
 The Subjunctive Aesthetic offers adaptable readings, and I think my introduction and 
chapters point to other eras where the Aesthetic would be useful.341 Instead of seeking other eras 
with this post-script, however, I will make a refocused summary in order to re-ground the 
Aesthetic in early modern England. I have claimed that architecture and planning are connected, 
pervading the cultural production of image and narrative that acknowledges and works through a 
category of perception currently called probability. This form of narrative and image is pre-
normative, yet nonetheless deals with ideal categories and has impact on physical bodies. Visual 
artifacts and imagistic descriptions capture a form that finds its connected inverse in textual and 
narrative multiplicity. The provisional uncertainty of the various forms of planning and 
probability sifting that I have surveyed can be contrasted with the early modern rise of 
descriptive fixing of time and space such as Providence or the national borders on maps. Using 
the multiplicity and provisional umbra around planning I have not only critiqued ongoing 
criticism, but performed meaningful readings in various genres and texts. I would like to 
conclude now by continuing this trend. I offer two readings of image and narrative in the early 
modern period using the Subjunctive Aesthetic, one of a broad and familiar form of narrative and 
one of a specific poem. 
First, the familiar: One aspect I hope to develop in the future is the relation of the image-
narrative that I outline to queer desire and potentially queer subjects and subjectivity in early 
modern texts. I have tried to maintain non-heteronormative forms of desire by avoiding a fixed 
                                                 
341 Bryan Reynolds also emphasizes multiplicity and Subjunctive Space in his work on 
Transversal theory, as I suggested in the Introduction. One fertile area for Subjunctive studies is 
the Victorian era. See Lindstrom, Eric. Romantic Fiat (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
Miller, Andrew.  “Lives Unlead in Realist Fiction.”  Representations, Vol. 98, No. 1 (Spring 
2007). 
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analysis of exactly how planning might be erotic. In many places, especially in the utopian 
chapter, my readings touched on or incorporated how probable deliberation gives rise to 
pleasures that appear to queer genre and gender at the same time. The multiplicity of the forms of 
image-narrative I engage, however, frustrates my attempts to describe in specifics how plans can 
queer desire besides registering suppressed forms of desire as a possibility. That being said, I 
plan to develop what I have argued up to this point more fully, namely, that planning renders 
desire self-consciously shared between multiple authors and interpreters. Plans, even when kept 
secret, are representations, open to the contingency of others and the ranging probabilities within 
even the designer’s own mind. Plans, more so than many other forms of representation, attempt 
to directly represent a desire, whether communal or individual, in a way that makes them 
attainable and yet is always fraught with denial and failure. As I analyzed over and over, 
however, the act of planning often renders the achieved goal strange, lacking, or unknowable. 
Extensive planning renders even the achievement of a design somehow different than the simple 
attainment of a desire. Working through a plot makes what appears to be straight somehow hazy. 
In this difficulty of specific description, however, I find the potential for exciting 
readings that again emphasize non-normative potentials. In particular, the ancient and well-
critiqued bed trick is a point where I will continue my analysis. The bed trick is the swap of one 
sexual partner for another when a rendezvous is planned or expected. And though it is called a 
trick, Julia Briggs survey of the bed-trick defines the trick as a plot device.342 I note that the bed 
trick could easily be called a plan, design, or plot in itself. Though the technique is widely used 
and well discussed, the bed plot remains strange. How can one accidentally have sex with the 
wrong partner just because it’s the right place at the right time? My initial response, based on my 
                                                 
342 For a summary of Shakespearean bed tricks and a history of the plot-device see Briggs, Julia. 
“Shakespeare’s Bed Tricks.” Essays in Criticism. (1994) XLIV (4).  
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research, is that a bed plot defines a wide form of desire because it is a plot. A plot, in its 
narrative and image, necessarily incorporates probability, gathering options that appear to be 
clear to the observer insensitive to probability. By limiting the place and time, the likely and the 
unlikely come to the fore of perception. In the right bed at the right moment, suppressed desires 
have a chance to come to the fore. Strange and unexpected sexual dalliances, such as the 
complicated multiple bed tricks featuring the disguised Pyrocles-as-Amazon in Sidney’s 
Arcadia, give space to recognizably queer or homoerotic narrative strands.  
In the case of the Arcadia, a husband and wife are both in love with the disguised 
Amazon, with the wife supposedly seeing through his appearance. Pyrocles tricks the two into 
seeking a dark cave where they find each other while expecting him, and despite the seeming 
resolution, the possibility for homoeroticism persists in both design and outcome. If the wife sees 
through the disguise, why not the husband? Or perhaps the cross-dressing is what makes 
Pyrocles appeal to the wife in the first place. In this bed trick, and in others, there may be a point 
where queer theory and life meet, as bed plots do not just contain the potential for swapped 
partners of the appropriate gender, but swapped partners of indeterminate gender. Often in early 
modern criticism, queer theory and lived reality are considered worlds apart. Conflicts between 
abstract ideas about subverted narrative and the painful reality of oppression seem irresolvable. 
But plans are the means by which theoretical concerns and practical application are bridged. 
Bodies can be changed and unlikely desire can become potentially practical. By further defining 
the way designs contain homoerotic, transexual, or other queer forms of desire in bed plots, I will 
be able to better define how theory and practice meet in the way individuals read, speak, and 
write.  
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I would like to conclude by suggesting another specific text that would help illuminate 
the Subjunctive Aesthetic, and the connecting of text and image. George Herbert’s concrete 
poetry in The Temple constructs images of a church using words, providing a poetic version of 
architectural image-narratives. In particular, his poem, “The Altar,” is a striking piece of imagery 
and poetry that gives a new energy to the next analytic step: 
 
A broken ALTAR, Lord thy servant rears, 
Made of a heart, and cemented with teares: 
Whose parts are as thy hand did frame; 
No workmans tool hath touch'd the same 
A HEART alone 
Is such a stone, 
As nothing but 
Thy pow'r doth cut. 
Wherefore each part 
Of my hard heart 
Meets in this frame, 
To praise thy Name: 
That if I chance to hold my peace, 
These stones to praise thee may not cease. 
O let thy blessed SACRIFICE be mine, 
And sanctifie this ALTAR to be thine.343 
 
The poem is in the shape of what it describes, adding an element of image to lyricism. Yet this 
placement also makes me keenly aware of the effort in shifting each word in a specific spot to 
achieve this effect. Poetry already suggests careful placement of words, but this is beyond the 
attentiveness of a non-concrete poem. I cannot help looking at the gaps between the words of 
“The Altar,” viewing the altar as a broken one and transforming it back again to a whole one. 
The shape of the poem, like its narrative, is both whole and split, a constellation that makes me 
aware of all the other ways the poem might have been. The shape, one most also note, appears as 
                                                 
343 Herbert, George. The Temple (Cambridge: Printed by Thom. Buck, and Roger Daniel, printers 
to the Universitie, 1633). 
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the letter I. The poem, in both form and content, is about constructing a self upon the potential 
wreckage of one’s self, about writing a narrative by making a lyric image. It is about the painful, 
pleasurable, and anachronistic process of forming subjectivity. The poem is a plan for how to 
achieve lyricism and holiness, but does so by embracing the potential failure of its design. It 
describes joy and agony in the same figure, a whole altar that is also a cracked altar. On the 
shape and story of Herbert’s multiplicitous altar, I find an appropriate end point for the 
Subjunctive Aesthetic. Looking ahead to what might be next, I see other ways my analysis might 
have been presented. I also see a completed text written within the range of design. If this 
dissertation is a construction then my consideration of the next steps makes feel the way that 
probability shaped and continues to shape my conception of what is complete and incomplete, 
what is concrete and what I’ve imagined. I look over a great mass of things in the figures of old 
plans, the shifting umbra of the shape of things to come. 
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